Nixon claim in Florida

2004Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033 (Fla.1999); see also Carroll v. State, 815 So.2d 601, 610 (Fla.2002); Porter v. State, 788 So.2d 917, 923 (Fla.2001).

2003See Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1034 (Fla.1999) (recognizing trial court's superior vantage point in assessing credibility of witnesses). [12] Chandler had not been tried or convicted for the alleged sexual battery.

2003To fully explore that issue, the Florida Supreme Court temporarily relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court in October of 1987 to "determine whether Nixon was informed of the strategy to concede guilt and seek leniency." Nixon v. State, 572 So.2d 1336, 1339 (Fla.1990).

2000I begin my analysis with reference to the facts as set forth in this Court's opinion in Nixon v. State, 572 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 1990): At trial, there was testimony that after church on August 12, 1984, Ms. Bickner went to a local mall to have lunch with friends.

2011We found Nixon’s claim without merit based in part on an earlier finding by the Court in Jones v. State, 966 So.2d 319, 326 (Fla.2007), that Florida’s definition of mental retardation is consistent with the APA’s diagnostic criteria for mental retardation.

2009See Harris v. State, 647 So.2d 206, 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“Conviction of a crime which did not take place is a fundamental error, which the appellate court should correct even when no timely objection or motion for acquittal was made below.”).

2006See, e.g., Mills v. State, 603 So.2d 482, 485 (Fla.1992) (finding no deficient performance where counsel had no reason to believe that mental mitigation could be developed). *1021 Thus, the record does not support Nixon's claim that trial counsel erred in failing to request a competency determination.

2004The present order is completely inadequate and does not assist us in our review." Ragsdale v. State, 798 So.2d 713, 720 (Fla.2001). [8] With the exception of Dillbeck's Cronic/Nixon claim — that counsel conceded his guilt without his consent — all of the claims Dillbeck has raised before this Court must be analyzed under the two — pronged test of Strickland . [9] Such claims present mixed questions of law and fact *973 and, therefore, require us to employ a mixed standard of review: we defer to the trial court's factual findings (to the extent they are supported by competent, substantial evide

2004Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033 (Fla.1999); see also Carroll v. State, 815 So.2d 601, 610 (Fla.2002); Porter v. State, 788 So.2d 917, 923 (Fla.2001).

2004Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033 (Fla.1999); see also Carroll v. State, 815 So.2d 601, 610 (Fla.2002); Porter v. State, 788 So.2d 917, 923 (Fla.2001).

2000See Davis v. State, 571 So.2d 118 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (holding that when the trial .court summarily denies motion for post-conviction relief without holding an eviden-tiary hearing or attaching portions of record to refute allegations, review is limited to determining whether, accepting allegations as true, the motion conclusively shows defendant is not entitled to relief).

2000See King v. State, 766 So.2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding that the defendant was entitled to evidentiary hearing on postconvietion relief claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to provide evidence for voluntary intoxication defense, although counsel had stated during pre-trial hearing that defendant was not intoxicated, as neither counsel’s statement nor defendant’s alleged presence during statement conclusively demonstrated that counsel competently considered intoxication defense and determined that witnesses’ testimony would not be helpful, that -witnesses were unavai

1992State v. Delva, 575 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1991); Morton v. State, 459 So.2d 322 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 467 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 1985).