mistake error in Maryland

2021We disagreed with the Court of Special Appeals and held “that the Commission had the authority to reopen [the claimant]’s award of permanent partial disability compensation and retroactively adjust his rate of compensation because his request for such, which was made within five years from the date of his last compensation, was based on a mistake or error.” Id. at 278 , 211 A.3d at 360 .

2021We disagreed with the Court of Special Appeals and held “that the Commission had the authority to reopen [the claimant]’s award of permanent partial disability compensation and retroactively adjust his rate of compensation because his request for such, which was made within five years from the date of his last compensation, was based on a mistake or error.” Id. at 278 , 211 A.3d at 360 .

2019Officer Gang then filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted, Gang v. Montgomery County , 462 Md. 554 , 201 A.3d 1227 (2019), to consider various questions, all of which we have rephrased and abbreviated into one 7 : Does the Workers' Compensation Commission have the authority to reopen a claim and retroactively readjust a rate of compensation within five years from the date of the last compensation payment when it finds that, based on a mistake or error, the injured employee received a lower rate of compensation than that to which he was otherwise entitled?

2019Officer Gang then filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted, Gang v. Montgomery County , 462 Md. 554 , 201 A.3d 1227 (2019), to consider various questions, all of which we have rephrased and abbreviated into one 7 : Does the Workers' Compensation Commission have the authority to reopen a claim and retroactively readjust a rate of compensation within five years from the date of the last compensation payment when it finds that, based on a mistake or error, the injured employee received a lower rate of compensation than that to which he was otherwise entitled?

2018As the Court in SAIC explained, "[t]he commonsense understanding of the phrase 'attributable to the State' as used in § 13-603(b) means that the mistake or error can be said to be caused by the State." 405 Md. at 203 , 950 A.2d 766 .

2018As the Court in SAIC explained, "[t]he commonsense understanding of the phrase 'attributable to the State' as used in § 13-603(b) means that the mistake or error can be said to be caused by the State." 405 Md. at 203 , 950 A.2d 766 .

2011The Court of Appeals discussed: State v. Brogan, 272 Mont. 156 , 900 P.2d 284 (1995) (The court admitted other crimes evidence finding this evidence relevant to rebut defendant's argument that the wild animals *500 on his property must have entered his property by mistake.); Margetts v. State, 107 Nev. 616 , 818 P.2d 392 (1991) (The court admitted the other crimes evidence as the defendant testified at trial that he issued a bad check by mistake.); State v. Crawford, 329 N.C. 466 , 406 S.E.2d 579 (1991) (The court admitted evidence of prior maltreatment of children, as the defendant testified

2011The Court of Appeals discussed: State v. Brogan, 272 Mont. 156 , 900 P.2d 284 (1995) (The court admitted other crimes evidence finding this evidence relevant to rebut defendant's argument that the wild animals *500 on his property must have entered his property by mistake.); Margetts v. State, 107 Nev. 616 , 818 P.2d 392 (1991) (The court admitted the other crimes evidence as the defendant testified at trial that he issued a bad check by mistake.); State v. Crawford, 329 N.C. 466 , 406 S.E.2d 579 (1991) (The court admitted evidence of prior maltreatment of children, as the defendant testified

2011The Court of Appeals discussed: State v. Brogan, 272 Mont. 156 , 900 P.2d 284 (1995) (The court admitted other crimes evidence finding this evidence relevant to rebut defendant's argument that the wild animals *500 on his property must have entered his property by mistake.); Margetts v. State, 107 Nev. 616 , 818 P.2d 392 (1991) (The court admitted the other crimes evidence as the defendant testified at trial that he issued a bad check by mistake.); State v. Crawford, 329 N.C. 466 , 406 S.E.2d 579 (1991) (The court admitted evidence of prior maltreatment of children, as the defendant testified

2011The Court of Appeals discussed: State v. Brogan, 272 Mont. 156 , 900 P.2d 284 (1995) (The court admitted other crimes evidence finding this evidence relevant to rebut defendant's argument that the wild animals *500 on his property must have entered his property by mistake.); Margetts v. State, 107 Nev. 616 , 818 P.2d 392 (1991) (The court admitted the other crimes evidence as the defendant testified at trial that he issued a bad check by mistake.); State v. Crawford, 329 N.C. 466 , 406 S.E.2d 579 (1991) (The court admitted evidence of prior maltreatment of children, as the defendant testified

