Compensation Act bar in Illinois

2002Chidichimo I , 278 Ill.

2002Chidichimo I, 278 Ill.

2000Delaney v. McDonald’s Corp., 158 Ill. 2d 465 (1994).

2000Delaney v. McDonald's Corp., 158 Ill.2d 465 , 199 Ill.Dec. 696 , 634 N.E.2d 749 (1994).

2023Franklin v. Industrial Commission, 211 Ill. 2d 272 , 279–80 (2004).

2023Id. 6 1-22-0742 ¶ 20 Fights between employees arising out of disputes concerning the employer’s work are risks incidental to the employment, and resulting injuries are compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act and bar recovery in civil suits against the employer.

2022Bronzeville explained that when an employee demonstrates that injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate, then that employee may obtain redress under the Privacy Act, but when the employee seeks a statutory right to damages under the Privacy Act, that claim is preempted by the exclusive remedies afforded under the Compensation Act. ¶ 10 In a written order entered on October 29, 2019, the circuit court denied Bronzeville’s motion to reconsider but certified the following question for interlocutory appeal: “Do[ ] the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act bar a claim for st

2022Citing this court’s decision in Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 2015 IL 118070 , the appellate court held that, to determine whether an employer’s liability is governed exclusively by the provisions of the Compensation Act, the court must consider whether “ ‘the injury is the type of -4- work-related injury within the purview of the [Compensation Act].’ ” 2020 IL App (1st) 192398 , ¶ 21 (quoting Folta, 2015 IL 118070, ¶ 36 ). ¶ 12 Recognizing that an employee can escape the exclusivity provisions of the Compensation Act if she establishes that her injury is not “compensable” under the Compensation

2022Citing this court’s decision in Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 2015 IL 118070 , the appellate court held that, to determine whether an employer’s liability is governed exclusively by the provisions of the Compensation Act, the court must consider whether “ ‘the injury is the type of -4- work-related injury within the purview of the [Compensation Act].’ ” 2020 IL App (1st) 192398 , ¶ 21 (quoting Folta, 2015 IL 118070, ¶ 36 ). ¶ 12 Recognizing that an employee can escape the exclusivity provisions of the Compensation Act if she establishes that her injury is not “compensable” under the Compensation

2022Citing this court’s decision in Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 2015 IL 118070 , the appellate court held that, to determine whether an employer’s liability is governed exclusively by the provisions of the Compensation Act, the court must consider whether “ ‘the injury is the type of -4- work-related injury within the purview of the [Compensation Act].’ ” 2020 IL App (1st) 192398 , ¶ 21 (quoting Folta, 2015 IL 118070, ¶ 36 ). ¶ 12 Recognizing that an employee can escape the exclusivity provisions of the Compensation Act if she establishes that her injury is not “compensable” under the Compensation

2005Finally, Larson discusses Hughey v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 109 Ill.App.3d 633 , 65 Ill.Dec. 194 , 440 N.E.2d 1049 (1982), which defendant cites as supporting its assertion that "if Clark Refining * * * were [defendant's] agent, [defendant] would be [plaintiffs'] employer and the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation Act would bar their claims." While this proposition is supported by the *860 holding in Villa and the plain language of the Act, the holding in Hughey negatively impacts on defendant's case.

2005Finally, Larson discusses Hughey v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 109 Ill.App.3d 633 , 65 Ill.Dec. 194 , 440 N.E.2d 1049 (1982), which defendant cites as supporting its assertion that "if Clark Refining * * * were [defendant's] agent, [defendant] would be [plaintiffs'] employer and the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation Act would bar their claims." While this proposition is supported by the *860 holding in Villa and the plain language of the Act, the holding in Hughey negatively impacts on defendant's case.

1937The Industrial Commission, 332 Ill. 611 .

1937Industrial Commission, 332 Ill. 156 , our Supreme Court held: “Where the record is barren, of any showing that any claim for compensation was made by the injured employee or that any compensation was paid or medical services furnished an award of compensation cannot be sustained, as section 24 of the Compensation Act requires such claim to be made within six months after the accident or after payments have ceased, before the proceeding for compensation; can be maintained.” To the same effect is the case of The Chicago Board of Underwriters vs.

1932Under the act, the claim for compensation must be made by the -party or the person entitled to compensation, in person or by or through some person who is authorized as the agent or attorney of such party to make such demand, and “the demand for compensation" by the proper claimant is jurisdictional and that if not made within the time required by the Compensation act the claim for compensation 'is barred.” (Northwestern Malt Co. v. Industrial Com., 313 Ill. 534, 538 ; Neenan v. Industrial Com., 329 Ill. 48, 55 .) Section 28 of the act, which the defendant cites in support of its contention, p

1932Under the act, the claim for compensation must be made by the -party or the person entitled to compensation, in person or by or through some person who is authorized as the agent or attorney of such party to make such demand, and “the demand for compensation" by the proper claimant is jurisdictional and that if not made within the time required by the Compensation act the claim for compensation 'is barred.” (Northwestern Malt Co. v. Industrial Com., 313 Ill. 534, 538 ; Neenan v. Industrial Com., 329 Ill. 48, 55 .) Section 28 of the act, which the defendant cites in support of its contention, p

1924(Haiselden v. Industrial Board, 275 Ill. 114 ; Central Car Works v. Industrial Com. 290 id. 436.) In the case of In re Gorski, 227 Mass. 456 , the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that neither ignorance of the law nor absence from the country constitutes reasonable cause for failure to make demand for compensation within the time required by the act.

1924(Haiselden v. Industrial Board, 275 Ill. 114 ; Central Car Works v. Industrial Com. 290 id. 436.) In the case of In re Gorski, 227 Mass. 456 , the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that neither ignorance of the law nor absence from the country constitutes reasonable cause for failure to make demand for compensation within the time required by the act.

1916(Hyman v. Bayne, 83 Ill. 256 .) In any event, therefore, it was incumbent on appellee to allege in some one of his pleadings, and prove, that the intentional violation of the Factory act was by an elective officer of appellant.