11 Florida opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Minotty v. Baudogreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., Minotty v. Baudo, 42 So. 3d 824, 836 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying “the late-filed motion to amend” where the plaintiffs sought to assert a claim for punitive damages on their breach of fiduciary duty and fraud claims “on 8 the eve of trial,” and noting that “the plaintiffs could have brought the motion as to those claims much earlier”). | 1 | 1 |
Broadfoot v. Broadfootgreen1 sentence2018Broadfoot v. Broadfoot, 791 So. 2d 584, 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). 2 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. 3 | 1 | 1 |
Virginia Abbott, Former Wife v. Todd Abbott, Former Husbandgreen1 sentence2017Staton v. Staton, 710 So.2d 744, 745-46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see Abbott v. Abbott, 187 So.3d 326, 329 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (reversing final judgment of dissolution of marriage where “the trial court failed to make any findings of fact with regard to the Former Wife’s need for alimony and the Former Husband’s ability to pay, the parties’ incomes and expenses, and the factors listed in section 61.08 (2) (a)-(j)”). | 1 | 1 |
Stoutamire v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Staton v. Staton, 710 So.2d 744, 745-46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see Abbott v. Abbott, 187 So.3d 326, 329 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (reversing final judgment of dissolution of marriage where “the trial court failed to make any findings of fact with regard to the Former Wife’s need for alimony and the Former Husband’s ability to pay, the parties’ incomes and expenses, and the factors listed in section 61.08 (2) (a)-(j)”). | 1 | 1 |
Jessee v. Jesseegreen1 sentence2011“Where the circumstances show no necessity nor legal justification, a distribution of marital property that creates such an inequitable impact constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting Jessee v. Jessee, 839 So.2d 842, 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)). | 1 | 1 |
Ryan v. Ryangreen1 sentence2011See, e.g., Ryan, 927 So.2d at 112 . | 1 | 1 |
Canakaris v. Canakarisgreen1 sentence1991Since any dissolution judgment must be viewed as a whole, Canakaris , at 1202, we recognize that the trial judge may find it necessary to revisit the manner in which the marital assets have been distributed. | 1 | 1 |
O'Neal v. O'Nealgreen1 sentence1988O'Neal v. O'Neal, 410 So.2d 1369, 1371 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Clarkgreen1 sentence1987The arrangement and content of these provisions with an obvious distinction between the division of capital assets and the alimony clause now before us, see Clark v. Clark, 79 So.2d 426, 429 (Fla. 1955) provides a strong indication that the latter was not given in partial exchange for the wife's rights; she had separately received that consideration in paragraph B. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rosario v. Rosario
green
1 sentence2011“Where the circumstances show no necessity nor legal justification, a distribution of marital property that creates such an inequitable impact constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting Jessee v. Jessee, 839 So.2d 842, 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Jantzen v. Cotner
green
1 sentence1989The court also found it significant that the payments at issue were treated as tax deductible by the husband, consistent with the tax treatment ordinarily given support payments. 513 So.2d at 684 , fn. 1 and 2. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Duttenhofer v. Duttenhofer
green
1 sentence1987Duttenhofer, 474 So.2d at 253 n. 3. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Sponholtz v. Sponholtz
green
1 sentence1985Mrs. Sponholtz’ second point, based on a claimed entitlement to an increase in alimony, is not reviewable for the following reasons: (1) no orders were entered in accordance with the mandate after the Florida Supreme Court, in Sponholtz v. Sponholtz, 190 So.2d 572 (Fla.1966), reversed an award to Mrs. Sponholtz of a family-owned corporation but remanded for reconsideration of the alimony award; (2) an appeal to this court from an order denying Mrs. Sponholtz’ petition to modify alimony was voluntarily dismissed; and (3) no appeal was taken from a prior order granting the estate’s petition for | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Salomon v. National Car Rental System, Inc.
green
1 sentence1985On the only reviewable point, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the testimony of the estate’s expert witness where the wife did not object to the qualifications of the expert, see Salomon v. National Car Rental System, Inc., 247 So.2d 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971), or offer testimony to contradict the expert’s opinion as to the present value of her claim. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Williamson v. Williamson
green
1 sentence1979As the court said in Williamson, supra, at 367 So.2d 1018 : ... it would be manifestly unfair for one spouse to be allowed to defend against an alimony claim by charging the other spouse with adultery when the spouse not seeking alimony may be equally guilty of the same misconduct. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.