2011The Court of Appeals analyzed three Maryland cases: Emory v. State, 101 Md.App. 585 , 647 A.2d 1243 , cert. denied, 337 Md. 90 , 651 A.2d 855 (1994) (We exeluded evidence of prior, uncharged drug related activities because defendants never argued that their involvement in drug-related activities was inadvertent or a mistake.); McKinney v. State, 82 Md.App. 111 , 570 A.2d 360 (1990) (We found that a mistake defense was not asserted and therefore the other crimes evidence would establish no material fact.); Hoes v. State, 35 Md.App. 61 , 368 A.2d 1080 , cert. denied, 280 Md. 731 (1977) (At trial

2011The Court of Appeals analyzed three Maryland cases: Emory v. State, 101 Md.App. 585 , 647 A.2d 1243 , cert. denied, 337 Md. 90 , 651 A.2d 855 (1994) (We exeluded evidence of prior, uncharged drug related activities because defendants never argued that their involvement in drug-related activities was inadvertent or a mistake.); McKinney v. State, 82 Md.App. 111 , 570 A.2d 360 (1990) (We found that a mistake defense was not asserted and therefore the other crimes evidence would establish no material fact.); Hoes v. State, 35 Md.App. 61 , 368 A.2d 1080 , cert. denied, 280 Md. 731 (1977) (At trial

2011The Court of Appeals analyzed three Maryland cases: Emory v. State, 101 Md.App. 585 , 647 A.2d 1243 , cert. denied, 337 Md. 90 , 651 A.2d 855 (1994) (We exeluded evidence of prior, uncharged drug related activities because defendants never argued that their involvement in drug-related activities was inadvertent or a mistake.); McKinney v. State, 82 Md.App. 111 , 570 A.2d 360 (1990) (We found that a mistake defense was not asserted and therefore the other crimes evidence would establish no material fact.); Hoes v. State, 35 Md.App. 61 , 368 A.2d 1080 , cert. denied, 280 Md. 731 (1977) (At trial

2011The Court of Appeals analyzed three Maryland cases: Emory v. State, 101 Md.App. 585 , 647 A.2d 1243 , cert. denied, 337 Md. 90 , 651 A.2d 855 (1994) (We exeluded evidence of prior, uncharged drug related activities because defendants never argued that their involvement in drug-related activities was inadvertent or a mistake.); McKinney v. State, 82 Md.App. 111 , 570 A.2d 360 (1990) (We found that a mistake defense was not asserted and therefore the other crimes evidence would establish no material fact.); Hoes v. State, 35 Md.App. 61 , 368 A.2d 1080 , cert. denied, 280 Md. 731 (1977) (At trial

2011The Court of Appeals analyzed three Maryland cases: Emory v. State, 101 Md.App. 585 , 647 A.2d 1243 , cert. denied, 337 Md. 90 , 651 A.2d 855 (1994) (We exeluded evidence of prior, uncharged drug related activities because defendants never argued that their involvement in drug-related activities was inadvertent or a mistake.); McKinney v. State, 82 Md.App. 111 , 570 A.2d 360 (1990) (We found that a mistake defense was not asserted and therefore the other crimes evidence would establish no material fact.); Hoes v. State, 35 Md.App. 61 , 368 A.2d 1080 , cert. denied, 280 Md. 731 (1977) (At trial

2011The Court of Appeals analyzed three Maryland cases: Emory v. State, 101 Md.App. 585 , 647 A.2d 1243 , cert. denied, 337 Md. 90 , 651 A.2d 855 (1994) (We exeluded evidence of prior, uncharged drug related activities because defendants never argued that their involvement in drug-related activities was inadvertent or a mistake.); McKinney v. State, 82 Md.App. 111 , 570 A.2d 360 (1990) (We found that a mistake defense was not asserted and therefore the other crimes evidence would establish no material fact.); Hoes v. State, 35 Md.App. 61 , 368 A.2d 1080 , cert. denied, 280 Md. 731 (1977) (At trial

2011The Court of Appeals discussed: State v. Brogan, 272 Mont. 156 , 900 P.2d 284 (1995) (The court admitted other crimes evidence finding this evidence relevant to rebut defendant's argument that the wild animals *500 on his property must have entered his property by mistake.); Margetts v. State, 107 Nev. 616 , 818 P.2d 392 (1991) (The court admitted the other crimes evidence as the defendant testified at trial that he issued a bad check by mistake.); State v. Crawford, 329 N.C. 466 , 406 S.E.2d 579 (1991) (The court admitted evidence of prior maltreatment of children, as the defendant testified

