perfect defense in Georgia

1993It has been *669 held that a right of defense should be held as inviolate as a right of action. [Cit.] In Thomas v. Town of Savannah Beach, 66 Ga. App. 178 ( 17 SE2d 747 ), it was held that an act, passed subsequently to the death of the claimant’s husband, changing the amount which might be set off by an employer in a workmen’s compensation proceeding, was not applicable, since ‘any rights which the employer or the tortfeasor may have had as respected the amount recoverable against either of them were fixed and vested as of the date of the homicide and could in no wise be changed by any subse

1993It has been *669 held that a right of defense should be held as inviolate as a right of action. [Cit.] In Thomas v. Town of Savannah Beach, 66 Ga. App. 178 ( 17 SE2d 747 ), it was held that an act, passed subsequently to the death of the claimant’s husband, changing the amount which might be set off by an employer in a workmen’s compensation proceeding, was not applicable, since ‘any rights which the employer or the tortfeasor may have had as respected the amount recoverable against either of them were fixed and vested as of the date of the homicide and could in no wise be changed by any subse

1974Cook v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 98 Ga. App. 818, 819 ( 107 SE2d 260 ); Henderson v. Fox, 83 Ga. 233 ( 9 SE 839 ).

1974Cook v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 98 Ga. App. 818, 819 ( 107 SE2d 260 ); Henderson v. Fox, 83 Ga. 233 ( 9 SE 839 ).

1993It has been *669 held that a right of defense should be held as inviolate as a right of action. [Cit.] In Thomas v. Town of Savannah Beach, 66 Ga. App. 178 ( 17 SE2d 747 ), it was held that an act, passed subsequently to the death of the claimant’s husband, changing the amount which might be set off by an employer in a workmen’s compensation proceeding, was not applicable, since ‘any rights which the employer or the tortfeasor may have had as respected the amount recoverable against either of them were fixed and vested as of the date of the homicide and could in no wise be changed by any subse

1953It has been held that a right of defense should be held as inviolate as a right of action. *526 Bussey v. Bishop, supra. In Thomas v. Town of Savannah Beach, 66 Ga. App. 178 ( 17 S. E. 2d, 747 ), it was held that an act, passed subsequently to the death of the claimant’s husband, changing the amount which might be set off by an employer in a workmen’s compensation proceeding, was not applicable, since “any rights which the employer or the tort-feasor may have had as respected the amount recoverable against either of them were fixed and vested as of the date of the homicide and could in no wise

1953It was held in Wilson v. Swift & Co., 68 Ga. App. 701 ( 23 S. E. 2d 261 ), that error on the part of the director in disregarding pertinent testimony in making his award, which testimony, if considered, would have authorized a contrary conclusion, is reversible.

1953It was held in Wilson v. Swift & Co., 68 Ga. App. 701 ( 23 S. E. 2d 261 ), that error on the part of the director in disregarding pertinent testimony in making his award, which testimony, if considered, would have authorized a contrary conclusion, is reversible.

1932However, you will consider the evidence as to the alibi, and if that evidence, along with the other evidence in the case, raises a doubt of guilt of the defendant, you would give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and acquit him.” Movant excepts to the charge “for the reason that said charge instructed the jury that the doubt as to the defendant’s guilt which would authorize them to acquit the defendant must be a doubt generated by a consideration of all the evidence along with the alibi, whereas, under the law, the doubt authorizing the jury to acquit may be generated by the alibi alone.”

1932However, you will consider the evidence as to the alibi, and if that evidence, along with the other evidence in the case, raises a doubt of guilt of the defendant, you would give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and acquit him.” Movant excepts to the charge “for the reason that said charge instructed the jury that the doubt as to the defendant’s guilt which would authorize them to acquit the defendant must be a doubt generated by a consideration of all the evidence along with the alibi, whereas, under the law, the doubt authorizing the jury to acquit may be generated by the alibi alone.”

1932However, you will consider the evidence as to the alibi, and if that evidence, along with the other evidence in the case, raises a doubt of guilt of the defendant, you would give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and acquit him.” Movant excepts to the charge “for the reason that said charge instructed the jury that the doubt as to the defendant’s guilt which would authorize them to acquit the defendant must be a doubt generated by a consideration of all the evidence along with the alibi, whereas, under the law, the doubt authorizing the jury to acquit may be generated by the alibi alone.”

1932However, you will consider the evidence as to the alibi, and if that evidence, along with the other evidence in the case, raises a doubt of guilt of the defendant, you would give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and acquit him.” Movant excepts to the charge “for the reason that said charge instructed the jury that the doubt as to the defendant’s guilt which would authorize them to acquit the defendant must be a doubt generated by a consideration of all the evidence along with the alibi, whereas, under the law, the doubt authorizing the jury to acquit may be generated by the alibi alone.”

1915As we view the case, it comes directly within the ruling laid down in Detwiler v. Bainbridge Grocery Co., 119 Ga. 982 ( 47 S. E. 553 ), in which Justice Lamar, speaking for the court, said, “Where one has a perfect defense to a negotiable note, he does not owe the sum represented thereby.