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11 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1933–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islandsgreen2 sentences2002If the claimant, as a result of such municipal conduct, in good faith fails to act, or acts thereon to his disadvantage, then an estoppel against the requirement of notice may be said to arise. *1103 Id. at 12-13 (emphasis supplied). 2002Valid grounds, such as estoppel or fraud, may exist that would and should excuse untimely claims.”); Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 178 So.2d 9, 13 (Fla.1965) (“If the claimant, as a result of such municipal conduct, in good faith fails to act, or acts thereon to his disadvantage, then an estoppel against the requirement of the notice may be said to arise.”). . | 3 | 6 |
Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Cartergreen2 sentences2002Valid grounds, such as estoppel or fraud, may exist that would and should excuse untimely claims."); Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 178 So.2d 9, 13 (Fla.1965)" ("If the claimant, as a result of such municipal conduct, in good faith fails to act, or acts thereon to his disadvantage, then an estoppel against the requirement of the notice may be said to arise."). [11] See, e.g., Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560, 563 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1995) ("It is well settled ... as a general rule... that fraud or misrepresentation which misleads a claimant into a justified failure to 2002See, e.g., Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560, 563 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1995) ("It is well settled ... as a general rule ... that fraud or misrepresentation which misleads a claimant into a justified failure to assert his rights bars reliance on a statute of limitations.”); Alachua County v. Cheshire, 603 So.2d 1334, 1337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ("A party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense to an admittedly untimely action where his conduct has induced another into forbearing suit within the applicable limitations period.”); Jaszay v. H.B. | 3 | 3 |
Alachua County v. Cheshiregreen2 sentences2002Valid grounds, such as estoppel or fraud, may exist that would and should excuse untimely claims."); Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 178 So.2d 9, 13 (Fla.1965)" ("If the claimant, as a result of such municipal conduct, in good faith fails to act, or acts thereon to his disadvantage, then an estoppel against the requirement of the notice may be said to arise."). [11] See, e.g., Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560, 563 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1995) ("It is well settled ... as a general rule... that fraud or misrepresentation which misleads a claimant into a justified failure to 2002See, e.g., Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560, 563 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1995) ("It is well settled ... as a general rule ... that fraud or misrepresentation which misleads a claimant into a justified failure to assert his rights bars reliance on a statute of limitations.”); Alachua County v. Cheshire, 603 So.2d 1334, 1337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ("A party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense to an admittedly untimely action where his conduct has induced another into forbearing suit within the applicable limitations period.”); Jaszay v. H.B. | 3 | 3 |
Meyers v. American Oil Co.green2 sentences2015Where it appears to have been the object of the covenant to assure to the grantee the full and absolute enjoyment of the property without any right of the grantor to divest or interfere with the possession at any time thereafter, the deed operates as an estoppel against the claim of the grantor to a subsequently acquired estate, whether a present right passes or not.”); Meyers v. American Oil Co., 192 Miss. 180 , 5 So.2d 218, 220 (1941) (“To suggest that a grantor who conveys property without title thereto may afterwards maneuver himself, or those in privity with him, into a more advantageous 2015Where it appears to have been the object of the covenant to assure to the grantee the full and absolute enjoyment of the property without any right of the grantor to divest or interfere with the possession at any time thereafter, the deed operates as an estoppel against the claim of the grantor to a subsequently acquired estate, whether a present right passes or not.”); Meyers v. American Oil Co., 192 Miss. 180 , 5 So.2d 218, 220 (1941) (“To suggest that a grantor who conveys property without title thereto may afterwards maneuver himself, or those in privity with him, into a more advantageous | 1 | 1 |
