absence of Miranda warning in Alabama

1992See McWilliams [v. State] , supra [ 476 So.2d 1244 ] at 1245-46 [(Ala.Cr.App. 1985)]; Stahl [v. State] , supra [ 426 So.2d 909 ] at 914 [(Ala.Cr.App. 1982)]; Satterfield , supra at 849 .

1987See McWilliams , supra at 1245-46 ; Stahl , supra at 914; Satterfield , supra at 849 .

1989"However, the adverse use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence, Jenkins v. Anderson , 447 U.S. 231 , 100 S.Ct. 2124 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980), or his silence in the absence of Miranda warnings, Fletcher v. Weir , 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), does not offend the constitutional principles of the Fifth Amendment." Salster v. State , 487 So.2d 1020 , 1021 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986) (emphasis added).

1989"However, the adverse use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence, Jenkins v. Anderson , 447 U.S. 231 , 100 S.Ct. 2124 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980), or his silence in the absence of Miranda warnings, Fletcher v. Weir , 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), does not offend the constitutional principles of the Fifth Amendment." Salster v. State , 487 So.2d 1020 , 1021 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986) (emphasis added).

1989"However, the adverse use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence, Jenkins v. Anderson , 447 U.S. 231 , 100 S.Ct. 2124 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980), or his silence in the absence of Miranda warnings, Fletcher v. Weir , 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), does not offend the constitutional principles of the Fifth Amendment." Salster v. State , 487 So.2d 1020 , 1021 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986) (emphasis added).

1989"However, the adverse use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence, Jenkins v. Anderson , 447 U.S. 231 , 100 S.Ct. 2124 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980), or his silence in the absence of Miranda warnings, Fletcher v. Weir , 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), does not offend the constitutional principles of the Fifth Amendment." Salster v. State , 487 So.2d 1020 , 1021 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986) (emphasis added).

2005"The absence of Miranda warnings does not forbid the introduction in evidence of statements by a defendant that are not the product of custodial interrogation." Seagroves v. State , 726 So.2d 738 , 742 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998).

2005"An unsolicited remark, not in response to any interrogation, does not fall within the scope *Page 1072 of the Miranda rule." Ray v. State , 809 So.2d 875 , 888 (Ala.Crim.App. 2001).

2002Our research has revealed no Alabama cases directly addressing this issue. 2 However, in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984), the United States Supreme Court was presented with a similar issue — specifically, whether a probationer’s admission to his probation officer that he had committed a murder some seven years before he had been placed on probation was admissible against that probationer in the trial for that murder in the absence of Miranda warnings.

2002Our research has revealed no Alabama cases directly addressing this issue. 2 However, in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984), the United States Supreme Court was presented with a similar issue — specifically, whether a probationer’s admission to his probation officer that he had committed a murder some seven years before he had been placed on probation was admissible against that probationer in the trial for that murder in the absence of Miranda warnings.

2002See United States v. Nieblas, 115 F.3d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that a probationer’s statement to her probation officer was admissible against the probationer in a probation-revocation proceeding because “a probationer generally has no Fifth Amendment privilege regarding questions relevant to the status of her probation”); United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382, 390 (2d Cir.1982) (holding that a probationer’s statement to his probation officer is admissible against the probationer in a probation-revocation proceeding despite the fact that the probationer requested an attorney during the in

2002See United States v. Nieblas, 115 F.3d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that a probationer’s statement to her probation officer was admissible against the probationer in a probation-revocation proceeding because “a probationer generally has no Fifth Amendment privilege regarding questions relevant to the status of her probation”); United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382, 390 (2d Cir.1982) (holding that a probationer’s statement to his probation officer is admissible against the probationer in a probation-revocation proceeding despite the fact that the probationer requested an attorney during the in

2002See United States v. Nieblas, 115 F.3d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that a probationer’s statement to her probation officer was admissible against the probationer in a probation-revocation proceeding because “a probationer generally has no Fifth Amendment privilege regarding questions relevant to the status of her probation”); United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382, 390 (2d Cir.1982) (holding that a probationer’s statement to his probation officer is admissible against the probationer in a probation-revocation proceeding despite the fact that the probationer requested an attorney during the in

2002See United States v. Nieblas, 115 F.3d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that a probationer’s statement to her probation officer was admissible against the probationer in a probation-revocation proceeding because “a probationer generally has no Fifth Amendment privilege regarding questions relevant to the status of her probation”); United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382, 390 (2d Cir.1982) (holding that a probationer’s statement to his probation officer is admissible against the probationer in a probation-revocation proceeding despite the fact that the probationer requested an attorney during the in

1996Just as a defendant cannot take the stand and lie, secure in the knowledge that his prior confession will be excluded solely because he had not received Miranda warnings, see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), we find nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the State from introducing psychological opinions based on statements a defendant has given in the absence of Miranda warnings when the defendant himself plans to make his mental abilities an issue." We further find that the record does not support the appellant's assertion that his interview with Dr.

1996Just as a defendant cannot take the stand and lie, secure in the knowledge that his prior confession will be excluded solely because he had not received Miranda warnings, see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), we find nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the State from introducing psychological opinions based on statements a defendant has given in the absence of Miranda warnings when the defendant himself plans to make his mental abilities an issue." We further find that the record does not support the appellant's assertion that his interview with Dr.

1989"However, the adverse use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence, Jenkins v. Anderson , 447 U.S. 231 , 100 S.Ct. 2124 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980), or his silence in the absence of Miranda warnings, Fletcher v. Weir , 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), does not offend the constitutional principles of the Fifth Amendment." Salster v. State , 487 So.2d 1020 , 1021 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986) (emphasis added).