perfect defense in Illinois

1946(Stein v. McKinney, 313 Ill. 84 ; Hagen v. Anderson, 317 Ill. 173 ; Volmut v. Bern, 346 Ill. 619 .) There is therefore a lack of mutuality in obligation, which requires a denial of a decree of specific performance.

1946(Stein v. McKinney, 313 Ill. 84 ; Hagen v. Anderson, 317 Ill. 173 ; Volmut v. Bern, 346 Ill. 619 .) There is therefore a lack of mutuality in obligation, which requires a denial of a decree of specific performance.

1946(Stein v. McKinney, 313 Ill. 84 ; Hagen v. Anderson, 317 Ill. 173 ; Volmut v. Bern, 346 Ill. 619 .) There is therefore a lack of mutuality in obligation, which requires a denial of a decree of specific performance.

1936(Roland v. Fletcher, 30 Ill. 224 .) In the instant case none of these presumptions are present.

1935Monroe v. Becker, 283 Ill. 42 .

1914(Great Western Railroad Co. v. Bacon, 30 Ill. 347 ; Germania Fire Ins.

1904Piper v. Connelly, 108 Ill. 646 .

1896Where a party knowingly and voluntarily signs a deed, although he do so in violation of his duty and of the laws, or be induced thereto by the fraudulent contrivances of others, yet if it be such, upon its face, as will convey title, it can only be impeached and set aside, and parol evidence be received for that purpose, in a court of equity.” Windett v. Hurlbut, 115 Ill. 403 ; Johnson v. Wilson, 33 Ill.

1896Where a party knowingly and voluntarily signs a deed, although he do so in violation of his duty and of the laws, or be induced thereto by the fraudulent contrivances of others, yet if it be such, upon its face, as will convey title, it can only be impeached and set aside, and parol evidence be received for that purpose, in a court of equity.” Windett v. Hurlbut, 115 Ill. 403 ; Johnson v. Wilson, 33 Ill.

1878Rice v. The Board of Trade of Chicago, 80 Ill. 134 , as authority, then it is clear that the petition for a mandamus in this case cannot be sustained and that the answer to it presents a perfect defense.

1877But, on the assumption he was a passenger on the car, riding on a free ticket containing the usual conditions, as this did, then the case is like that of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Read, 37 Ill. 484 , where it was held, such a pass or ticket is a perfect immunity to the company for such unavoidable accidents as will happen to the best managed railroad trains; not, however, shielding them from liability for gross negligence, or any degree of negligence having the character of recklessness.