legal right privilege in Connecticut

2016Even if the plaintiffs had the legal right to claim title to the contested area, they could not prevail because the court found that their use of the contested area was shared by the public. "[T]o establish title by adverse possession, the claimant must oust an owner of possession and keep such owner out without interruption for fifteen years by an open, visible and exclusive possession under a claim of right with the intent to use the property as his [or her] own and without the consent of the owner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schlichting v. Cotter , 109 Conn.App. 361 , 364-65, 952

2016Even if the plaintiffs had the legal right to claim title to the contested area, they could not prevail because the court found that their use of the contested area was shared by the public. "[T]o establish title by adverse possession, the claimant must oust an owner of possession and keep such owner out without interruption for fifteen years by an open, visible and exclusive possession under a claim of right with the intent to use the property as his [or her] own and without the consent of the owner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schlichting v. Cotter , 109 Conn.App. 361 , 364-65, 952

2016Even if the plaintiffs had the legal right to claim title to the contested area, they could not prevail because the court found that their use of the contested area was shared by the public. "[T]o establish title by adverse possession, the claimant must oust an owner of possession and keep such owner out without interruption for fifteen years by an open, visible and exclusive possession under a claim of right with the intent to use the property as his [or her] own and without the consent of the owner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schlichting v. Cotter , 109 Conn.App. 361 , 364-65, 952

2016Even if the plaintiffs had the legal right to claim title to the contested area, they could not prevail because the court found that their use of the contested area was shared by the public. "[T]o establish title by adverse possession, the claimant must oust an owner of possession and keep such owner out without interruption for fifteen years by an open, visible and exclusive possession under a claim of right with the intent to use the property as his [or her] own and without the consent of the owner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schlichting v. Cotter , 109 Conn.App. 361 , 364-65, 952

2007“The statutory requirement that an appeal to the Superior Court may be taken only from a contested case as defined in § 4-166 (2) is an obvious indicator that the legislature did not intend to authorize a right of appeal to the Superior Court from every determination of an administrative agency.” Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 226 Conn. 792, 800 , 629 A.2d 367 (1993).

1995No statutory right to appeal exists "unless the (agency) was statutorily required to determine the plaintiff's legal right or privilege . . . in a hearing. . . ." Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection 226 Conn. 792 , 802 (1993).

1993See, e.g., New England Dairies, Inc. v. Commissioner of Agriculture, supra, 429 (commissioner of agriculture was not required by statute to determine a milk dealer’s right to a license after an opportunity for a hearing); Rybinski v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462, 471 , 378 A.2d 547 (1977) (commission was not required by statute to provide an opportunity for a hearing prior to denying a state employee’s written request to change retirement plans); Taylor v. Robinson, 171 Conn. 691, 697 , 372 A.2d 102 (1976) (parole board had no statutory obligation to determine if a pri

1993See, e.g., New England Dairies, Inc. v. Commissioner of Agriculture, supra, 429 (commissioner of agriculture was not required by statute to determine a milk dealer’s right to a license after an opportunity for a hearing); Rybinski v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462, 471 , 378 A.2d 547 (1977) (commission was not required by statute to provide an opportunity for a hearing prior to denying a state employee’s written request to change retirement plans); Taylor v. Robinson, 171 Conn. 691, 697 , 372 A.2d 102 (1976) (parole board had no statutory obligation to determine if a pri

1993See, e.g., New England Dairies, Inc. v. Commissioner of Agriculture, supra, 429 (commissioner of agriculture was not required by statute to determine a milk dealer’s right to a license after an opportunity for a hearing); Rybinski v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462, 471 , 378 A.2d 547 (1977) (commission was not required by statute to provide an opportunity for a hearing prior to denying a state employee’s written request to change retirement plans); Taylor v. Robinson, 171 Conn. 691, 697 , 372 A.2d 102 (1976) (parole board had no statutory obligation to determine if a pri

1993See, e.g., New England Dairies, Inc. v. Commissioner of Agriculture, supra, 429 (commissioner of agriculture was not required by statute to determine a milk dealer’s right to a license after an opportunity for a hearing); Rybinski v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462, 471 , 378 A.2d 547 (1977) (commission was not required by statute to provide an opportunity for a hearing prior to denying a state employee’s written request to change retirement plans); Taylor v. Robinson, 171 Conn. 691, 697 , 372 A.2d 102 (1976) (parole board had no statutory obligation to determine if a pri

2012“Subordinate,” in contrast, is defined: “To place in a lower rank, class, or position; to assign a lower priority to.” Id. 7 Although the trial court did not explicitly determine that the term “subro-gate” was used erroneously, we infer this conclusion from the result reached by the court.

2007Our courts have had ample opportunity to construe the definition of “contested case.” 9 “The test for determining contested case status has been well established and requires an inquiry into three criteria, to wit: (1) whether a legal right, duty or privilege is at issue, (2) and is statutorily [or regulatorily] required to be determined by the agency, (3) through an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held.” Herman v. Division of Special Revenue, 193 Conn. 379, 382 , 477 A.2d 119 (1984). *773 Even if we were to assume, for the purposes of this opinion, that the plaintiff

2007Our courts have had ample opportunity to construe the definition of “contested case.” 9 “The test for determining contested case status has been well established and requires an inquiry into three criteria, to wit: (1) whether a legal right, duty or privilege is at issue, (2) and is statutorily [or regulatorily] required to be determined by the agency, (3) through an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held.” Herman v. Division of Special Revenue, 193 Conn. 379, 382 , 477 A.2d 119 (1984). *773 Even if we were to assume, for the purposes of this opinion, that the plaintiff

1997"No statutory right to appeal exists `unless the commissioner was statutorily required to determine the plaintiff's legal right or privilege . . . in a hearing . . . .' If a hearing is not statutorily mandated, even if one is gratuitously held, a `contested case' is not created." (Citations omitted) Dadiskos v. Connecticut Real Estate Commission, 37 Conn. App. 777 , 782 , 657 A.2d 717 (1995), quoting Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, supra, 226 Conn. 802 .

1997"No statutory right to appeal exists `unless the commissioner was statutorily required to determine the plaintiff's legal right or privilege . . . in a hearing . . . .' If a hearing is not statutorily mandated, even if one is gratuitously held, a `contested case' is not created." (Citations omitted) Dadiskos v. Connecticut Real Estate Commission, 37 Conn. App. 777 , 782 , 657 A.2d 717 (1995), quoting Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, supra, 226 Conn. 802 .