Hughes rule in Texas

2022The court reasoned that, “in the area of limitations, bright-lines rules generally represent the better approach, and that the policy reasons underlying the Hughes rule appropriately balance the competing concerns of the need to bar stale claims and avoid prejudice to defendants yet preserve a reasonable opportunity for plaintiffs to pursue legitimate claims.” Id.

2022The court reasoned that, “in the area of limitations, bright-lines rules generally represent the better approach, and that the policy reasons underlying the Hughes rule appropriately balance the competing concerns of the need to bar stale claims and avoid prejudice to defendants yet preserve a reasonable opportunity for plaintiffs to pursue legitimate claims.” Id.

2020Rather than toll limitations indefinitely for every potential malpractice claimant who seeks post-conviction relief, the Court should simply follow the Hughes rule and toll limitations only “until all appeals on the underlying claim are exhausted.” Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 157 .

2020Rather than toll limitations indefinitely for every potential malpractice claimant who seeks post-conviction relief, the Court should simply follow the Hughes rule and toll limitations only “until all appeals on the underlying claim are exhausted.” Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 157 .

2022We previously declined to broaden the Hughes exception to limitations, see Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 272 (Tex. 1997), and we decline to do so again today.

2022We previously declined to broaden the Hughes exception to limitations, see Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 272 (Tex. 1997), and we decline to do so again today.

2020In Gulf Coast Investment Corp. v. Brown, the Texas Supreme Court extended the Hughes rule to toll limitations during the pendency of a third-party suit rather than an appeal. 821 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tex. 1991).

2020In Gulf Coast Investment Corp. v. Brown, the Texas Supreme Court extended the Hughes rule to toll limitations during the pendency of a third-party suit rather than an appeal. 821 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tex. 1991).

2001See Eiland v. Turpin, Smith, Dyer, Saxe & McDonald, 16 S.W.3d 461, 469 (Tex.App. — El Paso 2000, pet. filed); Brents v. Haynes & Boone, L.L.P., 10 S.W.3d 772, 777-78 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, pet. filed); Nunez v. Caldarola, 2 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Tex.App.— Corpus Christi 1999, pet. filed); Swift v. Seidler, 988 S.W.2d 860, 861-62 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1999, pet. denied); Norman v. Yzaguirre & Chapa, 988 S.W.2d 460, 462-63 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).

2000But see Swift v. Seidler, 988 S.W.2d 860, 861-62 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet. h.); Norman v. Yzaguirre & Chapa, 988 S.W.2d 460, 461-62 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1999, no pet. h.); Apex Towing Company v. Tolin 997 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1999, no pet. h.). 3 Following Hughes , we find the statute of limitations was facially tolled on Edwards’ attorney malpractice claim until the exhaustion of his appeal, August 1, 1995.

2007The supreme court applied the Hughes rule phrase “claim that results in litigation” broadly in Sanchez, 898 S.W.2d at 288 ; Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 157 .

2007The supreme court applied the Hughes rule phrase “claim that results in litigation” broadly in Sanchez, 898 S.W.2d at 288 ; Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 157 .

2018Applying this court's holding in Burnap [ v. Linnartz , 914 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995) ], we refuse to extend the Hughes tolling doctrine to the facts of the instant case."); Murphy v. Mullin, Hoard & Brown, L.L.P. , 168 S.W.3d 288 , 292-93 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (stating that "[a]lthough we recognize that the citations contained in Apex create some ambiguity regarding application of the Hughes rule to cases arising from transactional work, we are persuaded by the Houston First Court of Appeals's analysis of Hughes , Murphy , and Apex and agree that alleged attorney malpr

2018Applying this court's holding in Burnap [ v. Linnartz , 914 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995) ], we refuse to extend the Hughes tolling doctrine to the facts of the instant case."); Murphy v. Mullin, Hoard & Brown, L.L.P. , 168 S.W.3d 288 , 292-93 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (stating that "[a]lthough we recognize that the citations contained in Apex create some ambiguity regarding application of the Hughes rule to cases arising from transactional work, we are persuaded by the Houston First Court of Appeals's analysis of Hughes , Murphy , and Apex and agree that alleged attorney malpr

2010See Kelly v. State , 60 S.W.3d 299, 302 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2001, no pet.) (finding no Hughes violation when "although the State 'suspected' its witness could turn, it had no reason to know this for certain").

