prudent investor rule in Illinois

2012The Third Circuit rejected the trustee’s broad argument and held that the trust clause does not “completely absolve[ ] [the trustee] from any duty to diversify” or “abrogate [the trustee’s] general obligation to [act] with prudence.” Robertson, 47 F.3d at 1275 .

2012The Third Circuit rejected the trustee's broad argument and held that the trust clause does not "completely absolve [] [the trustee] from any duty to diversify" or "abrogate [the trustee's] general obligation to [act] with prudence." Robertson, 47 F.3d at 1275 .

1997In response, defendants maintain that the trial court was correct in finding that Bracken v. Block, 204 Ill.

1997In response, defendants maintain that the trial court was correct in finding that Bracken v. Block , 204 Ill.

1986App.3d 873, 879 , 371 N.E.2d 692, 697 .) Here, the jury was told to assess defendant's conduct based upon a prudent-man standard and then in the next sentence was directed to assess defendant's management of the estate based on a prudent-investor standard.

1986App. 3d 873, 879 , 371 N.E.2d 692, 697 .) Here, the jury was told to assess defendant’s conduct based upon a prudent-man standard and then in the next sentence was directed to assess defendant’s management of the estate based on a prudent-investor standard.

1986In surcharging the executor, the court did not apply a prudent-investor standard, but rather concluded that the bank had failed to meet the test of "`that degree of reasonable diligence ordinarily employed in like business affairs by a man of common prudence * * *.'" People v. Busby (1937), 288 Ill.

1986In surcharging the executor, the court did not apply a prudent-investor standard, but rather concluded that the bank had failed to meet the test of “ ‘that degree of reasonable diligence ordinarily employed in like business affairs by a man of common prudence ***.’ ” People v. Busby (1937), 288 Ill.

1986App. 3d 714 , 725, 388 N.E.2d 148 , 157.) Lindberg does not support J-8 because the court there did not apply a prudent-investor standard, but rather imposed a duty upon the defendant bank to exhibit the degree of skill and diligence which an ordinary prudent man would bestow upon his own similar affairs. ( 69 Ill.

1986App. 3d 714 , 725, 388 N.E.2d 148 , 157.) Lindberg does not support J-8 because the court there did not apply a prudent-investor standard, but rather imposed a duty upon the defendant bank to exhibit the degree of skill and diligence which an ordinary prudent man would bestow upon his own similar affairs. ( 69 Ill.

2012Faville, 2011 IL App (1st) 110335, ¶ 35 , 355 Ill.Dec. 656 , 960 N.E.2d 99 (citing Laubner, 386 Ill.App.3d at 464 , 325 Ill.Dec. 697 , 898 N.E.2d 744 ). ¶ 30 Tiffany contends that Audrey has violated the prudent investor rule by *1157 engaging in an investment strategy that considers neither the reasonable production of income nor the safety of capital but, rather, seeks solely to maximize her income while decreasing the value of the principal.

2012Faville, 2011 IL App (1st) 110335, ¶ 35 , 355 Ill.Dec. 656 , 960 N.E.2d 99 (citing Laubner, 386 Ill.App.3d at 464 , 325 Ill.Dec. 697 , 898 N.E.2d 744 ). ¶ 30 Tiffany contends that Audrey has violated the prudent investor rule by *1157 engaging in an investment strategy that considers neither the reasonable production of income nor the safety of capital but, rather, seeks solely to maximize her income while decreasing the value of the principal.

2012Further, because no trust was established, the duties under the prudent investor rule delineated in section 5 of the Trusts and Trustees Act (760 ILCS 5/5 (West 2010)) do not apply. ¶ 35 Plaintiffs rely on Masi, 779 F.2d 397 , where the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that “IRAs are not regular savings accounts.

2012They clearly are special deposits that constitute a trust relationship wherein the Bank owes a fiduciary duty to the depositor.” Masi, 779 F.2d at 401 .

2012Faville, 2011 IL App (1st) 110335, ¶ 35 , 355 Ill.Dec. 656 , 960 N.E.2d 99 (citing Laubner, 386 Ill.App.3d at 464 , 325 Ill.Dec. 697 , 898 N.E.2d 744 ). ¶ 30 Tiffany contends that Audrey has violated the prudent investor rule by *1157 engaging in an investment strategy that considers neither the reasonable production of income nor the safety of capital but, rather, seeks solely to maximize her income while decreasing the value of the principal.

