information charging violation in Florida

2005In State v. Bales, 343 So.2d 9 (Fla.1977), our supreme court held that the denial of a motion to dismiss a lewdness count entered under section 796.07 of the Florida Statutes was not erroneous, even though the only persons present at the time of the alleged act were the defendant and the undercover police officer.

2005In State v. Davis, 623 So.2d 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), the fourth district reversed the county court's dismissal of an information charging a violation of section 796.07 of the Florida Statutes even though no one was present at the time of the alleged act other than the defendant and the undercover detective.

1990Keaton, 371 So.2d at 89 ; Brown, 358 So.2d at 20 (citing art.

1990Keaton, 371 So.2d at 89 ; Brown, 358 So.2d at 20 (citing art.

1985We recently held in State v. Graham, 468 So.2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), that false imprisonment is a crime requiring only general intent and that there is no necessity to assert a specific purpose or intent in an information charging a violation of section 787.02.

1984In State v. McNeill, 407 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), the court examined the sufficiency of an Information charging a violation of the same statute as the one allegedly violated here.

1980Conflict has been demonstrated with Gordon v. State, 145 So.2d 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), which holds that an information charging a violation of section 805.01, Florida Statutes (1973), must specifically allege an intent to secretly confine.

1978Miller v. Patterson, supra, held that an information charging a violation of F.S. 316.027 but which did not recite the *131 word "willfully" charged a misdemeanor, saying: "A person not charged with willfully failing to stop under these circumstances can only be convicted of a misdemeanor." In Holmes v. State, supra, this court considered a related problem, viz: Whether a person convicted of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury without willful intent, held to have been a misdemeanor by virtue of the cases hereinabove mentioned, could be punished therefor.

1976I would distinguish Phillips v. State, Fla.App.1975, 4 DCA, 314 So.2d 619 , on the basis that the defendant there was arrested upon a charge of breaching the peace in violation of § 877.03 F.S. 1973.

1975Reasonable doubts concerning the construction of this rule shall be resolved in favor of the defendant.” The defendant pointed out to the court that additional authority for an order authorizing a statement of particulars appears in Florida Statute 811.021 (5) which in essence states that allegations in an information charging a violation of Florida Statute 811.021 shall be generally sufficient if alleged in terms of the statute but does say in pertinent part — “This section shall not be construed as intending to interfere with the power of the court to require the state to furnish the defenda

1974The above rules are to be distinguished, however, from an information charging a violation "on or about " a named date; this has been expressly held by this Court to be sufficient in Sparks v. State, 273 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1973).

1959This cause having been considered on the petition for writ of habeas corpus,, the record of the conviction of the petitioner in the Circuit Court, and the return, of the respondent to the writ of habeas, corpus issued on June 2, 1959, and the Court finding that the petitioner is presently in custody of the respondent serving a sentence of four years imposed by the Circuit Court for Pinellas County consequent upon his conviction on an information charging a violation of the provisions of Section 562.451(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which statute has been held invalid by the Supreme Court in th

1953Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806 , 30 So.2d 304 .

1953Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806 , 30 So.2d 304 .