judge committed legal error in Louisiana

2016ANALYSIS This court recently in Cole v. Allstate Insurance Co., 07-1046, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/5/08), 987 So.2d 310, 312 , writ denied, 08-1463 (La.10/31/08), 994 So.2d 535 , discussed the appellate standard of review for factual determinations as follows: The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s factual findings is well settled and has long been established in this state.

2016ANALYSIS This court recently in Cole v. Allstate Insurance Co., 07-1046, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/5/08), 987 So.2d 310, 312 , writ denied, 08-1463 (La.10/31/08), 994 So.2d 535 , discussed the appellate standard of review for factual determinations as follows: The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s factual findings is well settled and has long been established in this state.

2014The plaintiffs contend Webb is inapposite because the Webb court failed to make a distinction between common causation and individual causation, and because it failed to consider the cautionary instruction in Dupree where the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that “the mere fact that varying degrees of damages may result from the same factual transaction and same legal relationship, or that class members must individually prove their right to recover, does not preclude class certification.” Dupree , 09-2602 at 10, 51 So.3d at 682 (citing Bartlett v. Browning-Ferris Industries Chemical Services, I

2014Surgery Ctr., L.P. v. Webb, 704 S.E.2d 185 , 307 Ga.App. 44 (Ga.Ct.App.2010), 24 wherein the plaintiffs sought to certify a class of individuals claiming “compensation for any contracted diseases.” The plaintiffs argue that Webb is factually and legally inapposite to the instant case and, thus, the trial judge committed legal error in relying upon it to support her denial of class certification.

2014Surgery Ctr., L.P. v. Webb, 704 S.E.2d 185 , 307 Ga.App. 44 (Ga.Ct.App.2010), 24 wherein the plaintiffs sought to certify a class of individuals claiming “compensation for any contracted diseases.” The plaintiffs argue that Webb is factually and legally inapposite to the instant case and, thus, the trial judge committed legal error in relying upon it to support her denial of class certification.

2014The plaintiffs contend Webb is inapposite because the Webb court failed to make a distinction between common causation and individual causation, and because it failed to consider the cautionary instruction in Dupree where the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that “the mere fact that varying degrees of damages may result from the same factual transaction and same legal relationship, or that class members must individually prove their right to recover, does not preclude class certification.” Dupree , 09-2602 at 10, 51 So.3d at 682 (citing Bartlett v. Browning-Ferris Industries Chemical Services, I

2009The second circuit in Dartlone v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 33,597 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/21/00), 763 So.2d 779, 787 , made this point quite well in finding that a trial judge committed legal error in disqualifying a qualified expert witness on the basis of his testifying for a party different from the one who had initially engaged him: |4An expert is not a party or a party’s representative and there is no presumption that an expert is adverse or hostile to anyone.

2007Alex v. Rayne Concrete Service, 04-1555 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/14/05) , 915 So.2d 931, 937 .

2002Gonzales v. Xerox Corp., 320 So.2d 163 (La.1975).

2000To assert that an operator owes a “very high degree of care” to its patrons, Plaintiffs cite Jenkins v. Ferguson, 357 So.2d 39 (La.App. 3 Cir.1978), in which this court made a res ipsa loquitur finding against the operator of a Scrambler ride where a locking device failed, and there was no other explanation for the door of the ride having flown open.

1997Cases such as Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257 (La.1993), and Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989), have to do with the appellate court's review of facts.

1997Cases such as Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257 (La.1993), and Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989), have to do with the appellate court's review of facts.

1989Likewise, in Rodriguez v. Traylor, supra , the trial judge committed legal error in improperly instructing the jury on damages.

1987However, we find that the trial judge committed legal error when he chose to base his decision on agency principles rather than Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products, Inc., supra. It was precisely in such a situation as this, when a client discharged his first attorney without cause and subsequently recovered damages as a result of the efforts of the second attorney, that our Supreme Court rendered its decision on rehearing in Saucier .

1987Writing for the Court, Justice Calogero held that only one contingency fee was to be paid by the client served by more than one attorney; “[f]urther, that fee should in turn be allocated between or among the various attorneys involved in handling the claim in question, such fee apportionment to be on the basis of factors which are set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility.” Saucier, supra, at p. 118 .

1985Of further significance, as stated in the Tidewater case 219 So.2d 616 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1969) no cases restrict the term “reworking of” to operations which “affect the ability of the formation to feed into the well bore.” Tidewater also noted that prior decisions gave “broad” definitions to the term “reworking operations.” I believe that the trial judge committed legal error in applying too strict an interpretation of what “reworking” consists of.

1985The State contends that the correct standard for granting a directed verdict is the standard set forth in Campbell v. Mouton, 373 So.2d 237 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1979) and as provided in LSA-C.C.P. art. 1810.