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11 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Russell v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Russell v. State, 614 So.2d 605, 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (contrasting the statements allegedly made in connection with plea negotiations in United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.1978), 3 with “Russell’s only statement [which] was his offer not to go to trial in return for sentencing concessions .... [that] was plainly inadmissible under the Robertson analysis.”). 2012See Russell v. State, 614 So.2d 605, 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (contrasting the statements allegedly made in connection with plea negotiations in United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.1978), 3 with “Russell’s only statement [which] was his offer not to go to trial in return for sentencing concessions .... [that] was plainly inadmissible under the Robertson analysis.”). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Andrew Jackson Robertsongreen2 sentences2012See Russell v. State, 614 So.2d 605, 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (contrasting the statements allegedly made in connection with plea negotiations in United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.1978), 3 with “Russell’s only statement [which] was his offer not to go to trial in return for sentencing concessions .... [that] was plainly inadmissible under the Robertson analysis.”). 2012See Russell v. State, 614 So.2d 605, 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (contrasting the statements allegedly made in connection with plea negotiations in United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.1978), 3 with “Russell’s only statement [which] was his offer not to go to trial in return for sentencing concessions .... [that] was plainly inadmissible under the Robertson analysis.”). | 1 | 2 |
Griffin v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Griffin v. State, 979 So.2d 1253,1255 (Fla. 4th DCA), review granted, 987 So.2d 1210 (Fla.2008), review dismissed, 4 So.3d 1218 (Fla.2009) (holding that period for mitigating sentence under rule 3.800(c) began when defendant was resentenced following appellate reversal of order denying motion to correct illegal sentence). | 1 | 1 |
Manning v. McNeilgreen1 sentence2014See Griffin v. State, 979 So.2d 1253,1255 (Fla. 4th DCA), review granted, 987 So.2d 1210 (Fla.2008), review dismissed, 4 So.3d 1218 (Fla.2009) (holding that period for mitigating sentence under rule 3.800(c) began when defendant was resentenced following appellate reversal of order denying motion to correct illegal sentence). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Griffingreen1 sentence2014See Griffin v. State, 979 So.2d 1253,1255 (Fla. 4th DCA), review granted, 987 So.2d 1210 (Fla.2008), review dismissed, 4 So.3d 1218 (Fla.2009) (holding that period for mitigating sentence under rule 3.800(c) began when defendant was resentenced following appellate reversal of order denying motion to correct illegal sentence). | 1 | 1 |
Richardson v. Stategreen1 sentence2008The trial court must determine “first, whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused’s expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances.” Robertson, 582 F.2d at 1366 ; see also Richardson v. State, 706 So.2d 1349 (Fla.1998) (applying Robertson test and reversing and remanding for a new trial where confession was inadmissible because it was given to police officer during plea negotiations). | 1 | 1 |
Robertson v. Stategreen1 sentence2004The court ruled, therefore, that “Robertson did not open the door to evidence that he allegedly threatened his ex-wife six years before with an assault rifle by testifying inaccurately to material facts.” Robertson, 829 So.2d at 913. | 1 | 1 |
Geralds v. Stategreen1 sentence2002See Geralds, 674 So.2d at 99 . [10] Thus, Robertson did not open the door to evidence that he allegedly threatened his ex-wife six years before with an assault rifle by testifying inaccurately to material facts. | 1 | 1 |
Robertson v. Stategreen2 sentences2000See Robertson v. State, 604 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1992). 2000See Robertson v. State, 604 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1992). | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Stategreen2 sentences1998We find that Anderson's February statement meets the Robertson test and that the trial court erred in not suppressing that statement. 420 So.2d at 576-77 (footnotes omitted). 1998We find that Anderson's February statement meets the Robertson test and that the trial court erred in not suppressing that statement. 420 So.2d at 576-77 (footnotes omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stevens v. State
green
