public official immunity in Maryland

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2015For example, in Walker v. D’Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 169 , 129 A.2d 148 (1957), the Court held that the public official privilege was not “confined in the law of torts to matters of defamation.” Likewise, in Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 582 , 177 A.2d 841 (1962), the Court held that the qualified privilege enjoyed by certain police officers when performing their duties applies not only to a claim for defamation but also to claims for invasion of privacy, divulging information without legal right, malicious interference with contract of employment, and conspiring to cause termination of employm

2015For example, in Walker v. D’Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 169 , 129 A.2d 148 (1957), the Court held that the public official privilege was not “confined in the law of torts to matters of defamation.” Likewise, in Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 582 , 177 A.2d 841 (1962), the Court held that the qualified privilege enjoyed by certain police officers when performing their duties applies not only to a claim for defamation but also to claims for invasion of privacy, divulging information without legal right, malicious interference with contract of employment, and conspiring to cause termination of employm

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004As Lee correctly points out, this Court has consistently held that Maryland common law qualified immunity in tort suits, for public officials performing discretionary acts, has no application in tort actions based upon alleged violations of state constitutional rights or tort actions based upon most so-called “intentional torts.” The Maryland public official immunity doctrine is quite limited and is generally applicable only in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct. 2 See e.g., Muthukumarana v. Montgomery *259 County, 370 Md. 447, 478-481 , 805 A.2d 372,

2000See Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 117 , 660 A.2d 447, 470 (1995); Cox v. Prince George’s County, 296 Md. 162, 169 , 460 A.2d 1038, 1041 (1983).

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004As Lee correctly points out, this Court has consistently held that Maryland common law qualified immunity in tort suits, for public officials performing discretionary acts, has no application in tort actions based upon alleged violations of state constitutional rights or tort actions based upon most so-called “intentional torts.” The Maryland public official immunity doctrine is quite limited and is generally applicable only in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct. 2 See e.g., Muthukumarana v. Montgomery *259 County, 370 Md. 447, 478-481 , 805 A.2d 372,

2004As Lee correctly points out, this Court has consistently held that Maryland common law qualified immunity in tort suits, for public officials performing discretionary acts, has no application in tort actions based upon alleged violations of state constitutional rights or tort actions based upon most so-called “intentional torts.” The Maryland public official immunity doctrine is quite limited and is generally applicable only in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct. 2 See e.g., Muthukumarana v. Montgomery *259 County, 370 Md. 447, 478-481 , 805 A.2d 372,

2008The public official immunity, I noticed in his instruction, [Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245 , 863 A.2d 297 (2004) ] is not even mentioned in there at all and that’s the case that I believe says that there is no public official immunity for the counts that are left, intentional torts and constitutional torts.

2008The public official immunity, I noticed in his instruction, [Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245 , 863 A.2d 297 (2004) ] is not even mentioned in there at all and that’s the case that I believe says that there is no public official immunity for the counts that are left, intentional torts and constitutional torts.

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004As Lee correctly points out, this Court has consistently held that Maryland common law qualified immunity in tort suits, for public officials performing discretionary acts, has no application in tort actions based upon alleged violations of state constitutional rights or tort actions based upon most so-called “intentional torts.” The Maryland public official immunity doctrine is quite limited and is generally applicable only in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct. 2 See e.g., Muthukumarana v. Montgomery *259 County, 370 Md. 447, 478-481 , 805 A.2d 372,

2000See Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 117 , 660 A.2d 447, 470 (1995); Cox v. Prince George’s County, 296 Md. 162, 169 , 460 A.2d 1038, 1041 (1983).

2004As Lee correctly points out, this Court has consistently held that Maryland common law qualified immunity in tort suits, for public officials performing discretionary acts, has no application in tort actions based upon alleged violations of state constitutional rights or tort actions based upon most so-called “intentional torts.” The Maryland public official immunity doctrine is quite limited and is generally applicable only in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct. 2 See e.g., Muthukumarana v. Montgomery *259 County, 370 Md. 447, 478-481 , 805 A.2d 372,

2004As Lee correctly points out, this Court has consistently held that Maryland common law qualified immunity in tort suits, for public officials performing discretionary acts, has no application in tort actions based upon alleged violations of state constitutional rights or tort actions based upon most so-called “intentional torts.” The Maryland public official immunity doctrine is quite limited and is generally applicable only in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct. 2 See e.g., Muthukumarana v. Montgomery *259 County, 370 Md. 447, 478-481 , 805 A.2d 372,

2022As the Sheriffs points out, Thornton Mellon’s reliance on the distinction between discretionary duties and ministerial ones is misplaced because that distinction is relevant only to tort cases involving the doctrine of public official immunity, which “applies to public officials . . . who perform negligent acts during the course of their discretionary (as opposed to ministerial) duties.” Cooper v. Rodriguez, 443 Md. 680, 713 , 118 A.3d 829, 848 (2015) (cleaned up).

