diligent inquiry in Maine

1997Citing State v. Thurlow, 414 A.2d 1241 (Me.1980) and State v. Ledger, 444 A.2d 404 (Me.1982), Robbins argues that the State had “a continuing duty to make a diligent inquiry as to the existence of relevant information and witnesses.” Robbins accuses the State of remaining “willfully ignorant of the evidence.” [¶ 7] Contrary to the contention of Robbins, we have never stated that M.R.Crim.P. 16 imposes a duty of due diligence in the conduct of police investigations.

1983Although the defendant does not argue that the prosecution had actual knowledge of Mr. Adams’ testimony, he asserts that the prosecution’s lack of knowledge resulted from its failure to make a diligent inquiry (relying upon State v. Ledger, 444 A.2d 404, 411 (Me.1982); State v. Simmons, 435 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me.1981); State v. Thurlow, 414 A.2d 1241, 1244 (Me.1980)).

1991See, e.g., State v. Ledger, 444 A.2d 404, 411 (Me.1982); State v. Simmons, 435 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me.1981); State v. Thurlow, 414 A.2d 1241, 1244 (Me.1980).

1983Although the defendant does not argue that the prosecution had actual knowledge of Mr. Adams’ testimony, he asserts that the prosecution’s lack of knowledge resulted from its failure to make a diligent inquiry (relying upon State v. Ledger, 444 A.2d 404, 411 (Me.1982); State v. Simmons, 435 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me.1981); State v. Thurlow, 414 A.2d 1241, 1244 (Me.1980)).

1997Citing State v. Thurlow, 414 A.2d 1241 (Me.1980) and State v. Ledger, 444 A.2d 404 (Me.1982), Robbins argues that the State had “a continuing duty to make a diligent inquiry as to the existence of relevant information and witnesses.” Robbins accuses the State of remaining “willfully ignorant of the evidence.” [¶ 7] Contrary to the contention of Robbins, we have never stated that M.R.Crim.P. 16 imposes a duty of due diligence in the conduct of police investigations.

1983Although the defendant does not argue that the prosecution had actual knowledge of Mr. Adams’ testimony, he asserts that the prosecution’s lack of knowledge resulted from its failure to make a diligent inquiry (relying upon State v. Ledger, 444 A.2d 404, 411 (Me.1982); State v. Simmons, 435 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me.1981); State v. Thurlow, 414 A.2d 1241, 1244 (Me.1980)).

2018P. 16(a). [¶ 22] Furthermore, to ensure that the State learns about and discloses Brady information, both Brady and Rule 16 require prosecutors to "make a diligent inquiry" of investigators to determine if such "automatically discoverable information does exist in their files." Robbins , 1997 ME 21 , ¶ 7, 689 A.2d 603 ; see Strickler , 527 U.S. at 281 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 ("In order to comply with Brady , therefore, the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in [a] case, including the police." (quotation marks omitted)

2018P. 16(a). [¶ 22] Furthermore, to ensure that the State learns about and discloses Brady information, both Brady and Rule 16 require prosecutors to "make a diligent inquiry" of investigators to determine if such "automatically discoverable information does exist in their files." Robbins , 1997 ME 21 , ¶ 7, 689 A.2d 603 ; see Strickler , 527 U.S. at 281 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 ("In order to comply with Brady , therefore, the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in [a] case, including the police." (quotation marks omitted)

1993“We have held repeatedly that Rule 16(a) requires a diligent inquiry by prosecutors to discover whether automatically discoverable information exists.” State v. Rich, 592 A.2d 1085, 1088 (Me.1991).