fraudulent transfer claim in Georgia

2017In RES-GA Hightower, LLC v. Golshani , 334 Ga. App. 176 , 778 S.E.2d 805 (2015), this Court determined that the UFTA had not displaced Ne Smith 's construction of the statute and held that "an assignee of debt is precluded from pursuing a fraudulent transfer claim even though the assignee meets the definitions of a "creditor" with a "claim" under the UFTA." Id. at 180 (1) (a), 778 S.E.2d 805 .

2017A separate statute, OCGA § 44-12-24, prohibits the assignment of “[a] right of action . . . for injuries arising from fraud to the assignor.” Reading this statute in conjunction with the UFTA, this Court has previously held that assignees of debt who otherwise qualified as “creditors” with “claims” under the broad definitions of the UFTA were nevertheless precluded by OCGA § 44-12-24 from pursuing a fraudulent transfer claim. 6 See Merrill Ranch Properties *719 v. Austell, 336 Ga. App. 722, 731 (3) ( 784 SE2d 125 ) (2016); Golshani, 334 Ga. App. at 179-180 (1) (a). (a) The Rowland Appellees co

2022See, e.g., RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma LLP, 302 Ga. 444, 448 (1) (807 SE2d 381) (2017) (concluding that plaintiff “had no standing to pursue a fraudulent transfer claim” based on the statutory language governing the cause of action); GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Allen, 299 Ga. 716, 717-720 (791 SE2d 800) (2016) (using “standing” to describe proper party authorized to bring cause of action when, after concluding that nonprofit corporation was not a “person” qualified to bring cause of action that was limited to natural persons, analyzing whether that corporation nonetheless had as

2022See, e.g., RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma LLP, 302 Ga. 444, 448 (1) (807 SE2d 381) (2017) (concluding that plaintiff “had no standing to pursue a fraudulent transfer claim” based on the statutory language governing the cause of action); GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Allen, 299 Ga. 716, 717-720 (791 SE2d 800) (2016) (using “standing” to describe proper party authorized to bring cause of action when, after concluding that nonprofit corporation was not a “person” qualified to bring cause of action that was limited to natural persons, analyzing whether that corporation nonetheless had as

2017A separate statute, OCGA § 44-12-24, prohibits the assignment of “[a] right of action . . . for injuries arising from fraud to the assignor.” Reading this statute in conjunction with the UFTA, this Court has previously held that assignees of debt who otherwise qualified as “creditors” with “claims” under the broad definitions of the UFTA were nevertheless precluded by OCGA § 44-12-24 from pursuing a fraudulent transfer claim. 6 See Merrill Ranch Properties *719 v. Austell, 336 Ga. App. 722, 731 (3) ( 784 SE2d 125 ) (2016); Golshani, 334 Ga. App. at 179-180 (1) (a). (a) The Rowland Appellees co

2017A separate statute, OCGA § 44-12-24, prohibits the assignment of “[a] right of action . . . for injuries arising from fraud to the assignor.” Reading this statute in conjunction with the UFTA, this Court has previously held that assignees of debt who otherwise qualified as “creditors” with “claims” under the broad definitions of the UFTA were nevertheless precluded by OCGA § 44-12-24 from pursuing a fraudulent transfer claim. 6 See Merrill Ranch Properties *719 v. Austell, 336 Ga. App. 722, 731 (3) ( 784 SE2d 125 ) (2016); Golshani, 334 Ga. App. at 179-180 (1) (a). (a) The Rowland Appellees co

2025“By its terms, OCGA § 9-11-68 does not require that the trial court make written findings of fact or conclusions of law unless the court concludes that an offer was not made in good faith[.]” Cohen v. The Alfred & Adele Davis Academy, 310 Ga. App. 761, 764 (2) ( 714 SE2d 350 ) (2011) (concluding that $750 offer of settlement was not made in bad faith in case where trial court awarded $84,104.63 in attorney fees and expenses under OCGA § 9-11-68).

2025“By its terms, OCGA § 9-11-68 does not require that the trial court make written findings of fact or conclusions of law unless the court concludes that an offer was not made in good faith[.]” Cohen v. The Alfred & Adele Davis Academy, 310 Ga. App. 761, 764 (2) ( 714 SE2d 350 ) (2011) (concluding that $750 offer of settlement was not made in bad faith in case where trial court awarded $84,104.63 in attorney fees and expenses under OCGA § 9-11-68).