2011The Court of Appeals discussed: State v. Brogan, 272 Mont. 156 , 900 P.2d 284 (1995) (The court admitted other crimes evidence finding this evidence relevant to rebut defendant's argument that the wild animals *500 on his property must have entered his property by mistake.); Margetts v. State, 107 Nev. 616 , 818 P.2d 392 (1991) (The court admitted the other crimes evidence as the defendant testified at trial that he issued a bad check by mistake.); State v. Crawford, 329 N.C. 466 , 406 S.E.2d 579 (1991) (The court admitted evidence of prior maltreatment of children, as the defendant testified

2008The Comptroller argued that this Court’s decision in Hercules v. Comptroller, 351 Md. 101 , 716 A.2d 276 (1998), which held that there was an insufficient nexus with Maryland to tax a gain realized from the sale of a corporate affiliate, contradicted the Tax Court's conclusion that SAIC could have been led by the laws, regulations and polices of the State to believe that the sale of NSI stock shares was taxable because the case was decided before SAIC filed its original return.

2008The Comptroller argued that this Court’s decision in Hercules v. Comptroller, 351 Md. 101 , 716 A.2d 276 (1998), which held that there was an insufficient nexus with Maryland to tax a gain realized from the sale of a corporate affiliate, contradicted the Tax Court's conclusion that SAIC could have been led by the laws, regulations and polices of the State to believe that the sale of NSI stock shares was taxable because the case was decided before SAIC filed its original return.

1996A conclusion based on a factual predicate that is incomplete or inaccurate may be deemed, in zoning law, a mistake or error.... 107 Md.App. at 645 , 670 A.2d 484 .

1996A conclusion based on a factual predicate that is incomplete or inaccurate may be deemed, in zoning law, a mistake or error.... 107 Md.App. at 645 , 670 A.2d 484 .

1995The owners argued that the earlier "comprehensive zoning of 1966 [was] presumed to be correct," 23 Md.App. at 368 , 328 A.2d 55 , and "that there was error in the 1971 comprehensive zoning" for failing to honor that presumptive validity of the earlier comprehensive zoning: The owners maintain that the then existing zoning of the subject property could not properly be altered by the Council unless there was evidence of error in the D.R.-16 classification assigned in 1966 or change in the character of the neighborhood subsequent to the assignment of that classification.

1995The owners argued that the earlier "comprehensive zoning of 1966 [was] presumed to be correct," 23 Md.App. at 368 , 328 A.2d 55 , and "that there was error in the 1971 comprehensive zoning" for failing to honor that presumptive validity of the earlier comprehensive zoning: The owners maintain that the then existing zoning of the subject property could not properly be altered by the Council unless there was evidence of error in the D.R.-16 classification assigned in 1966 or change in the character of the neighborhood subsequent to the assignment of that classification.

1995In Howard County v. Dorsey , a "witness qualified in the field of planning, after describing the subject property and its environs, testified that it was a mistake to classify the subject property in the R-12 zone because `the property is surrounded by industrial.' " The Court of Appeals concluded that expert opinion, based only on the incompatibility between the residential property in question and the surrounding industrial property was "insufficient to make the question of `error' or `mistake' fairly debatable." 292 Md. at 364-65 , 438 A.2d 1339 .

1995In Howard County v. Dorsey , a "witness qualified in the field of planning, after describing the subject property and its environs, testified that it was a mistake to classify the subject property in the R-12 zone because `the property is surrounded by industrial.' " The Court of Appeals concluded that expert opinion, based only on the incompatibility between the residential property in question and the surrounding industrial property was "insufficient to make the question of `error' or `mistake' fairly debatable." 292 Md. at 364-65 , 438 A.2d 1339 .

1995Mistake or Error is Something Other Than a Questionable Choice: It was in the second of the series of three opinions, Boyce v. Sembly, 25 Md.App. 43 , 334 A.2d 137 (1975), that Judge Davidson set out explicitly that a conclusion on the part of the County Board of Appeals that the comprehensive zoning of the County Council under review was wrong, ill-advised, or unsuitable is not an adequate finding of an actual mistake or error within the contemplation of zoning law.

