qualified official immunity in Kentucky

2019Having concluded that summary judgment was appropriate for Rogers, Jones, Gaines, Corbin, Pendleton, Gorin, Phillips, and Marcum (in both his individual and official capacities), we must next consider whether the remaining individual defendant, Benningfield, is shielded by the doctrine of qualified official immunity. 15 When government employees like Benningfield are sued in their individual capacities, they “enjoy only qualified official immunity, which affords protection from damages liability for good faith judgment calls made in a legally uncertain environment.” Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522 (c

2019Having concluded that summary judgment was appropriate for Rogers, Jones, Gaines, Corbin, Pendleton, Gorin, Phillips, and Marcum (in both his individual and official capacities), we must next consider whether the remaining individual defendant, Benningfield, is shielded by the doctrine of qualified official immunity. 15 When government employees like Benningfield are sued in their individual capacities, they “enjoy only qualified official immunity, which affords protection from damages liability for good faith judgment calls made in a legally uncertain environment.” Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522 (c

2021Because few acts are purely discretionary or purely ministerial, courts must look for the “dominant nature of the act.” Haney v. Monsky, 311 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Ky. 2010).

2015As noted in Haney v. Monsky, 311 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Ky.2010), the distinction between a discretionary act and ministerial act is one not easily made because “few acts are purely discretionary or purely ministerial [.] ” In Marson , the Court again attempted to explain the amorphous concept of qualified official immunity.

2020While “a trial court’s ruling on the issue of constitutional standing, in and of itself, does not give rise to an immediate right to an appeal, i.e. an 4 We refer to that case herein as the “Writ Case.” In an Order of the Court rendered today, we dismiss the Writ Case as moot. s 566 S.W.3d 185, 195 (Ky. 2018). 6 Our dismissal of this case renders the Writ Case moot. 8 interlocutory appeal!,]” this Court has the authority to address constitutional standing whenever a facially valid and procedurally proper interlocutory appeal is before it.7 In this case, the facially valid and procedurally prop

2020While “a trial court’s ruling on the issue of constitutional standing, in and of itself, does not give rise to an immediate right to an appeal, i.e. an 4 We refer to that case herein as the “Writ Case.” In an Order of the Court rendered today, we dismiss the Writ Case as moot. s 566 S.W.3d 185, 195 (Ky. 2018). 6 Our dismissal of this case renders the Writ Case moot. 8 interlocutory appeal!,]” this Court has the authority to address constitutional standing whenever a facially valid and procedurally proper interlocutory appeal is before it.7 In this case, the facially valid and procedurally prop

2025See Commonwealth v. Roth, 567 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Ky. 2019).

2024Co., LLC, 554 S.W.3d at 343 . 3 See also Curry v. Cincinnati Equitable Insurance Company, 834 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Ky. App. 1992). -11- Moreover, Huddleston had ample opportunity to counter the qualified official immunity defense raised in the amended answer.

2021The qualified official immunity defense is not applicable to “the negligent performance of a ministerial act, i.e., one that requires only obedience to the orders of others, or when the officer’s duty is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific act arising from fixed and designated facts.” Id. (citing Franklin County, Kentucky v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195, 201 (Ky. 1997)).