legal right privilege in Utah

2016The supreme court has held the public policy exception to apply where an employee was discharged for making an internal report about a bank's noncompliance with state reporting requirements, see id. ¶ 56 (citing Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992)), and where an employee was discharged for refusing to falsify tax documents, see id. ¶ 55 (citing Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992)). 129 "But having a legal right or privilege alone does not mean that a terminated employee will necessarily have a valid claim for wrongful termination:" Id. % 14. *104 To determine whether t

2016The supreme court has held the public policy exception to apply where an employee was discharged for making an internal report about a bank's noncompliance with state reporting requirements, see id. ¶ 56 (citing Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992)), and where an employee was discharged for refusing to falsify tax documents, see id. ¶ 55 (citing Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992)). 129 "But having a legal right or privilege alone does not mean that a terminated employee will necessarily have a valid claim for wrongful termination:" Id. % 14. *104 To determine whether t

2016This exception applies only when " 'the public interest is so strong and the policy so clear and weighty that we should place the policy beyond the reach' of any at-will employment contract." Id. (quoting Touchard v. La-Z-Boy Inc., 2006 UT 71, ¶ 13 , 148 P.3d 945 ). € 26 Our supreme court has identified four categories of public policy that may provide a basis for a wrongful termination claim; these include refusing to violate the law and reporting criminal activity.to a public authority: i) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, such as refusing to violate the antitrust laws; (i) perf

2016The supreme court has held the public policy exception to apply where an employee was discharged for making an internal report about a bank's noncompliance with state reporting requirements, see id. ¶ 56 (citing Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992)), and where an employee was discharged for refusing to falsify tax documents, see id. ¶ 55 (citing Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992)). 129 "But having a legal right or privilege alone does not mean that a terminated employee will necessarily have a valid claim for wrongful termination:" Id. % 14. *104 To determine whether t

2022As an initial matter, Peter contends certain portions of the original JEP Trust evidence John’s intent that Peter was to have a say in matters concerning his share of the JEP Trust, “even though the assets determined to constitute [his] share[] . . . would, ultimately, be transferred from the JEP Trust to the subtrusts and distributed pursuant to the terms thereof.” But Peter ignores that the original trust agreement must be interpreted in light of the third amendment, which created the POP Trust. ¶33 The creation of the POP Trust vested legal ownership of all Peter’s beneficial rights in the

2022As an initial matter, Peter contends certain portions of the original JEP Trust evidence John’s intent that Peter was to have a say in matters concerning his share of the JEP Trust, “even though the assets determined to constitute [his] share[] . . . would, ultimately, be transferred from the JEP Trust to the subtrusts and distributed pursuant to the terms thereof.” But Peter ignores that the original trust agreement must be interpreted in light of the third amendment, which created the POP Trust. ¶33 The creation of the POP Trust vested legal ownership of all Peter’s beneficial rights in the

2022For instance, one dictionary defines the verb ―claim‖ as ―to take as the rightful owner‖ or ―to assert to be rightfully one‘s own.‖38 And the legal definition of ―claim‖ includes ―[t]he assertion of an existing right.‖39 These facets of ―claim‖ are proactive and indicative of a legal ability to formally assert a claim of privilege in legal proceedings where that privilege is in jeopardy. ¶39 Because F.L. has a legal right under rule 506 to claim a privilege in her therapy records, then under the reasoning of Brown, she also ―possess[es] the status of a limited-purpose party with the right to‖

2016The supreme court has held the public policy exception to apply where an employee was discharged for making an internal report about a bank's noncompliance with state reporting requirements, see id. ¶ 56 (citing Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992)), and where an employee was discharged for refusing to falsify tax documents, see id. ¶ 55 (citing Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992)). 129 "But having a legal right or privilege alone does not mean that a terminated employee will necessarily have a valid claim for wrongful termination:" Id. % 14. *104 To determine whether t

2016The supreme court has held the public policy exception to apply where an employee was discharged for making an internal report about a bank's noncompliance with state reporting requirements, see id. ¶ 56 (citing Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992)), and where an employee was discharged for refusing to falsify tax documents, see id. ¶ 55 (citing Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992)). 129 "But having a legal right or privilege alone does not mean that a terminated employee will necessarily have a valid claim for wrongful termination:" Id. % 14. *104 To determine whether t