2 sentences2008Importantly, when adopting the two-tier Robertson test in Stevens , we explained that "[w]hether a defendant's subjective expectation of negotiating *321 a plea is reasonable depends on whether the state has indicated a willingness to plea-bargain and has in fact solicited the statement in question from the defendant. " Id. (emphasis added). 1993Utilizing the Robertson analysis, the Stevens court determined that although the polygraph examination was arranged so that appellant's version of the criminal episode could be substantiated, and although this was an agreed part of the negotiations, "appellant's spontaneous, unilateral statement was not connected to those negotiations in the sense contemplated by the rule of exclusion we are applying." 419 So.2d at 1062 . | 2 | 1993–2008 |
Hamblen v. State
green
1 sentence2016He argues that without any advocacy in favor of a life sentence, the result is a sentence of death imposed by default, which is not permitted under this Court’s decisions in Hamblen v. State, 527 So.2d 800 (Fla.1988), and Koon v. Dugger, 619 So.2d 246 (Fla.1993). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Koon v. Dugger
green
1 sentence2016He argues that without any advocacy in favor of a life sentence, the result is a sentence of death imposed by default, which is not permitted under this Court’s decisions in Hamblen v. State, 527 So.2d 800 (Fla.1988), and Koon v. Dugger, 619 So.2d 246 (Fla.1993). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Bottoson v. State
green
1 sentence2008Id. at 965 . [4] Given its extensive reliance on Russell v. State, 614 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), perhaps the majority is adopting the First District's conclusion that the plain meaning of the statute and rule should be applied when analyzing a defendant's unilateral offer to plead while the two-tier Robertson test should be applied when analyzing a statement made in connection with an offer. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Owen v. State
green
2 sentences2008Indeed, this Court most recently applied the Robertson test to determine whether a statement was made in connection with plea negotiations and was, therefore, inadmissible under section 90.410 and rule 3.172(i) in Owen v. State, 986 So.2d 534 (Fla.2008). 2008Indeed, this Court most recently applied the Robertson test to determine whether a statement was made in connection with plea negotiations and was, therefore, inadmissible under section 90.410 and rule 3.172(i) in Owen v. State, 986 So.2d 534 (Fla.2008). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Calabro
neutral
2 sentences2008Calabro, 957 So.2d at 1213 . 2008And no policy would be furthered by excluding that admission. [6] Accordingly, given this Court's precedent adopting the two-tier Robertson test and the rationale underlying the exclusionary rule, the Third District correctly held that Calabro's second statement admitting guilt was an "unsolicited, unilateral utterance not made in connection with any plea negotiation and is therefore, admissible." Calabro, 957 So.2d at 1212 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Blake v. State
green
1 sentence2008Indeed, contrary to the majority's holding today, this Court in Stevens expressly held that "[u]nsolicited, unilateral utterances are not statements made in connection with plea negotiations." Id. (citing Blake v. State, 332 So.2d 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Miles
green
2 sentences2000We affirm the D.U.I. manslaughter conviction and sentence of appellant, Atije Ibraimov, because the blood-alcohol evidence met the Robertson standard referenced in State v. Townsend, 746 So.2d 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), and State v. Miles, 732 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). 2000We affirm the D.U.I. manslaughter conviction and sentence of appellant, Atije Ibraimov, because the blood-alcohol evidence met the Robertson standard referenced in State v. Townsend, 746 So.2d 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), and State v. Miles, 732 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Townsend
green
2 sentences2000We affirm the D.U.I. manslaughter conviction and sentence of appellant, Atije Ibraimov, because the blood-alcohol evidence met the Robertson standard referenced in State v. Townsend, 746 So.2d 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), and State v. Miles, 732 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). 2000We affirm the D.U.I. manslaughter conviction and sentence of appellant, Atije Ibraimov, because the blood-alcohol evidence met the Robertson standard referenced in State v. Townsend, 746 So.2d 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), and State v. Miles, 732 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Mehl v. State
green
2 sentences1999Id. (emphasis added). 1999Id. (emphasis added). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.