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14 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Childress v. Yadkin Countygreen2 sentences2015See Childress v. Yadkin Cty., 186 N.C.App. 30 , 43, 650 S.E.2d 55 , 64 (2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). ("[F]indings and conclusions made in the grant of an injunction are not authoritative as the law of the case for any other purpose[.]") Indeed, our Supreme Court has explained the "relevant rules" regarding Preliminary Injunctions: 1. 2015See Childress v. Yadkin Cty., 186 N.C.App. 30 , 43, 650 S.E.2d 55 , 64 (2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). ("[F]indings and conclusions made in the grant of an injunction are not authoritative as the law of the case for any other purpose[.]") Indeed, our Supreme Court has explained the "relevant rules" regarding Preliminary Injunctions: 1. | 1 | 1 |
Nunn v. Allengreen1 sentence2013See Nunn v. Allen, 154 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Rowe v. Rowegreen2 sentences2002See Rowe, 305 N.C. at 187 , 287 S.E.2d at 846 . 2002See Rowe, 305 N.C. at 187 , 287 S.E.2d at 846 . | 1 | 1 |
Stegall v. Stegallgreen2 sentences1999Stegall v. Stegall, 336 N.C. 473, 479 , 444 S.E.2d 177, 181 (1994) (“if alimony . . . claim[] [is] properly asserted . . . and [is] not voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) until after judgment of absolute divorce is entered, a new action based on th[at] claim[] may be filed within the one-year period”); cf. Lafferty v. Lafferty, 125 N.C. 1999Stegall v. Stegall, 336 N.C. 473, 479 , 444 S.E.2d 177, 181 (1994) (“if alimony . . . claim[] [is] properly asserted . . . and [is] not voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) until after judgment of absolute divorce is entered, a new action based on th[at] claim[] may be filed within the one-year period”); cf. Lafferty v. Lafferty, 125 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Flynt Ex Rel. Barefoot v. Flyntgreen2 sentences1999Further, the determinations set forth in an APL order “form[ed] no part of the ultimate relief sought, [and] d[id] not affect the final rights of the parties.” Peele v. Peele, 216 N.C. 298, 300 , 4 S.E.2d 616, 618 (1939); see also Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 231 N.C. 600, 601 , 58 S.E.2d 360, 360 (1950) (facts found at APL hearing “not binding on the parties nor receivable in evidence on the trial of the issues”), Flynt v. Flynt, 237 N.C. 754, 757 , 75 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1953) (ruling at APL hearing had “no bearing whatever on the merits” of permanent alimony claim “for the very simple reason that [ 1999Further, the determinations set forth in an APL order “form[ed] no part of the ultimate relief sought, [and] d[id] not affect the final rights of the parties.” Peele v. Peele, 216 N.C. 298, 300 , 4 S.E.2d 616, 618 (1939); see also Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 231 N.C. 600, 601 , 58 S.E.2d 360, 360 (1950) (facts found at APL hearing “not binding on the parties nor receivable in evidence on the trial of the issues”), Flynt v. Flynt, 237 N.C. 754, 757 , 75 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1953) (ruling at APL hearing had “no bearing whatever on the merits” of permanent alimony claim “for the very simple reason that [ | 1 | 1 |
Bumgarner v. Bumgarnergreen2 sentences1999Further, the determinations set forth in an APL order “form[ed] no part of the ultimate relief sought, [and] d[id] not affect the final rights of the parties.” Peele v. Peele, 216 N.C. 298, 300 , 4 S.E.2d 616, 618 (1939); see also Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 231 N.C. 600, 601 , 58 S.E.2d 360, 360 (1950) (facts found at APL hearing “not binding on the parties nor receivable in evidence on the trial of the issues”), Flynt v. Flynt, 237 N.C. 754, 757 , 75 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1953) (ruling at APL hearing had “no bearing whatever on the merits” of permanent alimony claim “for the very simple reason that [ 1999Further, the determinations set forth in an APL order “form[ed] no part of the ultimate relief sought, [and] d[id] not affect the final rights of the parties.” Peele v. Peele, 216 N.C. 298, 300 , 4 S.E.2d 616, 618 (1939); see also Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 231 N.C. 600, 601 , 58 S.E.2d 360, 360 (1950) (facts found at APL hearing “not binding on the parties nor receivable in evidence on the trial of the issues”), Flynt v. Flynt, 237 N.C. 754, 757 , 75 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1953) (ruling at APL hearing had “no bearing whatever on the merits” of permanent alimony claim “for the very simple reason that [ | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Harrisgreen2 sentences1999Further, the determinations set