2010See Kelly v. State, 60 S.W.3d 299, 302 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (concluding that impeachment evidence need not be excluded under Hughes partly because “there were sources of the critical evidence other than the hearsay testimony”).

2018Applying this court's holding in Burnap [ v. Linnartz , 914 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995) ], we refuse to extend the Hughes tolling doctrine to the facts of the instant case."); Murphy v. Mullin, Hoard & Brown, L.L.P. , 168 S.W.3d 288 , 292-93 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (stating that "[a]lthough we recognize that the citations contained in Apex create some ambiguity regarding application of the Hughes rule to cases arising from transactional work, we are persuaded by the Houston First Court of Appeals's analysis of Hughes , Murphy , and Apex and agree that alleged attorney malpr

2018Applying this court's holding in Burnap [ v. Linnartz , 914 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995) ], we refuse to extend the Hughes tolling doctrine to the facts of the instant case."); Murphy v. Mullin, Hoard & Brown, L.L.P. , 168 S.W.3d 288 , 292-93 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (stating that "[a]lthough we recognize that the citations contained in Apex create some ambiguity regarding application of the Hughes rule to cases arising from transactional work, we are persuaded by the Houston First Court of Appeals's analysis of Hughes , Murphy , and Apex and agree that alleged attorney malpr

2000Murphy also understood the Hughes rule to be based on the consideration that requiring a client to file a malpractice claim against the lawyer representing him in another case would make it virtually impossible for the lawyer to continue to represent him. *468 Norman, 988 S.W.2d at 462 .

2000Murphy also understood the Hughes rule to be based on the consideration that requiring a client to file a malpractice claim against the lawyer representing him in another case would make it virtually impossible for the lawyer to continue to represent him. *468 Norman, 988 S.W.2d at 462 .

2011See Sexton v. Mount Olivet Cemetary Ass'n , 720 S.W. 2d 129 , 137-38 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ refd n.r.e.) (explaining that a state agency has no power other than one expressly granted by statute or implied as necessary to exercise a power expressly granted); Pierce v. Tex. Racing Comm'n , 212 S.W.3d 745 , 751-52 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied) (indicating that the TRC is a state agency).

2011See Sexton v. Mount Olivet Cemetary Ass'n , 720 S.W. 2d 129 , 137-38 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ refd n.r.e.) (explaining that a state agency has no power other than one expressly granted by statute or implied as necessary to exercise a power expressly granted); Pierce v. Tex. Racing Comm'n , 212 S.W.3d 745 , 751-52 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied) (indicating that the TRC is a state agency).

2011Mullin, 168 S.W.3d at 291 (citing Nunez v. Caldarola, 56 S.W.3d 812, 815 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.)).

2011Mullin, 168 S.W.3d at 291 (citing Nunez v. Caldarola, 56 S.W.3d 812, 815 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.)).

2010See, e.g., Swain v. State , 181 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex. Crim.

2010See, e.g., Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex. Crim.

2006See id.

2006See id.

2001See Eiland v. Turpin, Smith, Dyer, Saxe & McDonald, 16 S.W.3d 461, 469 (Tex.App. — El Paso 2000, pet. filed); Brents v. Haynes & Boone, L.L.P., 10 S.W.3d 772, 777-78 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, pet. filed); Nunez v. Caldarola, 2 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Tex.App.— Corpus Christi 1999, pet. filed); Swift v. Seidler, 988 S.W.2d 860, 861-62 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1999, pet. denied); Norman v. Yzaguirre & Chapa, 988 S.W.2d 460, 462-63 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).

