absence of Miranda warning in Massachusetts

2025See Commonwealth v. Leon L., 52 Mass. App. Ct. 823,829 (2001) (juvenile defendants' statements not voluntary where juveniles had been in the United States for only short time, were frightened and upset, and detective spoke loudly and pressured juveniles to make statements).

2023Although we use the framework designed to determine whether an interrogation was custodial for Miranda purposes, our focus here is not on the absence of Miranda warnings but instead on the defendants' custodial status. [Note 8] Page 178 "'The determination of custody depends primarily on the objective circumstances of the interrogation,' that is, 'whether, considering all the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have believed that [she] was in custody.'" Commonwealth v. Woollam, 478 Mass. 493 , 506 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1579 (2018), quoting Commonweal

2023Considering all of the circumstances, a reasonable person in either defendant's position here would have believed that she remained in custody. [Note 9] The factors we consider in determining whether the defendants were in custody include "(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the officers have conveyed to the person being questioned any belief or opinion that that person is a suspect; (3) the nature of the interrogation, including whether the interview was aggressive or, instead, informal and influenced in its contours by the person being interviewed; and (4) whether, at the time th

2023"In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings absent clear error, but conduct an independent review of [the judge's] ultimate findings and conclusions of law." Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 482 Mass. 850, 857 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015).

2023"In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings absent clear error, but conduct an independent review of [the judge's] ultimate findings and conclusions of law." Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 482 Mass. 850, 857 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015).

2018See, e.g., United States v. Yousef , 327 F.3d 56 , 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 933 , 124 S.Ct. 353 , 157 L.Ed.2d 241 (2003) ("the law is settled that statements taken by foreign police in the absence of Miranda warnings are admissible if voluntary"); Fisher v. United States , 779 A.2d 348 , 353-354 (D.C. 2001), cert. denied, **131 534 U.S. 1095 , 122 S.Ct. 844 , 151 L.Ed.2d 722 (2002). "[B]ecause the United States cannot dictate the protections provided to criminal suspects by foreign nations and one of the principal purposes of the exclusionary rule-deterrence of unlawful police act

2018See, e.g., United States v. Yousef , 327 F.3d 56 , 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 933 , 124 S.Ct. 353 , 157 L.Ed.2d 241 (2003) ("the law is settled that statements taken by foreign police in the absence of Miranda warnings are admissible if voluntary"); Fisher v. United States , 779 A.2d 348 , 353-354 (D.C. 2001), cert. denied, **131 534 U.S. 1095 , 122 S.Ct. 844 , 151 L.Ed.2d 722 (2002). "[B]ecause the United States cannot dictate the protections provided to criminal suspects by foreign nations and one of the principal purposes of the exclusionary rule-deterrence of unlawful police act

2018See, e.g., United States v. Yousef , 327 F.3d 56 , 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 933 , 124 S.Ct. 353 , 157 L.Ed.2d 241 (2003) ("the law is settled that statements taken by foreign police in the absence of Miranda warnings are admissible if voluntary"); Fisher v. United States , 779 A.2d 348 , 353-354 (D.C. 2001), cert. denied, **131 534 U.S. 1095 , 122 S.Ct. 844 , 151 L.Ed.2d 722 (2002). "[B]ecause the United States cannot dictate the protections provided to criminal suspects by foreign nations and one of the principal purposes of the exclusionary rule-deterrence of unlawful police act

2018See, e.g., United States v. Yousef , 327 F.3d 56 , 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 933 , 124 S.Ct. 353 , 157 L.Ed.2d 241 (2003) ("the law is settled that statements taken by foreign police in the absence of Miranda warnings are admissible if voluntary"); Fisher v. United States , 779 A.2d 348 , 353-354 (D.C. 2001), cert. denied, **131 534 U.S. 1095 , 122 S.Ct. 844 , 151 L.Ed.2d 722 (2002). "[B]ecause the United States cannot dictate the protections provided to criminal suspects by foreign nations and one of the principal purposes of the exclusionary rule-deterrence of unlawful police act

2014The Court emphasized that Miranda sought to protect or preserve a suspect’s ability to exercise his right against self-incrimination in the “inherently compelling” atmosphere of a police-dominated official interrogation, and concluded that under the Fifth Amendment, incriminating statements made during a voluntary conversation between a suspect who was incarcerated on other charges and his cellmate — an undercover officer posing as an inmate — were not rendered inadmissible because of the absence of Miranda warnings. 10 Id. at 296, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 .