forth in an APL order “form[ed] no part of the ultimate relief sought, [and] d[id] not affect the final rights of the parties.” Peele v. Peele, 216 N.C. 298, 300 , 4 S.E.2d 616, 618 (1939); see also Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 231 N.C. 600, 601 , 58 S.E.2d 360, 360 (1950) (facts found at APL hearing “not binding on the parties nor receivable in evidence on the trial of the issues”), Flynt v. Flynt, 237 N.C. 754, 757 , 75 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1953) (ruling at APL hearing had “no bearing whatever on the merits” of permanent alimony claim “for the very simple reason that [ 1999Further, the determinations set forth in an APL order “form[ed] no part of the ultimate relief sought, [and] d[id] not affect the final rights of the parties.” Peele v. Peele, 216 N.C. 298, 300 , 4 S.E.2d 616, 618 (1939); see also Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 231 N.C. 600, 601 , 58 S.E.2d 360, 360 (1950) (facts found at APL hearing “not binding on the parties nor receivable in evidence on the trial of the issues”), Flynt v. Flynt, 237 N.C. 754, 757 , 75 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1953) (ruling at APL hearing had “no bearing whatever on the merits” of permanent alimony claim “for the very simple reason that [ | 1 | 1 |
Peele v. . Peelegreen2 sentences1999Further, the determinations set forth in an APL order “form[ed] no part of the ultimate relief sought, [and] d[id] not affect the final rights of the parties.” Peele v. Peele, 216 N.C. 298, 300 , 4 S.E.2d 616, 618 (1939); see also Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 231 N.C. 600, 601 , 58 S.E.2d 360, 360 (1950) (facts found at APL hearing “not binding on the parties nor receivable in evidence on the trial of the issues”), Flynt v. Flynt, 237 N.C. 754, 757 , 75 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1953) (ruling at APL hearing had “no bearing whatever on the merits” of permanent alimony claim “for the very simple reason that [ 1999Further, the determinations set forth in an APL order “form[ed] no part of the ultimate relief sought, [and] d[id] not affect the final rights of the parties.” Peele v. Peele, 216 N.C. 298, 300 , 4 S.E.2d 616, 618 (1939); see also Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 231 N.C. 600, 601 , 58 S.E.2d 360, 360 (1950) (facts found at APL hearing “not binding on the parties nor receivable in evidence on the trial of the issues”), Flynt v. Flynt, 237 N.C. 754, 757 , 75 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1953) (ruling at APL hearing had “no bearing whatever on the merits” of permanent alimony claim “for the very simple reason that [ | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Hallgreen2 sentences1999Further, the determinations set forth in an APL order “form[ed] no part of the ultimate relief sought, [and] d[id] not affect the final rights of the parties.” Peele v. Peele, 216 N.C. 298, 300 , 4 S.E.2d 616, 618 (1939); see also Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 231 N.C. 600, 601 , 58 S.E.2d 360, 360 (1950) (facts found at APL hearing “not binding on the parties nor receivable in evidence on the trial of the issues”), Flynt v. Flynt, 237 N.C. 754, 757 , 75 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1953) (ruling at APL hearing had “no bearing whatever on the merits” of permanent alimony claim “for the very simple reason that [ 1999Further, the determinations set forth in an APL order “form[ed] no part of the ultimate relief sought, [and] d[id] not affect the final rights of the parties.” Peele v. Peele, 216 N.C. 298, 300 , 4 S.E.2d 616, 618 (1939); see also Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 231 N.C. 600, 601 , 58 S.E.2d 360, 360 (1950) (facts found at APL hearing “not binding on the parties nor receivable in evidence on the trial of the issues”), Flynt v. Flynt, 237 N.C. 754, 757 , 75 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1953) (ruling at APL hearing had “no bearing whatever on the merits” of permanent alimony claim “for the very simple reason that [ | 1 | 1 |
Lindh v. Murphygreen2 sentences1999While the “procedural remedy” of an alimony claim previously existed, “the substantive rights of the parties are different.” Smith, 276 N.C. at 333 , 172 S.E.2d at 492 ; see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 , 138 L. 1999While the “procedural remedy” of an alimony claim previously existed, “the substantive rights of the parties are different.” Smith, 276 N.C. at 333 , 172 S.E.2d at 492 ; see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 , 138 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Banner v. Banner
green
2 sentences2004Banner v. Banner, 86 N.C. 1994Id. | 2 | 1994–2004 |
Williamson v. Williamson
green
