insuperable bar in Illinois

1991It has also been said that there is no established rule forbidding the giving of relief in any case to one injured by reason of a mistake of law, but that whenever it is clearly shown that parties in their dealings with each other have acted under a common mistake of law and the party injured thereby can be relieved without doing injury to others, equity will afford him redress.” In Reggio v. Warren, 207 Mass. 525 , [534-35,] 93 N.E. 805 [, 807], the court said, “So it has been said that the important question was not whether the mistake was one of law or of fact, but whether the particular mi

1991It has also been said that there is no established rule forbidding the giving of relief in any case to one injured by reason of a mistake of law, but that whenever it is clearly shown that parties in their dealings with each other have acted under a common mistake of law and the party injured thereby can be relieved without doing injury to others, equity will afford him redress.” In Reggio v. Warren, 207 Mass. 525 , [534-35,] 93 N.E. 805 [, 807], the court said, “So it has been said that the important question was not whether the mistake was one of law or of fact, but whether the particular mi

1993Referring to the parent's and child's individual rights to be on the street, the court stated, "It seems thus clear to us that reason and justice require that the immunity rule should not stand as an insuperable bar to redress for injuries occasioned by the exercise of those rights." ( Schenk, 100 Ill.App.2d at 206 , 241 N.E.2d 12 ; see also Nocktonick v. Nocktonick (1980), 227 Kan. 758, 767 , 611 P.2d 135, 141 (citing Schenk as abolishing parental immunity in automobile negligence cases).) Notably, the Delaware Supreme Court impliedly adopted Schenk's reasoning concerning the demise of family

1993Referring to the parent’s and child’s individual rights to be on the street, the court stated, “It seems thus clear to us that reason and justice require that the immunity rule should not. stand as an insuperable bar to redress for injuries occasioned by the exercise of those rights.” (Schenk, 100 Ill.

1949People v. Touhy, 397 Ill. 19 ; People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435 .

1947Upon the authority of People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435 , and People v. Sprague, 371 Ill. 627 , section 72 of the Civil Practice Act is an insuperable bar to Touhy’s petition filed August 10, 1946.

1993(See Schneider v. Coe (Del.1979), 405 A.2d 682 (driving in auto not unique to the parent-child relationship and does not bring into question the validity of State supervision of parental control, authority and discretion in supervising a child); Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of A Women's Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 San Diego L.Rev. 325, 338-43 (1984).

1991It has also been said that there is no established rule forbidding the giving of relief in any case to one injured by reason of a mistake of law, but that whenever it is clearly shown that parties in their dealings with each other have acted under a common mistake of law and the party injured thereby can be relieved without doing injury to others, equity will afford him redress.” In Reggio v. Warren, 207 Mass. 525 , [534-35,] 93 N.E. 805 [, 807], the court said, “So it has been said that the important question was not whether the mistake was one of law or of fact, but whether the particular mi

1991It has also been said that there is no established rule forbidding the giving of relief in any case to one injured by reason of a mistake of law, but that whenever it is clearly shown that parties in their dealings with each other have acted under a common mistake of law and the party injured thereby can be relieved without doing injury to others, equity will afford him redress.” In Reggio v. Warren, 207 Mass. 525 , [534-35,] 93 N.E. 805 [, 807], the court said, “So it has been said that the important question was not whether the mistake was one of law or of fact, but whether the particular mi

1949People v. Touhy, 397 Ill. 19 ; People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435 .

1947Upon the authority of People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435 , and People v. Sprague, 371 Ill. 627 , section 72 of the Civil Practice Act is an insuperable bar to Touhy’s petition filed August 10, 1946.

1906(Rucker v. Dooley, 49 Ill. 377 .) The court in that case mentions other examples where a limitation had been adopted without legislation, and reiterates the declaration of a former opinion: “In short, the policy of our law is repose and security of titles and estates against dormant claims.” Where the only effect of an order to sell lands to pay debts is to subject the lands to sale for that purpose, the order amounts to no more than a lien, and payment of the claims will relieve the lands from the effect of the order.

1852Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277 ; Chapman v. Shattuck, 3 Gilm. 49 .