2022See, e.g., RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma LLP, 302 Ga. 444, 448 (1) (807 SE2d 381) (2017) (concluding that plaintiff “had no standing to pursue a fraudulent transfer claim” based on the statutory language governing the cause of action); GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Allen, 299 Ga. 716, 717-720 (791 SE2d 800) (2016) (using “standing” to describe proper party authorized to bring cause of action when, after concluding that nonprofit corporation was not a “person” qualified to bring cause of action that was limited to natural persons, analyzing whether that corporation nonetheless had as

2022See, e.g., RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma LLP, 302 Ga. 444, 448 (1) (807 SE2d 381) (2017) (concluding that plaintiff “had no standing to pursue a fraudulent transfer claim” based on the statutory language governing the cause of action); GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Allen, 299 Ga. 716, 717-720 (791 SE2d 800) (2016) (using “standing” to describe proper party authorized to bring cause of action when, after concluding that nonprofit corporation was not a “person” qualified to bring cause of action that was limited to natural persons, analyzing whether that corporation nonetheless had as

2022See, e.g., RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma LLP, 302 Ga. 444, 448 (1) (807 SE2d 381) (2017) (concluding that plaintiff “had no standing to pursue a fraudulent transfer claim” based on the statutory language governing the cause of action); GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Allen, 299 Ga. 716, 717-720 (791 SE2d 800) (2016) (using “standing” to describe proper party authorized to bring cause of action when, after concluding that nonprofit corporation was not a “person” qualified to bring cause of action that was limited to natural persons, analyzing whether that corporation nonetheless had as

2022See, e.g., RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma LLP, 302 Ga. 444, 448 (1) (807 SE2d 381) (2017) (concluding that plaintiff “had no standing to pursue a fraudulent transfer claim” based on the statutory language governing the cause of action); GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Allen, 299 Ga. 716, 717-720 (791 SE2d 800) (2016) (using “standing” to describe proper party authorized to bring cause of action when, after concluding that nonprofit corporation was not a “person” qualified to bring cause of action that was limited to natural persons, analyzing whether that corporation nonetheless had as

2017Moreover, unlike the mother in Burns , who sought to pursue a wrongful-death claim on her son’s behalf, West Basin is not pursuing its claim on behalf of someone else. 30 Golshani, 334 Ga. App. at 181 (1) (b) (emphasis supplied). 31 Houghton v. Sacor Fin., Inc., 337 Ga. App. 254, 258 (1) (b) (i) ( 786 SE2d 903 ) (2016) (punctuation omitted); accord S. Telecom, Inc. v. TW Telecom of Ga. L.P., 321 Ga. App. 110, 114 (3) ( 741 SE2d 234 ) (2013); see also Golden Pantry Food Stores, Inc. v. Lay Bros., Inc., 266 Ga. App. 645, 648 (1) ( 597 SE2d 659 ) (2004) (“It is a well-established principle of Geo

2017Moreover, unlike the mother in Burns , who sought to pursue a wrongful-death claim on her son’s behalf, West Basin is not pursuing its claim on behalf of someone else. 30 Golshani, 334 Ga. App. at 181 (1) (b) (emphasis supplied). 31 Houghton v. Sacor Fin., Inc., 337 Ga. App. 254, 258 (1) (b) (i) ( 786 SE2d 903 ) (2016) (punctuation omitted); accord S. Telecom, Inc. v. TW Telecom of Ga. L.P., 321 Ga. App. 110, 114 (3) ( 741 SE2d 234 ) (2013); see also Golden Pantry Food Stores, Inc. v. Lay Bros., Inc., 266 Ga. App. 645, 648 (1) ( 597 SE2d 659 ) (2004) (“It is a well-established principle of Geo

2017Moreover, unlike the mother in Burns , who sought to pursue a wrongful-death claim on her son’s behalf, West Basin is not pursuing its claim on behalf of someone else. 30 Golshani, 334 Ga. App. at 181 (1) (b) (emphasis supplied). 31 Houghton v. Sacor Fin., Inc., 337 Ga. App. 254, 258 (1) (b) (i) ( 786 SE2d 903 ) (2016) (punctuation omitted); accord S. Telecom, Inc. v. TW Telecom of Ga. L.P., 321 Ga. App. 110, 114 (3) ( 741 SE2d 234 ) (2013); see also Golden Pantry Food Stores, Inc. v. Lay Bros., Inc., 266 Ga. App. 645, 648 (1) ( 597 SE2d 659 ) (2004) (“It is a well-established principle of Geo

2017Moreover, unlike the mother in Burns , who sought to pursue a wrongful-death claim on her son’s behalf, West Basin is not pursuing its claim on behalf of someone else. 30 Golshani, 334 Ga. App. at 181 (1) (b) (emphasis supplied). 31 Houghton v. Sacor Fin., Inc., 337 Ga. App. 254, 258 (1) (b) (i) ( 786 SE2d 903 ) (2016) (punctuation omitted); accord S. Telecom, Inc. v. TW Telecom of Ga. L.P., 321 Ga. App. 110, 114 (3) ( 741 SE2d 234 ) (2013); see also Golden Pantry Food Stores, Inc. v. Lay Bros., Inc., 266 Ga. App. 645, 648 (1) ( 597 SE2d 659 ) (2004) (“It is a well-established principle of Geo