2022As the Sheriffs points out, Thornton Mellon’s reliance on the distinction between discretionary duties and ministerial ones is misplaced because that distinction is relevant only to tort cases involving the doctrine of public official immunity, which “applies to public officials . . . who perform negligent acts during the course of their discretionary (as opposed to ministerial) duties.” Cooper v. Rodriguez, 443 Md. 680, 713 , 118 A.3d 829, 848 (2015) (cleaned up).

2015For example, in Walker v. D’Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 169 , 129 A.2d 148 (1957), the Court held that the public official privilege was not “confined in the law of torts to matters of defamation.” Likewise, in Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 582 , 177 A.2d 841 (1962), the Court held that the qualified privilege enjoyed by certain police officers when performing their duties applies not only to a claim for defamation but also to claims for invasion of privacy, divulging information without legal right, malicious interference with contract of employment, and conspiring to cause termination of employm

2015For example, in Walker v. D’Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 169 , 129 A.2d 148 (1957), the Court held that the public official privilege was not “confined in the law of torts to matters of defamation.” Likewise, in Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 582 , 177 A.2d 841 (1962), the Court held that the qualified privilege enjoyed by certain police officers when performing their duties applies not only to a claim for defamation but also to claims for invasion of privacy, divulging information without legal right, malicious interference with contract of employment, and conspiring to cause termination of employm

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004As Lee correctly points out, this Court has consistently held that Maryland common law qualified immunity in tort suits, for public officials performing discretionary acts, has no application in tort actions based upon alleged violations of state constitutional rights or tort actions based upon most so-called “intentional torts.” The Maryland public official immunity doctrine is quite limited and is generally applicable only in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct. 2 See e.g., Muthukumarana v. Montgomery *259 County, 370 Md. 447, 478-481 , 805 A.2d 372,

2004As Lee correctly points out, this Court has consistently held that Maryland common law qualified immunity in tort suits, for public officials performing discretionary acts, has no application in tort actions based upon alleged violations of state constitutional rights or tort actions based upon most so-called “intentional torts.” The Maryland public official immunity doctrine is quite limited and is generally applicable only in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct. 2 See e.g., Muthukumarana v. Montgomery *259 County, 370 Md. 447, 478-481 , 805 A.2d 372,

2004As Lee correctly points out, this Court has consistently held that Maryland common law qualified immunity in tort suits, for public officials performing discretionary acts, has no application in tort actions based upon alleged violations of state constitutional rights or tort actions based upon most so-called “intentional torts.” The Maryland public official immunity doctrine is quite limited and is generally applicable only in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct. 2 See e.g., Muthukumarana v. Montgomery *259 County, 370 Md. 447, 478-481 , 805 A.2d 372,

2004As Lee correctly points out, this Court has consistently held that Maryland common law qualified immunity in tort suits, for public officials performing discretionary acts, has no application in tort actions based upon alleged violations of state constitutional rights or tort actions based upon most so-called “intentional torts.” The Maryland public official immunity doctrine is quite limited and is generally applicable only in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct. 2 See e.g., Muthukumarana v. Montgomery *259 County, 370 Md. 447, 478-481 , 805 A.2d 372,

2004As Lee correctly points out, this Court has consistently held that Maryland common law qualified immunity in tort suits, for public officials performing discretionary acts, has no application in tort actions based upon alleged violations of state constitutional rights or tort actions based upon most so-called “intentional torts.” The Maryland public official immunity doctrine is quite limited and is generally applicable only in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct. 2 See e.g., Muthukumarana v. Montgomery *259 County, 370 Md. 447, 478-481 , 805 A.2d 372,

2004As Lee correctly points out, this Court has consistently held that Maryland common law qualified immunity in tort suits, for public officials performing discretionary acts, has no application in tort actions based upon alleged violations of state constitutional rights or tort actions based upon most so-called “intentional torts.” The Maryland public official immunity doctrine is quite limited and is generally applicable only in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct. 2 See e.g., Muthukumarana v. Montgomery *259 County, 370 Md. 447, 478-481 , 805 A.2d 372,

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o

2004Public official immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285 , 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995) (contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370 , 597 A.2d at 445 (reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who violates the plaintiffs rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680 , 541 A.2d at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public o