2 sentences2017In Williamson v. Williamson , the trial court permitted evidence of cohabitation at an initial alimony hearing *482 and then ruled that "plaintiff was not *474 obligated for alimony or postseparation support payments from the time defendant's cohabitation began." 142 N.C.App. 702 , 703, 543 S.E.2d 897 , 897 (2001). 2017In Williamson v. Williamson , the trial court permitted evidence of cohabitation at an initial alimony hearing *482 and then ruled that "plaintiff was not *474 obligated for alimony or postseparation support payments from the time defendant's cohabitation began." 142 N.C.App. 702 , 703, 543 S.E.2d 897 , 897 (2001). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Coleman v. Coleman
green
1 sentence2014It is for the trial court, not plaintiff’s attorney, to decide the reasonableness of the fees and the trial court must make a specific finding that the attorney’s fees were reasonable “in comparison with that of other lawyers.” Coleman v. Coleman, 74 N.C. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Manning v. Manning
green
1 sentence2011Manning, 20 N.C. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Loflin v. Loflin
green
1 sentence2011We reject Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff had the burden of presenting evidence of his income because “[t]he burden of proving dependency is upon the spouse asserting the claim for alimony[.]” Loflin v. Loflin, 25 N.C. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Walters v. Walters
green
2 sentences2009Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381 , 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983). 2009Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381 , 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Pharr v. Beck
red
2 sentences2005Accordingly, this Court concluded “an alienation of affection[s] claim must be based on pre-separation conduct, and post-separation conduct is admissible only to the extent it corroborates pre-separation activities resulting in the alienation of affectionfs].” Pharr, 147 N.C. 2005Accordingly, this Court concluded "an alienation of affection[s] claim must be based on pre-separation conduct, and post-separation conduct is admissible only to the extent it corroborates pre-separation activities resulting in the alienation of affection[s]." Pharr, 147 N.C.App. at 273 , 554 S.E.2d at 855 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Unisys Corp. v. Ceska Sporitelna, A. S.
green
2 sentences1999Ed. 2d 481, 489 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1069 , 139 L. 1999Ed. 2d 481, 489 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1069 , 139 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Lafferty v. Lafferty
neutral
1 sentence1999Stegall v. Stegall, 336 N.C. 473, 479 , 444 S.E.2d 177, 181 (1994) (“if alimony . . . claim[] [is] properly asserted . . . and [is] not voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) until after judgment of absolute divorce is entered, a new action based on th[at] claim[] may be filed within the one-year period”); cf. Lafferty v. Lafferty, 125 N.C. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Smith v. Mercer
green
2 sentences1999While the “procedural remedy” of an alimony claim previously existed, “the substantive rights of the parties are different.” Smith, 276 N.C. at 333 , 172 S.E.2d at 492 ; see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 , 138 L. 1999While the “procedural remedy” of an alimony claim previously existed, “the substantive rights of the parties are different.” Smith, 276 N.C. at 333 , 172 S.E.2d at 492 ; see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 , 138 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Williams v. Williams
green
2 sentences1995In the fifteen years since the Supreme Court in Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174 , 261 S.E.2d 849 (1979), parenthetically indicated that “child custody” may be an “other condition” that the trial court may consider at the time of hearing on an alimony claim, no court in this state has ever interpreted that to mean “child support expenses.” Today, the majority takes that novel step and in doing so inextricably intertwines the determination of alimony dependency with the determination of child support. 1995In the fifteen years since the Supreme Court in Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174 , 261 S.E.2d 849 (1979), parenthetically indicated that “child custody” may be an “other condition” that the trial court may consider at the time of hearing on an alimony claim, no court in this state has ever interpreted that to mean “child support expenses.” Today, the majority takes that novel step and in doing so inextricably intertwines the determination of alimony dependency with the determination of child support. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.