2017Moreover, unlike the mother in Burns , who sought to pursue a wrongful-death claim on her son’s behalf, West Basin is not pursuing its claim on behalf of someone else. 30 Golshani, 334 Ga. App. at 181 (1) (b) (emphasis supplied). 31 Houghton v. Sacor Fin., Inc., 337 Ga. App. 254, 258 (1) (b) (i) ( 786 SE2d 903 ) (2016) (punctuation omitted); accord S. Telecom, Inc. v. TW Telecom of Ga. L.P., 321 Ga. App. 110, 114 (3) ( 741 SE2d 234 ) (2013); see also Golden Pantry Food Stores, Inc. v. Lay Bros., Inc., 266 Ga. App. 645, 648 (1) ( 597 SE2d 659 ) (2004) (“It is a well-established principle of Geo

2017Moreover, unlike the mother in Burns , who sought to pursue a wrongful-death claim on her son’s behalf, West Basin is not pursuing its claim on behalf of someone else. 30 Golshani, 334 Ga. App. at 181 (1) (b) (emphasis supplied). 31 Houghton v. Sacor Fin., Inc., 337 Ga. App. 254, 258 (1) (b) (i) ( 786 SE2d 903 ) (2016) (punctuation omitted); accord S. Telecom, Inc. v. TW Telecom of Ga. L.P., 321 Ga. App. 110, 114 (3) ( 741 SE2d 234 ) (2013); see also Golden Pantry Food Stores, Inc. v. Lay Bros., Inc., 266 Ga. App. 645, 648 (1) ( 597 SE2d 659 ) (2004) (“It is a well-established principle of Geo

2015In determining intent, consideration is given to an open-ended set of factors listed in OCGA § 18-2-74 (b), which are also commonly called the “badges of fraud.” See Target Corp. v. Amerson, 326 Ga. App. 734, 737 (1) ( 755 SE2d 333 ) (2014).

2015In determining intent, consideration is given to an open-ended set of factors listed in OCGA § 18-2-74 (b), which are also commonly called the “badges of fraud.” See Target Corp. v. Amerson, 326 Ga. App. 734, 737 (1) ( 755 SE2d 333 ) (2014).

2013But American National did not argue that ground when pursuing its motion for summary judgment.4 “Fairness to the trial 3 In this regard, American National relies upon Huggins v. Powell, 315 Ga. App. 599, 601-604 (1) ( 726 SE2d 730 ) (2012), which was decided two years after the trial court’s ruling at issue. 4 See Cleaveland v. Gannon, 284 Ga. 376, 381 (2) ( 667 SE2d 366 ) (2008) (explaining that “the defense of statute of limitation[ ] is an affirmative defense” and thus, where a defendant moves for summary judgment on that ground, the defendant has the burden to show that the applicable stat

2013But American National did not argue that ground when pursuing its motion for summary judgment.4 “Fairness to the trial 3 In this regard, American National relies upon Huggins v. Powell, 315 Ga. App. 599, 601-604 (1) ( 726 SE2d 730 ) (2012), which was decided two years after the trial court’s ruling at issue. 4 See Cleaveland v. Gannon, 284 Ga. 376, 381 (2) ( 667 SE2d 366 ) (2008) (explaining that “the defense of statute of limitation[ ] is an affirmative defense” and thus, where a defendant moves for summary judgment on that ground, the defendant has the burden to show that the applicable stat

2013But American National did not argue that ground when pursuing its motion for summary judgment.4 “Fairness to the trial 3 In this regard, American National relies upon Huggins v. Powell, 315 Ga. App. 599, 601-604 (1) ( 726 SE2d 730 ) (2012), which was decided two years after the trial court’s ruling at issue. 4 See Cleaveland v. Gannon, 284 Ga. 376, 381 (2) ( 667 SE2d 366 ) (2008) (explaining that “the defense of statute of limitation[ ] is an affirmative defense” and thus, where a defendant moves for summary judgment on that ground, the defendant has the burden to show that the applicable stat

2013But American National did not argue that ground when pursuing its motion for summary judgment.4 “Fairness to the trial 3 In this regard, American National relies upon Huggins v. Powell, 315 Ga. App. 599, 601-604 (1) ( 726 SE2d 730 ) (2012), which was decided two years after the trial court’s ruling at issue. 4 See Cleaveland v. Gannon, 284 Ga. 376, 381 (2) ( 667 SE2d 366 ) (2008) (explaining that “the defense of statute of limitation[ ] is an affirmative defense” and thus, where a defendant moves for summary judgment on that ground, the defendant has the burden to show that the applicable stat