2012Citizens National Bank of Paris v. Kids Hope United, Inc., 235 Ill.2d 565, 574 , 337 Ill.Dec. 516 , 922 N.E.2d 1093 (2009).

2012Citizens National Bank of Paris v. Kids Hope United, Inc., 235 Ill.2d 565, 574 , 337 Ill.Dec. 516 , 922 N.E.2d 1093 (2009).

2009In re Guardianship of Connor, 170 Ill.App.3d 759, 763 , 121 Ill.Dec. 408 , 525 N.E.2d 214 (1988) (the court applied the prudent-person standard to a corporate guardian but not with regard to statutory investments); see also In re Estate of Pirie, 141 Ill.App.3d 750, 766 , 97 Ill.Dec. 225 , 492 N.E.2d 884 (1986) (the court interpreted a portion of the Probate Act to apply the prudent-person standard to investments by corporate executors; it also agreed that if the prudent-investor standard is to be applied, it should be applied by the legislature and not the court).

2009In re Guardianship of Connor, 170 Ill.App.3d 759, 763 , 121 Ill.Dec. 408 , 525 N.E.2d 214 (1988) (the court applied the prudent-person standard to a corporate guardian but not with regard to statutory investments); see also In re Estate of Pirie, 141 Ill.App.3d 750, 766 , 97 Ill.Dec. 225 , 492 N.E.2d 884 (1986) (the court interpreted a portion of the Probate Act to apply the prudent-person standard to investments by corporate executors; it also agreed that if the prudent-investor standard is to be applied, it should be applied by the legislature and not the court).

2009A court's function is to interpret the law as enacted by the legislature, "`not to annex new provisions or substitute different ones, or read into a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions which depart from its plain meaning.'" In re Estate of Swiecicki, 106 Ill.2d 111, 120 , 87 Ill.Dec. 511 , 477 N.E.2d 488 (1985), quoting Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill.2d 293, 307 , 134 N.E.2d 249 (1956).

1986Prior to reviewing the facts, however, the Beach court first expressly decided the legal question, finding that the trial court had applied the correct standard of care in analyzing the executor's conduct. ( Estate of Beach (1975), 15 Cal.3d 623, 630 , 542 P.2d 994, 998 , 125 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574 , cert. denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1046 , 54 L.Ed.2d 797 , 98 S.Ct. 891 .) Moreover, two factors in Beach provided a stronger basis for applying a prudent-investor standard there than do the circumstances here.

1986Prior to reviewing the facts, however, the Beach court first expressly decided the legal question, finding that the trial court had applied the correct standard of care in analyzing the executor's conduct. ( Estate of Beach (1975), 15 Cal.3d 623, 630 , 542 P.2d 994, 998 , 125 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574 , cert. denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1046 , 54 L.Ed.2d 797 , 98 S.Ct. 891 .) Moreover, two factors in Beach provided a stronger basis for applying a prudent-investor standard there than do the circumstances here.

1986Prior to reviewing the facts, however, the Beach court first expressly decided the legal question, finding that the trial court had applied the correct standard of care in analyzing the executor's conduct. ( Estate of Beach (1975), 15 Cal.3d 623, 630 , 542 P.2d 994, 998 , 125 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574 , cert. denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1046 , 54 L.Ed.2d 797 , 98 S.Ct. 891 .) Moreover, two factors in Beach provided a stronger basis for applying a prudent-investor standard there than do the circumstances here.

1986Prior to reviewing the facts, however, the Beach court first expressly decided the legal question, finding that the trial court had applied the correct standard of care in analyzing the executor's conduct. ( Estate of Beach (1975), 15 Cal.3d 623, 630 , 542 P.2d 994, 998 , 125 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574 , cert. denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1046 , 54 L.Ed.2d 797 , 98 S.Ct. 891 .) Moreover, two factors in Beach provided a stronger basis for applying a prudent-investor standard there than do the circumstances here.

1986Prior to reviewing the facts, however, the Beach court first expressly decided the legal question, finding that the trial court had applied the correct standard of care in analyzing the executor's conduct. ( Estate of Beach (1975), 15 Cal.3d 623, 630 , 542 P.2d 994, 998 , 125 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574 , cert. denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1046 , 54 L.Ed.2d 797 , 98 S.Ct. 891 .) Moreover, two factors in Beach provided a stronger basis for applying a prudent-investor standard there than do the circumstances here.