1995App. 43 , 334 A.2d 137 (1975), that Judge Davidson set out explicitly that a conclusion on the part of the County Board of Appeals that the comprehensive zoning of the County Council under review was wrong, ill-advised, or unsuitable is not an adequate finding of an actual mistake or error within the contemplation of zoning law.

1985It is perfectly clear, we think, that there was no mistake or error on the part of the executors____ [Ijnterest on the refund is required upon any theory of the case.” 234 Md. at 273 , 199 A.2d 360 .

1985It is perfectly clear, we think, that there was no mistake or error on the part of the executors____ [Ijnterest on the refund is required upon any theory of the case.” 234 Md. at 273 , 199 A.2d 360 .

1985The Comptroller’s interpretation is premised on the principle of law recognized by us in Little Store, Inc. v. State, 295 Md. 158, 163 , 453 A.2d 1215 (1983) that the words “and” and “or” are interchangeable “when it is reasonable and logical to do so.” The Comptroller asserts that such a construction is reasonable and logical in this instance, and as no mistake or error can be attributed to the State, the payment of interest on Fairchild’s tax refund is prohibited.

1985The Comptroller’s interpretation is premised on the principle of law recognized by us in Little Store, Inc. v. State, 295 Md. 158, 163 , 453 A.2d 1215 (1983) that the words “and” and “or” are interchangeable “when it is reasonable and logical to do so.” The Comptroller asserts that such a construction is reasonable and logical in this instance, and as no mistake or error can be attributed to the State, the payment of interest on Fairchild’s tax refund is prohibited.

1967We are also mindful that this Court has on other occasions stated the principle that there is a strong presumption favoring the validity of a comprehensive zoning map adopted by the proper authority, Bd. of Co. Comm’rs v. Edmonds, 240 Md. 680 , 215 A. 2d 209 (1965) ; cf. County Commissioners of Queen Anne’s County, et at. v. Clarence W.

1967We are also mindful that this Court has on other occasions stated the principle that there is a strong presumption favoring the validity of a comprehensive zoning map adopted by the proper authority, Bd. of Co. Comm’rs v. Edmonds, 240 Md. 680 , 215 A. 2d 209 (1965) ; cf. County Commissioners of Queen Anne’s County, et at. v. Clarence W.

1967As no- mistake or error was found at that time and since it is admitted by all parties that there has been no change in the character of the neighborhood, we are constrained to find that the action of the Board, and its affirmance by the Circuit Court, in reclassifying the properties from R-6 to B-L, to quote Chief Judge Hammond in Polinger v. Briefs, 244 Md. 538, 541 , 224 A. 2d 460, 461 (1966), “can amount to no more than the mere impermissible change of mind or heart which was condemned in Kay Const. *567 Co. v. County Council, 227 Md. 479 , and Schultze v. Montgomery County Planning Bd., 2

1967As no- mistake or error was found at that time and since it is admitted by all parties that there has been no change in the character of the neighborhood, we are constrained to find that the action of the Board, and its affirmance by the Circuit Court, in reclassifying the properties from R-6 to B-L, to quote Chief Judge Hammond in Polinger v. Briefs, 244 Md. 538, 541 , 224 A. 2d 460, 461 (1966), “can amount to no more than the mere impermissible change of mind or heart which was condemned in Kay Const. *567 Co. v. County Council, 227 Md. 479 , and Schultze v. Montgomery County Planning Bd., 2

1967As no- mistake or error was found at that time and since it is admitted by all parties that there has been no change in the character of the neighborhood, we are constrained to find that the action of the Board, and its affirmance by the Circuit Court, in reclassifying the properties from R-6 to B-L, to quote Chief Judge Hammond in Polinger v. Briefs, 244 Md. 538, 541 , 224 A. 2d 460, 461 (1966), “can amount to no more than the mere impermissible change of mind or heart which was condemned in Kay Const. *567 Co. v. County Council, 227 Md. 479 , and Schultze v. Montgomery County Planning Bd., 2

1967As no- mistake or error was found at that time and since it is admitted by all parties that there has been no change in the character of the neighborhood, we are constrained to find that the action of the Board, and its affirmance by the Circuit Court, in reclassifying the properties from R-6 to B-L, to quote Chief Judge Hammond in Polinger v. Briefs, 244 Md. 538, 541 , 224 A. 2d 460, 461 (1966), “can amount to no more than the mere impermissible change of mind or heart which was condemned in Kay Const. *567 Co. v. County Council, 227 Md. 479 , and Schultze v. Montgomery County Planning Bd., 2