Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287 (Ind. 1988). · Go Syfert
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Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287 (Ind. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
37 citation events (26 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Daquoine D. Harriston v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (indctapp, 2019-12-06) · Strongest negative: Payne v. State (indctapp, 2002-10-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Payne v. State (2×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: but see · confidence high
Finally, “unexplained possession of recently stolen property will support a burglary conviction so long as there is evidence that there was in fact a burglary committed.” Allen v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1222, 1230 (Ind.Ct.App.2001); but see Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287, 288 (Ind.1988) (holding that mere possession of stolen property one to three days after the burglary was insufficient, even with evidence of a breaking and entry).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Daquoine D. Harriston v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
It has long been held that “[o]n appellate review of circumstantial evidence of guilt, [the court] need not determine whether the circumstantial evidence is adequate to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, but rather whether inferences may be reasonably drawn from that evidence which support the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bustamante, 557 N.E.2d at 1317–18 (citing Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287, 287 (Ind. 1988)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Aaron Harlow v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Harlow argues that this is analogous to the case of Kidd v. State in which the Indiana Supreme Court found that a person may not be convicted of burglary solely on the basis of having been found in possession of burgled items; although, such evidence does support an inference of guilt of burglary and theft of that property. 530 N.E.2d 287, 288 (Ind. 1988).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Desmond E. Lewis v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Id. (citing Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287, 287 (Ind. 1988)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mike Harmon, Jr. v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
“Hence, a burglar’s intent to commit a specific felony at the time of the breaking and entering may be inferred from the circumstances.” Id. at 229-30 (internal quotation omitted). “‘Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a burglary conviction.’” Id. at 230 (quoting Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287, 287 (Ind. 1988).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Zachary Daye Riffle v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Id. (citing Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287, 287 (Ind. 1988), reh’g denied).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Baker v. State
Ind. · 2012 · confidence medium
Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287, 287 (Ind.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shelby v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ind. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Further, while we recognize that in Trotter v. State, 838 N.E.2d 553 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), and Buntin v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), this court overturned auto theft convictions under the theory that the State was required to establish the defendants were the original “thieves” and not merely exercising control over a stolen car, those cases rested largely upon the Indiana Supreme Court’s analysis in Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287, 288 (Ind.1988).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Trotter v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Our Supreme Court addressed this distinction in Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287, 288 (Ind.1988).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287, 288 (Ind.1988); Maynard v. State, 508 N.E.2d 1346, 1357 (Ind.Ct.App.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gibson v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
A recent supreme court case, Kidd v. State (1988), Ind., 530 N.E.2d 287, 288 (Gi-van, J., Pivarnik, J., dissenting), not only corroborates this analysis but also appears to further restrict the outer limitation of “recent.” In Kidd , the defendant, charged with burglary, was in exclusive possession one to four days later of property stolen from the burglarized house.
cited Cited "see" Robertson v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287, 288 (Ind.1988); Buntin v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (Ind.Ct.App.2005); Trotter v. State, 838 N.E.2d 553, 557-58 (Ind.Ct.App.2005).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Matthew D. Tribble v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287 (Ind. 1988) (finding insufficient evidence to sustain a burglary conviction where the sole evidence was that a defendant possessed items taken in a burglary two to four days earlier) and Buntin v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (possession of a vehicle stolen five days earlier and turning around upon spotting a police officer did not support an auto theft conviction).
Clarence KIDD, Appellant (Defendant Below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below)
65S00-8703-CR-288.
Indiana Supreme Court.
Nov 17, 1988.
530 N.E.2d 287
1988 Ind. LEXIS 312
1988 WL 123510
William H. Bender, Allyn, Givens & Bender, Poseyville, for appellant., Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
DeBRULER, Dickson, Givan, Pivarnik, Shepard.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

DICKSON, Justice.

A Posey County jury found defendant-appellant Clarence Kidd guilty of burglary, a class B felony, Ind.Code § 35-43-2-1. The trial court entered conviction thereon and sentenced defendant to twenty years, increasing the presumptive ten year sentence by an additional ten years for aggravating circumstances. The sole issue raised in this direct appeal is defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.

