legal right privilege in Washington

2015Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 232-33 , 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). ¶11 Because we construe this tort exception narrowly, wrongful discharge claims have generally been limited to four scenarios: (1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation, such as serving jury duty; (3) where employees are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege, such as filing workers’ compensation claims; and (4) where employees are fired in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing.

2015Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 232-33 , 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). ¶11 Because we construe this tort exception narrowly, wrongful discharge claims have generally been limited to four scenarios: (1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation, such as serving jury duty; (3) where employees are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege, such as filing workers’ compensation claims; and (4) where employees are fired in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing.

2006Hubbard, 146 Wn.2d at 708 . ¶9 Washington courts have recognized four general situations that give rise to the public policy exception for termination at will: discharge “(1) for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) for performing a public duty or obligation; (3) for exercising a legal right or privilege; and (4) in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct.” Id. at 707-08 (citing Dicomes v. State, 113 Wn.2d 612, 618 , 782 P.2d 1002 (1989)).

2006Hubbard, 146 Wn.2d at 708 . ¶9 Washington courts have recognized four general situations that give rise to the public policy exception for termination at will: discharge “(1) for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) for performing a public duty or obligation; (3) for exercising a legal right or privilege; and (4) in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct.” Id. at 707-08 (citing Dicomes v. State, 113 Wn.2d 612, 618 , 782 P.2d 1002 (1989)).

2025Wilmot, 118 Wn.2d at 53 .

2002Although RCW 51.48.025(1) states that “[n]o employer may discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed or communicated to the employer any intent to file a claim for compensation or exercises any rights provided under this title,” the statute does not provide a direct cause of action for an aggrieved employee. 21 It does, however, provide the requisite public policy used by this court to establish an action for wrongful discharge in Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 118 Wn.2d 46 , 821 P.2d 18 (1991).

2021Accordingly, claims of termination in violation of public policy have generally been limited to four scenarios: “(1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation, such as serving jury duty; (3) where employees are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege, such as filing workers’ compensation claims; and (4) where employees are fired in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing.” Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 184 Wn.2d 252, 258-59 , 359 P.3d 746 (2015) (quoting Gard

2021Accordingly, claims of termination in violation of public policy have generally been limited to four scenarios: “(1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation, such as serving jury duty; (3) where employees are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege, such as filing workers’ compensation claims; and (4) where employees are fired in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing.” Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 184 Wn.2d 252, 258-59 , 359 P.3d 746 (2015) (quoting Gard

2014This narrow claim is recognized in four areas: "'(1) where the discharge was a result of refusing to commit an illegal act, (2) where the discharge resulted due to the employee 8 No. 31950-4-111 Rupert v. Kennewick Irrigation Dist. performing a public duty or obligation, (3) where the [discharge] resulted because the employee exercised a legal right or privilege, and (4) where the discharge was premised on employee "whistleblowing" activity.'" Piel v. City of Federal Way, 177 Wn.2d 604, 609-10 , 306 P.3d 879 (2013) (quoting Dicomes v. State, 113 Wn.2d 612, 618 , 782 P.2d 1002 (1989) (citations

2014This narrow claim is recognized in four areas: "'(1) where the discharge was a result of refusing to commit an illegal act, (2) where the discharge resulted due to the employee 8 No. 31950-4-111 Rupert v. Kennewick Irrigation Dist. performing a public duty or obligation, (3) where the [discharge] resulted because the employee exercised a legal right or privilege, and (4) where the discharge was premised on employee "whistleblowing" activity.'" Piel v. City of Federal Way, 177 Wn.2d 604, 609-10 , 306 P.3d 879 (2013) (quoting Dicomes v. State, 113 Wn.2d 612, 618 , 782 P.2d 1002 (1989) (citations

2011Id. ¶ 31 Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash.2d 931 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996), refined the analysis of the action, recognizing that the action has generally arisen in the past in four situations: (1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation, such as serving jury duty; (3) where employees are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege, such as filing workers' compensation claims; and (4) where employees are fired in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing.