2015The Right of an Employee to Self-Defense Is of Broad Public Importance ¶39 Even if a public policy is reflected in the Utah Constitution, the Utah Code, and our common law decisions, it is not clear and substantial unless it is ―of overarching importance to the public, as opposed to the parties only.‖59 Otherwise, we will not find that ―the 57 Hansen, 2004 UT 62 , ¶ 15 n.7. 58 1994 Utah Laws 281 . 59 Retherford, 844 P.2d at 966 n.9. 18 Cite as: 2015 UT 83 Opinion of the Court public interest is so strong and the policy so clear and weighty that we should place the policy beyond the reach of co

2015To determine whether the legal right at issue reflects the type of clear and substantial Utah public policy that qualifies as an exception to the at-will rule, we consider three factors: (1) whether the policy at issue is reflected in authoritative sources of state public policy,14 (2) whether the policy affects the public generally as opposed to the private interests of the employee and the employer,15 and (3) whether countervailing policies outweigh the policy at issue.16 These factors are conjunctive requirements; to have a wrongful termination claim, an employee must demonstrate that each

2015Found., 45 P.3d 1162 , 1166–67 (Cal. 2002) (―The public policy that is the basis of this exception must furthermore be ‗public‘ in that it affects society at large rather than the individual . . . .‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 162So far as I can tell, our precedents have adhered to this view of what ―rights‖ can serve the basis of a public policy exception.

1998In our previous cases, we have already outlined certain conduct that typically brings into play a clear and substantial public policy: (i) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, such as refusing to violate the antitrust laws, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal.1980)); (ii) performing a public obligation, see id., such as accepting jury duty, see Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210 , 536 P.2d 512 (1975); (iii) exercising a legal right or privilege, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 , such as filing a worker

1998In our previous cases, we have already outlined certain conduct that typically brings into play a clear and substantial public policy: (i) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, such as refusing to violate the antitrust laws, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal.1980)); (ii) performing a public obligation, see id., such as accepting jury duty, see Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210 , 536 P.2d 512 (1975); (iii) exercising a legal right or privilege, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 , such as filing a worker

1998In our previous cases, we have already outlined certain conduct that typically brings into play a clear and substantial public policy: (i) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, such as refusing to violate the antitrust laws, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal.1980)); (ii) performing a public obligation, see id., such as accepting jury duty, see Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210 , 536 P.2d 512 (1975); (iii) exercising a legal right or privilege, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 , such as filing a worker

1998In our previous cases, we have already outlined certain conduct that typically brings into play a clear and substantial public policy: (i) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, such as refusing to violate the antitrust laws, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal.1980)); (ii) performing a public obligation, see id., such as accepting jury duty, see Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210 , 536 P.2d 512 (1975); (iii) exercising a legal right or privilege, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 , such as filing a worker

1998In our previous cases, we have already outlined certain conduct that typically brings into play a clear and substantial public policy: (i) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, such as refusing to violate the antitrust laws, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal.1980)); (ii) performing a public obligation, see id., such as accepting jury duty, see Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210 , 536 P.2d 512 (1975); (iii) exercising a legal right or privilege, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 , such as filing a worker

1998In our previous cases, we have already outlined certain conduct that typically brings into play a clear and substantial public policy: (i) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, such as refusing to violate the antitrust laws, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal.1980)); (ii) performing a public obligation, see id., such as accepting jury duty, see Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210 , 536 P.2d 512 (1975); (iii) exercising a legal right or privilege, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 , such as filing a worker

1998In our previous cases, we have already outlined certain conduct that typically brings into play a clear and substantial public policy: (i) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, such as refusing to violate the antitrust laws, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal.1980)); (ii) performing a public obligation, see id., such as accepting jury duty, see Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210 , 536 P.2d 512 (1975); (iii) exercising a legal right or privilege, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 , such as filing a worker

1998In our previous cases, we have already outlined certain conduct that typically brings into play a clear and substantial public policy: (i) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, such as refusing to violate the antitrust laws, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal.1980)); (ii) performing a public obligation, see id., such as accepting jury duty, see Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210 , 536 P.2d 512 (1975); (iii) exercising a legal right or privilege, see Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281 , such as filing a worker