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34 California opinions name it 2 courts 1861–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sweeney (1944)green2 sentences1963Any other defense is for the consideration of the judge or jury, as the case may he; . . . ’ See also People v. Charley Quong, 5 Cal.App.2d 137, 139 [ 42 P.2d 386 ] ; People v. Gin Shue, 58 Cal.App.2d 625, 628 [ 137 P.2d 742 ] ; and People v. Sweeney, 66 Cal.App.2d 855, 859-860 [ 153 P.2d 371 ], . . . 1963Any other defense is for the consideration of the judge or jury, as the case may he; . . . ’ See also People v. Charley Quong, 5 Cal.App.2d 137, 139 [ 42 P.2d 386 ] ; People v. Gin Shue, 58 Cal.App.2d 625, 628 [ 137 P.2d 742 ] ; and People v. Sweeney, 66 Cal.App.2d 855, 859-860 [ 153 P.2d 371 ], . . . | 3 | 3 |
People v. Gin Shuegreen2 sentences1963Any other defense is for the consideration of the judge or jury, as the case may he; . . . ’ See also People v. Charley Quong, 5 Cal.App.2d 137, 139 [ 42 P.2d 386 ] ; People v. Gin Shue, 58 Cal.App.2d 625, 628 [ 137 P.2d 742 ] ; and People v. Sweeney, 66 Cal.App.2d 855, 859-860 [ 153 P.2d 371 ], . . . 1963Any other defense is for the consideration of the judge or jury, as the case may he; . . . ’ See also People v. Charley Quong, 5 Cal.App.2d 137, 139 [ 42 P.2d 386 ] ; People v. Gin Shue, 58 Cal.App.2d 625, 628 [ 137 P.2d 742 ] ; and People v. Sweeney, 66 Cal.App.2d 855, 859-860 [ 153 P.2d 371 ], . . . | 2 | 2 |
People v. Charley Quonggreen2 sentences1963Any other defense is for the consideration of the judge or jury, as the case may he; . . . ’ See also People v. Charley Quong, 5 Cal.App.2d 137, 139 [ 42 P.2d 386 ] ; People v. Gin Shue, 58 Cal.App.2d 625, 628 [ 137 P.2d 742 ] ; and People v. Sweeney, 66 Cal.App.2d 855, 859-860 [ 153 P.2d 371 ], . . . 1963Any other defense is for the consideration of the judge or jury, as the case may he; . . . ’ See also People v. Charley Quong, 5 Cal.App.2d 137, 139 [ 42 P.2d 386 ] ; People v. Gin Shue, 58 Cal.App.2d 625, 628 [ 137 P.2d 742 ] ; and People v. Sweeney, 66 Cal.App.2d 855, 859-860 [ 153 P.2d 371 ], . . . | 2 | 2 |
People v. Randolphgreen2 sentences1962Any other defense is for the consideration of the judge or jury, as the case may be; . . .’ ” (People v. Randolph, 133 Cal.App. 192, 196 [ 23 P.2d 777 ].) We think that the facts established by the direct evidence in this case, as well as the circumstantial evidence, could reasonably infer to the jury that defendant knew the narcotic nature of the materials and knew that Baiza had possession and could furnish the narcotic to the agent. 1962Any other defense is for the consideration of the judge or jury, as the case may be; . . .’ ” (People v. Randolph, 133 Cal.App. 192, 196 [ 23 P.2d 777 ].) We think that the facts established by the direct evidence in this case, as well as the circumstantial evidence, could reasonably infer to the jury that defendant knew the narcotic nature of the materials and knew that Baiza had possession and could furnish the narcotic to the agent. | 2 | 2 |
Landis v. Morrisseygreen2 sentences1940In Landis v. Morrissey, 69 Cal. 83, 87 [ 10 Pac. 258 ], such a contention is referred to as “a perfect defense”. 1940In Landis v. Morrissey, 69 Cal. 83, 87 [ 10 Pac. 258 ], such a contention is referred to as “a perfect defense”. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Andersongreen2 sentences2005Duress and Malice Penal Code section 26 declares duress to be a perfect defense against criminal charges when the person charged "committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused." That section also provides that this defense does not apply to crimes "punishable with death." We recently rejected the argument that duress could negate the elements of malice or premeditation, thereby reducing a first degree murder to manslaughter or second degree murder. ( Pe 2005Duress and Malice Penal Code section 26 declares duress to be a perfect defense against criminal charges when the person charged "committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused." That section also provides that this defense does not apply to crimes "punishable with death." We recently rejected the argument that duress could negate the elements of malice or premeditation, thereby reducing a first degree murder to manslaughter or second degree murder. ( Pe | 1 | 2 |
Coyne v. Krempelsgreen2 sentences1967The answer may be stricken and judgment entered in accord with the uneontroverted allegations of plaintiff’s affidavits. [Citations.]” (Coyne v. Krempels, 36 Cal.2d 257, 262-263 [ 223 P.2d 244 ].) The above quote from Coyne v. Krempels answers any suggestion by defendant that he may rely on his answer to provide his defense. 1967The answer may be stricken and judgment entered in accord with the uneontroverted allegations of plaintiff’s affidavits. [Citations.]” (Coyne v. Krempels, 36 Cal.2d 257, 262-263 [ 223 P.2d 244 ].) The above quote from Coyne v. Krempels answers any suggestion by defendant that he may rely on his answer to provide his defense. | 1 | 2 |
Barclay Hollander Corp. v. Cal. Reg'l Water Quality Control Bd.green1 sentence2024(Barclay Hollander Corp. v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 479, 513 [“‘“The Due Process Clause simply does not mandate that all governmental decisionmaking comply with standards that assure perfect, error-free determinations”’”].) The other party at the hearings, the Division, is subject to the same procedures as RND; RND suffered no special prejudice by being required to appear remotely. | 1 | 1 |