2014The Court emphasized that Miranda sought to protect or preserve a suspect's ability to exercise his right against self-incrimination in the "inherently compelling" atmosphere of a police-dominated official interrogation, and concluded that under the Fifth Amendment, incriminating statements made during a voluntary conversation between a suspect who was incarcerated on other charges and his cellmate -- an undercover officer posing as an inmate -– were not rendered inadmissible because of the absence of Miranda warnings.10 Id. at 296 , quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 10 The Supreme Court reasoned:

2006To the extent that Commonwealth v. Alan A., supra, appears to permit a search of nonpublic space for reasons of officer safety, I note that after that case was decided, the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Clark, 432 Mass. 1, 14 (2000), declined to reach the issue whether New York v. Quarles, supra, extends to cases where there is a “speculative threat to an individual officer” or is limited “to those cases in which there is ‘a grave threat to public safety.’ ” There was no discussion in Commonwealth v. Clark, supra, of Commonwealth v. Alan A., supra, or of Commonwealth v. Kitchings,

2006To the extent that Commonwealth v. Alan A., supra, appears to permit a search of nonpublic space for reasons of officer safety, I note that after that case was decided, the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Clark, 432 Mass. 1, 14 (2000), declined to reach the issue whether New York v. Quarles, supra, extends to cases where there is a “speculative threat to an individual officer” or is limited “to those cases in which there is ‘a grave threat to public safety.’ ” There was no discussion in Commonwealth v. Clark, supra, of Commonwealth v. Alan A., supra, or of Commonwealth v. Kitchings,

2006To the extent that Commonwealth v. Alan A., supra, appears to permit a search of nonpublic space for reasons of officer safety, I note that after that case was decided, the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Clark, 432 Mass. 1, 14 (2000), declined to reach the issue whether New York v. Quarles, supra, extends to cases where there is a “speculative threat to an individual officer” or is limited “to those cases in which there is ‘a grave threat to public safety.’ ” There was no discussion in Commonwealth v. Clark, supra, of Commonwealth v. Alan A., supra, or of Commonwealth v. Kitchings,

2006To the extent that Commonwealth v. Alan A., supra, appears to permit a search of nonpublic space for reasons of officer safety, I note that after that case was decided, the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Clark, 432 Mass. 1, 14 (2000), declined to reach the issue whether New York v. Quarles, supra, extends to cases where there is a “speculative threat to an individual officer” or is limited “to those cases in which there is ‘a grave threat to public safety.’ ” There was no discussion in Commonwealth v. Clark, supra, of Commonwealth v. Alan A., supra, or of Commonwealth v. Kitchings,

2006I agree that, in light of New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656-657 (1984), as interpreted by Commonwealth v. Alan A., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 271 (1999), the public safety exception applies to the facts of this case, obviating the need for Miranda warnings when questioning is limited to ascertaining whether the gun is in a public place. 1 This exception does not, however, provide a basis to permit a warrantless search for the gun in the juvenile’s home. 2 Nor does it permit further questioning regarding the gun in the absence of Miranda warnings (and, where a juvenile is involved, a meaningful opp

2004Id.; Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 792, 796-97 (1997).

2001However, we do not accept the converse proposition that the absence of Miranda warnings is a factor that tends to undermine the voluntariness of a statement that is made in circumstances where the warnings were not necessary. 5 The defendant maintains that it makes a difference that he was noticeably intoxicated because, when a defendant is visibly impaired by alcohol or drugs, the police are required to take “[sjpecial care ... to ensure that [the] defendant [does] not unknowingly relinquish! ] his constitutional rights.” See Commonwealth v. Hooks, 375 Mass. 284, 289 (1978); Com monwealth v.

1998Commonwealth v. Sheriff, 425 Mass. 186, 197 (1997), citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980). 5 We therefore conclude that it was error to admit the statement.

1998Commonwealth v. Sheriff, 425 Mass. 186, 197 (1997), citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980). 5 We therefore conclude that it was error to admit the statement.