Jaszay v. HB CORPORATIONgreen1 sentence2002Corp., 598 So.2d 112, 113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) ("The appellee is estopped from asserting the limitations defense because it stipulated to a sixty-day extension of the pre-suit screening period...."); Glantzis v. State Auto. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ashleygreen1 sentence2001Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164 , 192 So. 637 (1939); Coogler v. Rogers, 25 Fla. 853 , 7 So. 391 (1889); Collins v. Mitchell, 5 Fla. 364 (1853); Camp v. Moseley, 2 Fla. 171 (1848). [14] § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). [15] See State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 341 (Fla.1997). [16] See also Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So.2d 1184, 1187 (Fla.1992) ("[A]mbiguity [in a statute of limitations], if there is any, should be construed in favor of the plaintiffs."). [17] See Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25, 36 (Fla.1976). [18] See Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, | 1 | 1 |
Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc.green1 sentence2001Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164 , 192 So. 637 (1939); Coogler v. Rogers, 25 Fla. 853 , 7 So. 391 (1889); Collins v. Mitchell, 5 Fla. 364 (1853); Camp v. Moseley, 2 Fla. 171 (1848). [14] § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). [15] See State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 341 (Fla.1997). [16] See also Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So.2d 1184, 1187 (Fla.1992) ("[A]mbiguity [in a statute of limitations], if there is any, should be construed in favor of the plaintiffs."). [17] See Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25, 36 (Fla.1976). [18] See Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, | 1 | 1 |
Barnett Bank v. Estate of Readgreen1 sentence2001Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164 , 192 So. 637 (1939); Coogler v. Rogers, 25 Fla. 853 , 7 So. 391 (1889); Collins v. Mitchell, 5 Fla. 364 (1853); Camp v. Moseley, 2 Fla. 171 (1848). [14] § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). [15] See State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 341 (Fla.1997). [16] See also Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So.2d 1184, 1187 (Fla.1992) ("[A]mbiguity [in a statute of limitations], if there is any, should be construed in favor of the plaintiffs."). [17] See Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25, 36 (Fla.1976). [18] See Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, | 1 | 1 |
Nardone v. Reynoldsred1 sentence2001Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164 , 192 So. 637 (1939); Coogler v. Rogers, 25 Fla. 853 , 7 So. 391 (1889); Collins v. Mitchell, 5 Fla. 364 (1853); Camp v. Moseley, 2 Fla. 171 (1848). [14] § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). [15] See State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 341 (Fla.1997). [16] See also Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So.2d 1184, 1187 (Fla.1992) ("[A]mbiguity [in a statute of limitations], if there is any, should be construed in favor of the plaintiffs."). [17] See Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25, 36 (Fla.1976). [18] See Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Moralis v. Matheson
green
2 sentences2015Where it appears to have been the object of the covenant to assure to the grantee the full and absolute enjoyment of the property without any right of the grantor to divest or interfere with the possession at any time thereafter, the deed operates as an estoppel against the claim of the grantor to a subsequently acquired estate, whether a present right passes or not.”); Meyers v. American Oil Co., 192 Miss. 180 , 5 So.2d 218, 220 (1941) (“To suggest that a grantor who conveys property without title thereto may afterwards maneuver himself, or those in privity with him, into a more advantageous 2015Where it appears to have been the object of the covenant to assure to the grantee the full and absolute enjoyment of the property without any right of the grantor to divest or interfere with the possession at any time thereafter, the deed operates as an estoppel against the claim of the grantor to a subsequently acquired estate, whether a present right passes or not.”); Meyers v. American Oil Co., 192 Miss. 180 , 5 So.2d 218, 220 (1941) (“To suggest that a grantor who conveys property without title thereto may afterwards maneuver himself, or those in privity with him, into a more advantageous | 1 | 2015–2015 |
New York Liff Insurance Co. v. Oates, Et Ux.