Schaefer Dixon Associates v. Santa Ana Watershed Project Authoritygreen2 sentences2007(Schaefer Dixon Associates v. Santa Ana Watershed Project Authority (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 524, 533 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 ].) In City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 797 , 525 P.2d 701 ], the state high court adopted a two-part test for determining whether there has been substantial compliance with the Government Claims Act: “Is there some compliance with all of the statutory requirements; and, if so, is this compliance sufficient to constitute substantial compliance?” {City of San Jose, at pp. 456-457.) Westcon contends the June 9, 2003, submittal contained al 2007(Schaefer Dixon Associates v. Santa Ana Watershed Project Authority (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 524, 533 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 ].) In City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 797 , 525 P.2d 701 ], the state high court adopted a two-part test for determining whether there has been substantial compliance with the Government Claims Act: “Is there some compliance with all of the statutory requirements; and, if so, is this compliance sufficient to constitute substantial compliance?” {City of San Jose, at pp. 456-457.) Westcon contends the June 9, 2003, submittal contained al | 1 | 1 |
Gardenswartz v. Equitable Etc. Soc.green2 sentences1958Soc., 23 Cal.App.2d Supp. 745, 750, 751 [ 68 P.2d 322 ].) “Since under that section ‘an answer may be stricken out, even though a perfect defense may be stated therein, unless the defendant by his affidavits shows facts to substantiate the defense’ (Cowan Oil & Ref. 1958Soc., 23 Cal.App.2d Supp. 745, 750, 751 [ 68 P.2d 322 ].) “Since under that section ‘an answer may be stricken out, even though a perfect defense may be stated therein, unless the defendant by his affidavits shows facts to substantiate the defense’ (Cowan Oil & Ref. | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Foxgreen2 sentences1949(Landis v. Morrissey, 69 Cal. 83, 87 [ 10 P. 258 ].) The defect cannot even be cured by a supplemental complaint founded on what subsequently occurred. (21 Cal.Jur. 172.) In Lewis v. Fox, 122 Cal. 244, 252 [ 54 P. 823 ], the following example is given: “If a suit be brought upon a promissory note before it becomes due, the complaint would not be aided by a supplemental complaint filed after it became due alleging its maturity at a date subsequent to the commencement of the action. ” If in the case before us, plaintiff had accepted the note, and certainly if he had done so in full satisfaction— 1949(Landis v. Morrissey, 69 Cal. 83, 87 [ 10 P. 258 ].) The defect cannot even be cured by a supplemental complaint founded on what subsequently occurred. (21 Cal.Jur. 172.) In Lewis v. Fox, 122 Cal. 244, 252 [ 54 P. 823 ], the following example is given: “If a suit be brought upon a promissory note before it becomes due, the complaint would not be aided by a supplemental complaint filed after it became due alleging its maturity at a date subsequent to the commencement of the action. ” If in the case before us, plaintiff had accepted the note, and certainly if he had done so in full satisfaction— | 1 | 1 |
Westerfeld v. New York Life Insurancegreen2 sentences1949Co., 129 Cal. 68, 85 [ 58 P. 92 , 61 P. 667 ].) The plea that an action is prematurely brought is a perfect defense to the merits. 1949Co., 129 Cal. 68, 85 [ 58 P. 92 , 61 P. 667 ].) The plea that an action is prematurely brought is a perfect defense to the merits. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Vieira
green
2 sentences2022On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there 45 simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 .) “Penal Code section 26 declares duress to be a perfect defense against criminal charges when the person charged ‘committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable ca 2021In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether “there was evidence which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt . . . .” [Citations.]’ 13 [Citations.] On appeal, we likewise ask only whether the requested instruction was supported by substantial evidence . . . .” (People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 288 .) “Penal Code section 26 declares duress to be a perfect defense against criminal charges when the person charged ‘committed the act | 4 | 2015–2022 |
People v. Otis
green
2 sentences2022On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there 45 simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 .) “Penal Code section 26 declares duress to be a perfect defense against criminal charges when the person charged ‘committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable ca 2021On 39 direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 .) “Penal Code section 26 declares duress to be a perfect defense against criminal charges when the person charged ‘committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable ca | 2 | 2021–2022 |
The People v. Mai
green
2 sentences2022On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there 45 simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 .) “Penal Code section 26 declares duress to be a perfect defense against criminal charges when the person charged ‘committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable ca 2021On 39 direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 .) “Penal Code section 26 declares duress to be a perfect defense against criminal charges when the person charged ‘committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable ca | 2 | 2021–2022 |