2000See Swift, 988 S.W.2d at 862 ; Norman, 988 S.W.2d at 463 ; Apex Towing Co., 997 S.W.2d at 905 ; Nunez, 2 S.W.3d at 759 ; Brents , at 777-78.

2001Nunez, 2 S.W.3d at 759 .

2001See Eiland v. Turpin, Smith, Dyer, Saxe & McDonald, 16 S.W.3d 461, 469 (Tex.App. — El Paso 2000, pet. filed); Brents v. Haynes & Boone, L.L.P., 10 S.W.3d 772, 777-78 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, pet. filed); Nunez v. Caldarola, 2 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Tex.App.— Corpus Christi 1999, pet. filed); Swift v. Seidler, 988 S.W.2d 860, 861-62 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1999, pet. denied); Norman v. Yzaguirre & Chapa, 988 S.W.2d 460, 462-63 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).

2011In a Hughes analysis, the district court must inquire into the extent of the State's knowledge of whether the witness would testify unfavorably and whether the State's purpose for eliciting the evidence was legitimate or was instead being offered "under the guise of impeachment for the primary purpose of placing before the jury evidence which was not otherwise admissible." See Hughes v. State , 4 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim.

2011In a Hughes analysis, the district court must inquire into the extent of the State's knowledge of whether the witness would testify unfavorably and whether the State's purpose for eliciting the evidence was legitimate or was instead being offered "under the guise of impeachment for the primary purpose of placing before the jury evidence which was not otherwise admissible." See Hughes v. State , 4 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim.

2011See Sexton v. Mount Olivet Cemetary Ass'n , 720 S.W. 2d 129 , 137-38 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ refd n.r.e.) (explaining that a state agency has no power other than one expressly granted by statute or implied as necessary to exercise a power expressly granted); Pierce v. Tex. Racing Comm'n , 212 S.W.3d 745 , 751-52 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied) (indicating that the TRC is a state agency).

2011See Sexton v. Mount Olivet Cemetary Ass'n , 720 S.W. 2d 129 , 137-38 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ refd n.r.e.) (explaining that a state agency has no power other than one expressly granted by statute or implied as necessary to exercise a power expressly granted); Pierce v. Tex. Racing Comm'n , 212 S.W.3d 745 , 751-52 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied) (indicating that the TRC is a state agency).

2007Junell and A & K cite Sharpe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas in support of their contention that the Hughes rule does not apply to Whitsett’s legal malpractice claims. 97 S.W.3d 791, 796-97 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).

2007Junell and A & K cite Sharpe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas in support of their contention that the Hughes rule does not apply to Whitsett’s legal malpractice claims. 97 S.W.3d 791, 796-97 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).

2026See J.M.K. 6, Inc. v. Gregg & Gregg, P.C., 192 S.W.3d 189, 198 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

2026See J.M.K. 6, Inc. v. Gregg & Gregg, P.C., 192 S.W.3d 189, 198 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

2023To “obtain traditional summary judgment on a limitations defense, the defendant must conclusively prove (1) when the cause of action accrued, and (2) that the plaintiff brought its suit later than the applicable number of years thereafter—i.e., that ‘the statute of limitations has run.’” Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81 , 89 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Provident Life & Acc. Ins. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 220 (Tex. 2003)).

2022Pollard v. Hanschen, 315 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.).

2022Pollard v. Hanschen, 315 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.).

2022Because this case does not involve the second provision of Article 36.22 or any complaint about communication with the jury, we do not believe Laws is entitled to any Ocon/Hughes presumption.5 This is because the “defendant’s burden is not satisfied if there is no showing what a reported conversation was about.” Hendrix v. State, No. 05-18-00822-CR, 2020 WL 3424915 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)6 (citing Stults v. State, 23 S.W.3d 198, 207 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d)).