ICC rule in Illinois

1998OPINION “The powers of courts in reviewing orders issued by the [ICC] are limited” and “[i]t has long been recognized that upon appeal, the court exercises a statutory jurisdiction rather than a general, appellate jurisdiction.” City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 264 Ill.

1998OPINION "The powers of courts in reviewing orders issued by the [ICC] are limited [and] [i]t has long been recognized that upon appeal, the court exercises a statutory jurisdiction rather than a general, appellate jurisdiction." The City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n , 264 Ill.

2020The first court to acquire “jurisdiction of any appeal from any rule, regulation, order or decision shall have and retain jurisdiction of *** appeals from the same rule, regulation, order or decision until such appeal is disposed of in such appellate court.” Id. ¶ 101 In Hutchings, our supreme court considered whether a circuit court had jurisdiction to review the legality and constitutionality of the administrative proceedings before the ICC. 2018 IL 122973 , ¶ 12.

2020The first court to acquire “jurisdiction of any appeal from any rule, regulation, order or decision shall have and retain jurisdiction of *** appeals from the same rule, regulation, order or decision until such appeal is disposed of in such appellate court.” Id. ¶ 101 In Hutchings, our supreme court considered whether a circuit court had jurisdiction to review the legality and constitutionality of the administrative proceedings before the ICC. 2018 IL 122973 , ¶ 12.

2020The first court to acquire “jurisdiction of any appeal from any rule, regulation, order or decision shall have and retain jurisdiction of *** appeals from the same rule, regulation, order or decision until such appeal is disposed of in such appellate court.” Id. ¶ 101 In Hutchings, our supreme court considered whether a circuit court had jurisdiction to review the legality and constitutionality of the administrative proceedings before the ICC. 2018 IL 122973 , ¶ 12.

2020The first court to acquire “jurisdiction of any appeal from any rule, regulation, order or decision shall have and retain jurisdiction of *** appeals from the same rule, regulation, order or decision until such appeal is disposed of in such appellate court.” Id. ¶ 101 In Hutchings, our supreme court considered whether a circuit court had jurisdiction to review the legality and constitutionality of the administrative proceedings before the ICC. 2018 IL 122973 , ¶ 12.

2016Rather, the plaintiffs’ reply brief asserts that Rule 191 is inapplicable to ICC’s motion, citing cases discussing why certain motions for summary judgment do not necessarily require strict compliance with Rule 191. ¶ 46 Our court has held: “There are two types of summary judgment motions: (1) a motion affirmatively showing that some element of the case must be resolved in the defendant’s favor, requiring the defendant to prove something that it would not be required to prove at a trial, and (2) a motion of the kind recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

2015Sign; (2) vacated the summary judgment order in favor of -4- 2015 IL App (2d) 150016 Wellington and against ICC; (3) ruled that ICC had no “duty or obligation to defend or indemnify” West Dundee for liability or damages arising from the underlying lawsuit; and (4) entered summary judgment in favor of ICC and against Wellington and West Dundee “on all counts of [ICC’s] Complaint for Declaratory Judgment” and denied summary judgment “with respect to [Wellington’s] Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment.” The trial court stated, “Based on the reasoning and holding of the G.M.

1994App. 3d 500 , 610 N.E.2d 813 , appeal pending, No. 75558 (petition for certificate of importance granted by appellate court on May 25, 1993, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 316 (134 Ill. 2d R. 316)). 1 We affirm the trial court’s denial of ICC’s motion to transfer venue from Madison County.

1994App. 3d 1080, 1084 , 452 N.E.2d 798, 801 .) By stressing section 1—102(a) (the general) over section 525.10(c) (a specific ICC rule properly promulgated pursuant to its express rulemaking authority under section 9—220 of the Public Utilities Act), Monarch violates the aforementioned long-standing rule of statutory construction that particular provisions prevail over general.

1994App. 3d 1080, 1084 , 452 N.E.2d 798, 801 .) By stressing section 1—102(a) (the general) over section 525.10(c) (a specific ICC rule properly promulgated pursuant to its express rulemaking authority under section 9—220 of the Public Utilities Act), Monarch violates the aforementioned long-standing rule of statutory construction that particular provisions prevail over general.

1986For this reason we will consider the merits of those issues (see First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128 , 345 N.E.2d 493 ), and we therefore deny the cities’ motion to strike the portions of the ICC’s brief discussing such issues.

1986For this reason we will consider the merits of those issues (see First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128 , 345 N.E.2d 493 ), and we therefore deny the cities’ motion to strike the portions of the ICC’s brief discussing such issues.

1983App. 3d 74 , 390 N.E.2d 1384 , stated that punitive damages are proper in an action arising out of a crossing accident where: (1) a statute or ICC rule requires a certain standard; (2) the railroad has violated that standard; (3) the violation is of a longstanding nature; (4) the railroad is aware of the violation; (5) the railroad has failed to conduct proper maintenance to correct the violation; and (6) the railroad has failed to continue to inspect to determine whether the violation still exists.

1978Co. (1908), 233 Ill. 564, 566 .) There is no reason to suppose that grounds of social policy exist favoring strict liability for an ICC rule when they do not exist for an identical statutory provision.

1978Co. (1908), 233 Ill. 564, 566 .) There is no reason to suppose that grounds of social policy exist favoring strict liability for an ICC rule when they do not exist for an identical statutory provision.