United States v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2022On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there 45 simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 .) “Penal Code section 26 declares duress to be a perfect defense against criminal charges when the person charged ‘committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable ca 2021On 39 direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 .) “Penal Code section 26 declares duress to be a perfect defense against criminal charges when the person charged ‘committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable ca | 2 | 2021–2022 |
People v. Rios
green
2 sentences2016(People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 460 .) Rather than being a perfect defense to murder, it is a mitigating circumstance that reduces an intentional, unlawful killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter because it negates the element of malice. 2016(People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 460 .) Rather than being a perfect defense to murder, it is a mitigating circumstance that reduces an intentional, unlawful killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter because it negates the element of malice. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Perlman v. Perlman
neutral
2 sentences1949Under it, an answer may be stricken out, even though a perfect defense may be stated therein, unless the defendant by his affidavits shows facts to substantiate the defense.’ And in Perlman v. Perlman, 235 App.Div. 313 [ 257 N.Y.S. 48, 50 ], the court, expressing the same thought conversely, said with respect to summary judgments: ‘Even though the pleading itself be deemed insufficient, the motion must be denied if the affidavits show facts sufficient to constitute a defense entitling the pleader to defend. 1949Under it, an answer may be stricken out, even though a perfect defense may be stated therein, unless the defendant by his affidavits shows facts to substantiate the defense.’ And in Perlman v. Perlman, 235 App.Div. 313 [ 257 N.Y.S. 48, 50 ], the court, expressing the same thought conversely, said with respect to summary judgments: ‘Even though the pleading itself be deemed insufficient, the motion must be denied if the affidavits show facts sufficient to constitute a defense entitling the pleader to defend. | 2 | 1942–1949 |
Rancho San Carlos, Inc. v. Bank of Italy National Trust & Savings Ass'n
green
2 sentences1937“In the case of Rancho San Carlos, Inc., v. Bank of Italy, 123 Cal. App. 291 [ 11 Pac. (2d) 424 ], ‘the person making the check so payable ’ was not even a signer. 1937In paying out in cashier's checks, appellant did what was intended by Williams, an intent binding upon his employer; and in our opinion, therefore, under the authority of the Goodyear case, supra, appellant had a perfect defense to any claim made against it by its depositor." "In the case of Rancho San Carlos, Inc., v. Bank of Italy, 123 Cal.App. 291 [11 PaCal.2d 424], 'the person making the check so payable' was not even a signer. | 2 | 1937–1937 |
Employers Insurance Of Wausau v. National Union Fire Insurance Company Of Pittsburgh
green
1 sentence2026Co. (9th Cir. 1991) 933 F.2d 1481 , 1491.) He had notice, he had the opportunity to be heard and present evidence, and the record before us does not reflect that the arbitrator was infected with bias. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Heath
green
1 sentence2021In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether “there was evidence which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt . . . .” [Citations.]’ 13 [Citations.] On appeal, we likewise ask only whether the requested instruction was supported by substantial evidence . . . .” (People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 288 .) “Penal Code section 26 declares duress to be a perfect defense against criminal charges when the person charged ‘committed the act | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Mentch
green
1 sentence2021In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether “there was evidence which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt . . . .” [Citations.]’ 13 [Citations.] On appeal, we likewise ask only whether the requested instruction was supported by substantial evidence . . . .” (People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 288 .) “Penal Code section 26 declares duress to be a perfect defense against criminal charges when the person charged ‘committed the act | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Randle
green
1 sentence2014The Court had No Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct on Defense of Others Because There was No Substantial Evidence Defendant “Actually” Feared Imminent Harm Would Befall Rojas Imperfect defense of others applies where the defendant kills “in the actual but unreasonable belief he must defend another from imminent danger of death or great bodily injury ….” (People v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 997 , overruled on another ground by People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172 .) Perfect defense of others applies whether the defendant kills in the actual, reasonable belief he must defend another from imminent | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Chun
red