2011Id. ¶32 Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wn.2d 931, 936 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996), refined the analysis of the action, recognizing that the action has generally arisen in the past in four situations: (1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation, such as serving jury duty; (3) where employees are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege, such as filing workers’ compensation claims; and (4) where employees are fired in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing. |33 Th

2009This court has recognized four general types of conduct involved in wrongful termination actions, including, "situations where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act, for performing a public duty or obligation, for exercising a legal right or privilege, or for engaging in whistleblowing activity." Korslund, 156 Wash.2d at 178 , 125 P.3d 119 .

2009This court has recognized four general types of conduct involved in wrongful termination actions, including, “situations where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act, for performing a public duty or obligation, for exercising a legal right or privilege, or for engaging in whistleblowing activity.” Korslund, 156 Wn.2d at 178 .

2006Hubbard, 146 Wash.2d at 708 , 50 P.3d 602 . ¶ 9 Washington courts have recognized four general situations that give rise to the public policy exception for termination at will: discharge "(1) for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) for performing a public duty or obligation; (3) for exercising a legal right or privilege; and (4) in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct." Id. at 707-08 , 50 P.3d 602 (citing Dicomes v. State, 113 Wash.2d 612, 618 , 782 P.2d 1002 (1989)).

2006Hubbard, 146 Wash.2d at 708 , 50 P.3d 602 . ¶ 9 Washington courts have recognized four general situations that give rise to the public policy exception for termination at will: discharge "(1) for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) for performing a public duty or obligation; (3) for exercising a legal right or privilege; and (4) in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct." Id. at 707-08 , 50 P.3d 602 (citing Dicomes v. State, 113 Wash.2d 612, 618 , 782 P.2d 1002 (1989)).

2002Wrongful discharge claims have generally been allowed in four circumstances: "`(1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation, such as serving jury duty; (3) where employees are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege, such as filing workers' compensation claims; and (4) where employees are fired in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing.'" Warnek v. ABB Combustion Eng'g Servs., Inc., 137 Wash.2d 450, 461 , 972 P.2d 453 (1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Gardner v.

2002Wrongful discharge claims have generally been allowed in four circumstances: “ ‘(1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation, such as serving jury duty; (3) where employees are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege, such as filing workers’ compensation claims; and (4) where employees are fired in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing.’ ” Warnek v. ABB Combustion Eng’g Servs., Inc., 137 Wn.2d 450, 461 , 972 P.2d 453 (1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Gardner v.

2002Wrongful discharge claims have generally been allowed in four circumstances: "`(1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation, such as serving jury duty; (3) where employees are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege, such as filing workers' compensation claims; and (4) where employees are fired in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing.'" Warnek v. ABB Combustion Eng'g Servs., Inc., 137 Wash.2d 450, 461 , 972 P.2d 453 (1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Gardner v.

2002Wrongful discharge claims have generally been allowed in four circumstances: “ ‘(1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation, such as serving jury duty; (3) where employees are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege, such as filing workers’ compensation claims; and (4) where employees are fired in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing.’ ” Warnek v. ABB Combustion Eng’g Servs., Inc., 137 Wn.2d 450, 461 , 972 P.2d 453 (1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Gardner v.

1991Thompson, at 232-33. [2] In Dicomes , this court stated that contravention of a clear mandate of public policy has been found in four general areas: (1) where the discharge was the result of refusing to commit an illegal act, see, e.g, Tameny v. ARCO, 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (termination for refusal to engage in price-fixing); (2) where the discharge resulted due to the employee performing a public duty or obligation, see, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210 , 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge because employee absent from work to serve on jury duty); (3) where the t

1991Thompson, at 232-33. [2] In Dicomes , this court stated that contravention of a clear mandate of public policy has been found in four general areas: (1) where the discharge was the result of refusing to commit an illegal act, see, e.g, Tameny v. ARCO, 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (termination for refusal to engage in price-fixing); (2) where the discharge resulted due to the employee performing a public duty or obligation, see, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210 , 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge because employee absent from work to serve on jury duty); (3) where the t

1991Thompson, at 232-33. [2] In Dicomes , this court stated that contravention of a clear mandate of public policy has been found in four general areas: (1) where the discharge was the result of refusing to commit an illegal act, see, e.g, Tameny v. ARCO, 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (termination for refusal to engage in price-fixing); (2) where the discharge resulted due to the employee performing a public duty or obligation, see, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210 , 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge because employee absent from work to serve on jury duty); (3) where the t