green
2 sentences2001Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164 , 192 So. 637 (1939); Coogler v. Rogers, 25 Fla. 853 , 7 So. 391 (1889); Collins v. Mitchell, 5 Fla. 364 (1853); Camp v. Moseley, 2 Fla. 171 (1848). [14] § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). [15] See State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 341 (Fla.1997). [16] See also Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So.2d 1184, 1187 (Fla.1992) ("[A]mbiguity [in a statute of limitations], if there is any, should be construed in favor of the plaintiffs."). [17] See Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25, 36 (Fla.1976). [18] See Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 2001Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164 , 192 So. 637 (1939); Coogler v. Rogers, 25 Fla. 853 , 7 So. 391 (1889); Collins v. Mitchell, 5 Fla. 364 (1853); Camp v. Moseley, 2 Fla. 171 (1848). [14] § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). [15] See State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 341 (Fla.1997). [16] See also Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So.2d 1184, 1187 (Fla.1992) ("[A]mbiguity [in a statute of limitations], if there is any, should be construed in favor of the plaintiffs."). [17] See Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25, 36 (Fla.1976). [18] See Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Camp v. Moseley
green
1 sentence2001Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164 , 192 So. 637 (1939); Coogler v. Rogers, 25 Fla. 853 , 7 So. 391 (1889); Collins v. Mitchell, 5 Fla. 364 (1853); Camp v. Moseley, 2 Fla. 171 (1848). [14] § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). [15] See State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 341 (Fla.1997). [16] See also Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So.2d 1184, 1187 (Fla.1992) ("[A]mbiguity [in a statute of limitations], if there is any, should be construed in favor of the plaintiffs."). [17] See Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25, 36 (Fla.1976). [18] See Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Collins v. Mitchell
green
1 sentence2001Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164 , 192 So. 637 (1939); Coogler v. Rogers, 25 Fla. 853 , 7 So. 391 (1889); Collins v. Mitchell, 5 Fla. 364 (1853); Camp v. Moseley, 2 Fla. 171 (1848). [14] § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). [15] See State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 341 (Fla.1997). [16] See also Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So.2d 1184, 1187 (Fla.1992) ("[A]mbiguity [in a statute of limitations], if there is any, should be construed in favor of the plaintiffs."). [17] See Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25, 36 (Fla.1976). [18] See Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Coogler v. Rogers
green
1 sentence2001Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164 , 192 So. 637 (1939); Coogler v. Rogers, 25 Fla. 853 , 7 So. 391 (1889); Collins v. Mitchell, 5 Fla. 364 (1853); Camp v. Moseley, 2 Fla. 171 (1848). [14] § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). [15] See State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 341 (Fla.1997). [16] See also Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So.2d 1184, 1187 (Fla.1992) ("[A]mbiguity [in a statute of limitations], if there is any, should be construed in favor of the plaintiffs."). [17] See Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25, 36 (Fla.1976). [18] See Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Odom v. Deltona Corp.
green
1 sentence1982It is to be observed that governmental conveyances were made in reliance on them and the grantees of such conveyances had the right to assume the U. S. Government and the Trustees were acting lawfully. 341 So.2d at 984 . (f) In applying the doctrine of estoppel against the State in a virtually identical title dispute over submerged lands, Judge Stephenson of this Court held last year: [T]he Trustees are legally estopped to rebut the presumption of non-navigability after the government survey has stood unimpeached for so many years. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Texas Co. v. Town of Miami Springs
green
1 sentence1968The judgment of the trial court is sustained under the holdings in the following cases: Texas Co. v. Town of Miami Springs, Fla. 1950, 44 So.2d 808 ; Bregar v. Britton, Fla. 1954, 75 So.2d 753 ; Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, Fla. 1963, 151 So.2d 433 ; City of Gainesville v. Bishop, Fla.App. 1965, 174 So.2d 100 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
City of Gainesville v. Bishop
neutral
1 sentence1968The judgment of the trial court is sustained under the holdings in the following cases: Texas Co. v. Town of Miami Springs, Fla. 1950, 44 So.2d 808 ; Bregar v. Britton, Fla. 1954, 75 So.2d 753 ; Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, Fla. 1963, 151 So.2d 433 ; City of Gainesville v. Bishop, Fla.App. 1965, 174 So.2d 100 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables
green
1 sentence1968The judgment of the trial court is sustained under the holdings in the following cases: Texas Co. v. Town of Miami Springs, Fla. 1950, 44 So.2d 808 ; Bregar v. Britton, Fla. 1954, 75 So.2d 753 ; Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, Fla. 1963, 151 So.2d 433 ; City of Gainesville v. Bishop, Fla.App. 1965, 174 So.2d 100 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Bregar v. Britton
green
1 sentence1968The judgment of the trial court is sustained under the holdings in the following cases: Texas Co. v. Town of Miami Springs, Fla. 1950, 44 So.2d 808 ; Bregar v. Britton, Fla. 1954, 75 So.2d 753 ; Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, Fla. 1963, 151 So.2d 433 ; City of Gainesville v. Bishop, Fla.App. 1965, 174 So.2d 100 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Finneran v. City of Lake Worth
neutral
1 sentence1965In Finneran v. City of Lake Worth, Fla.App., 152 So.2d 501 , the City was held to have waived and also to have suffered an estoppel against a requirement that the notice be authenticated by oath. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Chesser v. DePrater
neutral
1 sentence1933The principle was discussed by this Court in Cheeser and Cone v. Deprater, 20 Fla. 691 . | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.