1 sentence2014The Court had No Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct on Defense of Others Because There was No Substantial Evidence Defendant “Actually” Feared Imminent Harm Would Befall Rojas Imperfect defense of others applies where the defendant kills “in the actual but unreasonable belief he must defend another from imminent danger of death or great bodily injury ….” (People v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 997 , overruled on another ground by People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172 .) Perfect defense of others applies whether the defendant kills in the actual, reasonable belief he must defend another from imminent | 1 | 2014–2014 |
City of San Jose v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2007(Schaefer Dixon Associates v. Santa Ana Watershed Project Authority (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 524, 533 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 ].) In City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 797 , 525 P.2d 701 ], the state high court adopted a two-part test for determining whether there has been substantial compliance with the Government Claims Act: “Is there some compliance with all of the statutory requirements; and, if so, is this compliance sufficient to constitute substantial compliance?” {City of San Jose, at pp. 456-457.) Westcon contends the June 9, 2003, submittal contained al 2007(Schaefer Dixon Associates v. Santa Ana Watershed Project Authority (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 524, 533 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 ].) In City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 797 , 525 P.2d 701 ], the state high court adopted a two-part test for determining whether there has been substantial compliance with the Government Claims Act: “Is there some compliance with all of the statutory requirements; and, if so, is this compliance sufficient to constitute substantial compliance?” {City of San Jose, at pp. 456-457.) Westcon contends the June 9, 2003, submittal contained al | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Krupp v. Mullen
green
2 sentences1961Therefore an answer may be stricken out although it states a perfect defense if defendant does not by his affidavits show facts to substantiate such defense.” Krupp v. Mullen, 120 Cal.App.2d 53 [ 260 P.2d 629 ], involved an answer to complaint which did not plead estoppel but defendant nevertheless sought to establish that contention by his affidavits in support of his motion for summary judgment. 1961Therefore an answer may be stricken out although it states a perfect defense if defendant does not by his affidavits show facts to substantiate such defense.” Krupp v. Mullen, 120 Cal.App.2d 53 [ 260 P.2d 629 ], involved an answer to complaint which did not plead estoppel but defendant nevertheless sought to establish that contention by his affidavits in support of his motion for summary judgment. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Clabaguera v. Espéndez Mandés
neutral
1 sentence1949Co., 129 Cal. 68, 85 [ 58 P. 92 , 61 P. 667 ].) The plea that an action is prematurely brought is a perfect defense to the merits. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Curry v. MacKenzie
green
2 sentences1949Gurry v. Mackenzie, 239 N.Y. 267 [ 146 N.E. 375 ] ....’” Tested by the foregoing principles, we believe the affidavits presented by appellant show sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the action and that it is therefore entitled to a trial on the merits. 1949Gurry v. Mackenzie, 239 N.Y. 267 [ 146 N.E. 375 ] ....’” Tested by the foregoing principles, we believe the affidavits presented by appellant show sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the action and that it is therefore entitled to a trial on the merits. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
People v. Hill
green
2 sentences1949That is not the law in this state.” The case of People v. Hill, 123 Cal. 47 [ 55 P. 692 ] is directly in point. 1949That is not the law in this state.” The case of People v. Hill, 123 Cal. 47 [ 55 P. 692 ] is directly in point. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| People v. Craig green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Santa Cruz Rock Pavement Co. v. Broderick green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| City Improvement Co. v. Broderick neutral | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Shaw v. City & County of San Francisco green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Times Publishing Co. v. Weatherby
neutral
1 sentence1913(Santa Cruz Rock Pavement Co. v. Broderick, 113 Cal. 629 , [ 45 Pac. 863 ]; City Improvement Co. v. Broderick, 125 Cal. 139 , [ 57 Pac. 776 ] ; Times Publishing Co. v. Weatherby, 139 Cal. 619 , [ 73 Pac. 465 ] ; Shaw v. San Francisco, 13 Cal. App. 548 , [ 110 Pac. 149 ].) The principle announced in the cases last cited is applicable alike to eases arising out of contract and to those sounding in tort. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Gallardo Díaz v. Rodríguez Fuertes neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| American Bonding Co. v. National Mechanics Bank green | 1 | 1907–1907 |
| Maxwell v. County of San Luis Obispo neutral | 1 | 1905–1905 |
| Phelan v. City & County of San Francisco green | 1 | 1905–1905 |
| Robinson v. Irish-American Benevolent Society neutral | 1 | 1895–1895 |
| Screwmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Benson green | 1 | 1895–1895 |
| Palmer v. White neutral | 1 | 1892–1892 |
| The People v. . McCumber green | 1 | 1861–1861 |
| Piercy v. Sabin green | 1 | 1861–1861 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.