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11 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Guidi v. Town of Turnergreen2 sentences2009Guidi, 2004 ME 42, ¶ 12 , 845 A.2d at 1193 . [¶ 9] Boothby argued that, because the counterclaims and cross-claims that survived the dismissal of his complaint involved only some of the original parties in interest, any judgment resulting from a trial of those claims would bind only the remaining parties. 2009Guidi, 2004 ME 42, ¶ 12 , 845 A.2d at 1193 . [¶ 9] Boothby argued that, because the counterclaims and cross-claims that survived the dismissal of his complaint involved only some of the original parties in interest, any judgment resulting from a trial of those claims would bind only the remaining parties. | 1 | 2 |
Boothby v. Grindlegreen2 sentences2011Id. ¶¶ 12, 13; see also Boothby v. Grindle, 2009 ME 132, ¶ 8 , 985 A.2d 1147 . [¶ 14] First, we conclude that the Superior Court’s decision to certify the appeal was not an abuse of discretion. 2011Id. ¶¶ 12, 13; see also Boothby v. Grindle, 2009 ME 132, ¶ 8 , 985 A.2d 1147 . [¶ 14] First, we conclude that the Superior Court’s decision to certify the appeal was not an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. v. Spauldinggreen2 sentences2008Id. ¶ 13 n. 1, 930 A.2d at 1028 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 11] Here, the judgment did not provide specific findings regarding why it was entered as final but instead only stated genetically that “there [was] no just reason for delay.” Chase drafted the language in the judgment but did not, in connection with its motion for summary judgment and entry of final judgment, offer any argument regarding how Rule 54(b)(1) should be applied. 2008Id. ¶ 13 n. 1, 930 A.2d at 1028 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 11] Here, the judgment did not provide specific findings regarding why it was entered as final but instead only stated genetically that “there [was] no just reason for delay.” Chase drafted the language in the judgment but did not, in connection with its motion for summary judgment and entry of final judgment, offer any argument regarding how Rule 54(b)(1) should be applied. | 1 | 1 |
Durgin v. Robertsongreen1 sentence2004Id.; Durgin v. Robertson, 428 A.2d 65, 68 (Me.1981). [¶ 13] The trial court must consider similar factors prior to its decision to certify. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
John McClare v. James J. Rocha
green
2 sentences2021The statutory notice requirement states: Cancellation and nonrenewal by an insurer of surplus lines coverage subject to this chapter shall not be effective unless received by the named insured at least 14 days prior to the effective date of cancellation or, when the cancellation is for nonpayment of premium, at least 10 days prior to the effective date of cancellation. 24-A M.R.S. § 2009-A. • Miscellaneous factors such as solvency considerations, the res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of a final judgment and the like.” McClare v. Rocha, 2014 ME 4 , ¶ 8 n.1, 86 A.3d 22 . 9 [¶16] The tri 2021The statutory notice requirement states: Cancellation and nonrenewal by an insurer of surplus lines coverage subject to this chapter shall not be effective unless received by the named insured at least 14 days prior to the effective date of cancellation or, when the cancellation is for nonpayment of premium, at least 10 days prior to the effective date of cancellation. 24-A M.R.S. § 2009-A. • Miscellaneous factors such as solvency considerations, the res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of a final judgment and the like.” McClare v. Rocha, 2014 ME 4 , ¶ 8 n.1, 86 A.3d 22 . 9 [¶16] The tri | 4 | 2015–2021 |
Marquis v. Town of Kennebunk
green
2 sentences2015McC/are v. Rocha, 2014 ME 4 , ~ 8 n.l, 86 A.3d 22 (quoting Marquis v. Town of Kennebunk, 2011 ME 128 , ~ 13, 36 A.3d 861 ). 2015McC/are v. Rocha, 2014 ME 4 , ~ 8 n.l, 86 A.3d 22 (quoting Marquis v. Town of Kennebunk, 2011 ME 128 , ~ 13, 36 A.3d 861 ). | 3 | 2014–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.