1991Thompson, at 232-33. [2] In Dicomes , this court stated that contravention of a clear mandate of public policy has been found in four general areas: (1) where the discharge was the result of refusing to commit an illegal act, see, e.g, Tameny v. ARCO, 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (termination for refusal to engage in price-fixing); (2) where the discharge resulted due to the employee performing a public duty or obligation, see, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210 , 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge because employee absent from work to serve on jury duty); (3) where the t

1991Thompson, at 232-33. [2] In Dicomes , this court stated that contravention of a clear mandate of public policy has been found in four general areas: (1) where the discharge was the result of refusing to commit an illegal act, see, e.g, Tameny v. ARCO, 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (termination for refusal to engage in price-fixing); (2) where the discharge resulted due to the employee performing a public duty or obligation, see, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210 , 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge because employee absent from work to serve on jury duty); (3) where the t

1991Thompson, at 232-33. [2] In Dicomes , this court stated that contravention of a clear mandate of public policy has been found in four general areas: (1) where the discharge was the result of refusing to commit an illegal act, see, e.g, Tameny v. ARCO, 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (termination for refusal to engage in price-fixing); (2) where the discharge resulted due to the employee performing a public duty or obligation, see, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210 , 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge because employee absent from work to serve on jury duty); (3) where the t

2009The judge then asked plaintiffs' counsel "to explain and show why in each of these plaintiffs' cases they have adequately responded to summary judgment motions." Id.

2009This court has recognized four general types of conduct involved in wrongful termination actions, including, "situations where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act, for performing a public duty or obligation, for exercising a legal right or privilege, or for engaging in whistleblowing activity." Korslund, 156 Wash.2d at 178 , 125 P.3d 119 .

2005Reninger v. Dep’t of Corr., 134 Wn.2d 437, 446-47 , 951 P.2d 782 (1998); Gardner, 128 Wn.2d at 936 . ¶8 Andrus asserts that revocation of the at-will position violated public policy because Hill did not have the authority to “terminate” Andrus.

2005Reninger v. Dep’t of Corr., 134 Wn.2d 437, 446-47 , 951 P.2d 782 (1998); Gardner, 128 Wn.2d at 936 . ¶8 Andrus asserts that revocation of the at-will position violated public policy because Hill did not have the authority to “terminate” Andrus.

1996Review granted at 130 Wn.2d 1015 (1996). 1 Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wn.2d 476, 485 , 824 P.2d 483 (1992). 2 Clerk’s Papers at 36. 3 Clerk’s Papers at 37. 4 According to the defendants, Kalinas was foul-mouthed and rude. 5 According to Deputy Jones: *108 We explained that [Kalmas] doesn’t have the legal right to bar them if he’s been given the 24-hour written notice, and Deputy Wagner said that he could be subject to arrest.

1996Review granted at 130 Wn.2d 1015 (1996). 1 Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wn.2d 476, 485 , 824 P.2d 483 (1992). 2 Clerk’s Papers at 36. 3 Clerk’s Papers at 37. 4 According to the defendants, Kalinas was foul-mouthed and rude. 5 According to Deputy Jones: *108 We explained that [Kalmas] doesn’t have the legal right to bar them if he’s been given the 24-hour written notice, and Deputy Wagner said that he could be subject to arrest.

1991E.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., supra; Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249 , 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644 , 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987); see generally Annot., Recovery for Discharge From Employment in Retaliation for Filing Workers' Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R.4th 1221 § 4[a] (1984 & Supp. 1990).

1991E.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., supra; Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249 , 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644 , 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987); see generally Annot., Recovery for Discharge From Employment in Retaliation for Filing Workers' Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R.4th 1221 § 4[a] (1984 & Supp. 1990).

1991E.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., supra; Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249 , 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644 , 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987); see generally Annot., Recovery for Discharge From Employment in Retaliation for Filing Workers' Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R.4th 1221 § 4[a] (1984 & Supp. 1990).

1991E.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., supra; Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249 , 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644 , 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987); see generally Annot., Recovery for Discharge From Employment in Retaliation for Filing Workers' Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R.4th 1221 § 4[a] (1984 & Supp. 1990).

1991E.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., supra; Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249 , 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644 , 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987); see generally Annot., Recovery for Discharge From Employment in Retaliation for Filing Workers' Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R.4th 1221 § 4[a] (1984 & Supp. 1990).