In addressing the issue of sufficiency of evidence, we will affirm the conviction if, considering only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict, without weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Case v. State (1984), Ind., 458 N.E.2d 223. Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a burglary conviction. Taylor v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E. 2d 290. In appellate review of circumstantial evidence of guilt, this Court need not determine whether the circumstantial evidence is adequate to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, but only whether inferences may reasonably be drawn to support the verdict. Lovell v. State (1985), Ind., 474 N.E.2d 505; Kizer v. State (1982), Ind., 437 N.E.2d 466.

The evidence most favorable to the trial court’s judgment reveals that between June 5, 1985, and June 7, 1985, Dennis Dale’s mobile home was burglarized. The burglar stole four rifles and five pieces of Pioneer stereo equipment. Jim Browning testified that in early June, “somewhere around the 3rd, 4th, or 5th, I don’t remember the date,” defendant sold Browning some Pioneer stereo equipment[*288] with the explanation that the equipment belonged to his girlfriend’s brother and the brother wanted to sell it. Browning also understood that defendant desired to sell the stereo equipment so that defendant and his girlfriend could leave town. After the two men agreed to the terms of the sale, defendant gave Browning a signed receipt, dated June 8, 1985, evidencing the transaction. The stereo equipment sold by defendant to Browning proved to be the same stereo equipment stolen from Dale’s mobile home. On June 9, 1985, defendant approached Emmitt Caudill and offered to sell Caudill some rifles, explaining the rifles belonged to his girlfriend’s mother and were being sold because the woman needed money. The four rifles purchased by Cau-dill from defendant were the four rifles stolen from Dale’s mobile home.

Defendant argues that “[s]imply because the defendant was identified as the one who sold stereo equipment and guns owned by the victim, does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the individual who broke and entered the mobile home.” We have previously held that the unexplained possession of recently stolen items provides support for an inference of guilt of burglary and theft of that property. Steele v. State (1985), Ind., 475 N.E.2d 1149 (defendant in possession of stolen property on same evening burglary committed); Ward v. State (1982), Ind., 439 N.E.2d 156, reh. denied (although facts not clear, it appears police discovered defendant in possession of stolen property on same day burglary committed); Turpin v. State (1982), Ind., 435 N.E.2d 1, appeal after remand, (1986), Ind., 490 N.E.2d 1109 (police discovered defendant in possession of stolen property on same morning burglary committed).

In the present case, however, the sole evidence is that subsequent to the burglary, defendant was found in possession of stolen rifles two to four days later, and of stolen stereo equipment one to three days later. The State argues that such evidence, combined with defendant’s false explanations regarding his possession of the property and desire to sell it, are sufficient to support the conviction for burglary. If this were so, evidence sufficient to prove possession of stolen property would necessarily and inevitably support a further conviction for burglary, even absent evidence that such defendant participated in the burglary itself.

Defendant Kidd was charged with the single offense of breaking and entering the dwelling of another with the intent to commit the felony of theft. He was not charged with the offense of possessing stolen property, Ind.Code § 35-43-4-2.

Under the circumstances presented to us, we cannot conclude that a reasonably trier of fact could find the defendant guilty of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

SHEPARD, C.J., and DeBRULER, J., concur. GIVAN, J., dissents with opinion in which PIVARNIK, J., concurs.

Dissent

GIVAN, Justice,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. The majority correctly cites authority for the proposition that this Court will not reweigh evidence on appeal. However, that is precisely what the Court then proceeds to do.

Possession of the goods by appellant shortly after the burglary, together with his false explanations of his possession, was ample evidence to support the jury’s finding that he was in fact the person who had acquired the goods through the perpetration of the burglary. The evidence is clear that the burglary was committed, and the goods taken were in the unexplained possession of appellant shortly thereafter.

The trial court should be affirmed.

PIVARNIK, J., concurs.