11 Indiana opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kidd v. Stategreen1 sentence2007Further, while we recognize that in Trotter v. State, 838 N.E.2d 553 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), and Buntin v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), this court overturned auto theft convictions under the theory that the State was required to establish the defendants were the original “thieves” and not merely exercising control over a stolen car, those cases rested largely upon the Indiana Supreme Court’s analysis in Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287, 288 (Ind.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Weaver v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Weaver v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1066, 1070-72 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied, Whether substantive protections similarly compel the retroactive application of the Blakely standard we do not decide, but we do note, with respect to claims specifically brought under P-C.R. 2, that we have determined in the past that the Indiana Supreme Court's rule precluding retroactive application of new criminal rules to collateral proceedings does not apply to direct appeals, including those involving Blakely claims. | 1 | 1 |
Sullivan v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Sullivan v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). 13 . | 1 | 1 |
Fosha v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Fosha v. State, 747 N.E.2d 549, 552 (Ind.2001) (holding that defendant's claim based on Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999), would be considered on the merits, where defendant was convicted in 1993 and did not originally timely file a direct appeal but in 1999 was granted permission to file a belated appeal). 2005Fosha v. State, 747 N.E.2d 549, 552 (Ind.2001) (holding that defendant's claim based on Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999), would be considered on the merits, where defendant was convicted in 1993 and did not originally timely file a direct appeal but in 1999 was granted permission to file a belated appeal). | 1 | 1 |
Smalis v. Pennsylvaniagreen2 sentences1989In 1986, the United States Supreme Court eliminated confusion then existing in double jeopardy doctrine when it unanimously held that a ruling by a court "that as a matter of law the State's evidence is insufficient to establish [a defendant's] factual guilt.... is an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause," Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144 , 106 S.Ct. 1745, 1748 , 90 L.Ed.2d 116, 121 (1986), and that "subjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. at 145 , 106 S.Ct. at 1749 , 90 L.Ed.2d at 12 1989In 1986, the United States Supreme Court eliminated confusion then existing in double jeopardy doctrine when it unanimously held that a ruling by a court "that as a matter of law the State's evidence is insufficient to establish [a defendant's] factual guilt.... is an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause," Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144 , 106 S.Ct. 1745, 1748 , 90 L.Ed.2d 116, 121 (1986), and that "subjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. at 145 , 106 S.Ct. at 1749 , 90 L.Ed.2d at 12 | 1 | 1 |
Glissman v. Ruttgreen1 sentence1980See Glissman v. Rutt (3d Dist. 1978) Ind.App., 372 N.E.2d 1188 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cardinal Health Ventures, Inc v. Michael Scanameo, M.D., Carol Scanameo, and Michael Scanameo, M.D., Inc
neutral
1 sentence2025Zotec does point to a single case, Cardinal Health Ventures, Inc. v. Scanameo, 85 N.E.3d 637 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied, to support its argument that it was entitled to a jury trial. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Trotter v. State
green
1 sentence2007Further, while we recognize that in Trotter v. State, 838 N.E.2d 553 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), and Buntin v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), this court overturned auto theft convictions under the theory that the State was required to establish the defendants were the original “thieves” and not merely exercising control over a stolen car, those cases rested largely upon the Indiana Supreme Court’s analysis in Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287, 288 (Ind.1988). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Buntin v. State
green
1 sentence2007Further, while we recognize that in Trotter v. State, 838 N.E.2d 553 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), and Buntin v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), this court overturned auto theft convictions under the theory that the State was required to establish the defendants were the original “thieves” and not merely exercising control over a stolen car, those cases rested largely upon the Indiana Supreme Court’s analysis in Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287, 288 (Ind.1988). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Richardson v. State
green
2 sentences2005Fosha v. State, 747 N.E.2d 549, 552 (Ind.2001) (holding that defendant's claim based on Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999), would be considered on the merits, where defendant was convicted in 1993 and did not originally timely file a direct appeal but in 1999 was granted permission to file a belated appeal). 2005Fosha v. State, 747 N.E.2d 549, 552 (Ind.2001) (holding that defendant's claim based on Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999), would be considered on the merits, where defendant was convicted in 1993 and did not originally timely file a direct appeal but in 1999 was granted permission to file a belated appeal). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Goudy v. State
green
2 sentences1998In Goudy v. State (1997) Ind., 689 N.E.2d 686, 698 , reh’g denied, our Indiana Supreme Court held that carjacking was an included offense of robbery, as a class A felony. 1998In Goudy v. State (1997) Ind., 689 N.E.2d 686, 698 , reh'g denied, our Indiana Supreme Court held that carjacking was an included offense of robbery, as a class A felony. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Hays v. Hays
green
2 sentences1997Our determination that Moore’s sentence is not solely punitive in nature, but is coercive, is supported by the Indiana Supreme Court’s analysis in Hays v. Hays, 216 Ind. 62 , 22 N.E.2d 971 (Ind.1939). 1997Our determination that Moore’s sentence is not solely punitive in nature, but is coercive, is supported by the Indiana Supreme Court’s analysis in Hays v. Hays, 216 Ind. 62 , 22 N.E.2d 971 (Ind.1939). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Department of Treasury v. Muessel
green
2 sentences1996This Court is also persuaded by the Indiana Supreme Court’s analysis of a similar issue in Department of Treasury v. Muessel, 218 Ind. 250 , 32 N.E.2d 596 (1941). 1996This Court is also persuaded by the Indiana Supreme Court’s analysis of a similar issue in Department of Treasury v. Muessel, 218 Ind. 250 , 32 N.E.2d 596 (1941). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Indiana Waste Systems of Indiana, Inc. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue
green
1 sentence1994Indiana Waste, 633 N.E.2d at 364 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ayres v. Indian Heights Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.
green
1 sentence1994Applying the Indiana Supreme Court's analysis in Ayres v. Indian Heights Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 1229 , the court rejected the notion that the garbage hauler was a governmental agency or instrumentality. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Smith v. State
green
1 sentence1992And, of course, in the seminal Smith v. *697 State, supra, 459 N.E.2d at 357 , our Supreme Court observed: "When an instruction purports to set forth all of the elements of a crime necessary to a conviction, the instruction is fatally defective if a nee-essary element is omitted." Furthermore, it may be noted that mandates continue to exist both in the form of Indiana Supreme Court rule, and in statutes concerning the subject matter. | 1 | 1992–1992 |