presiding justice rule in Maine

2025Specifically, the trial court “may not . . . create an impression that it doubts the defendant’s veracity.” Id. at 156 n.10. [¶12] In addition to her constitutional protections, Bernier’s right to an impartial bench is protected by statute: During a jury trial the presiding justice shall rule and charge the jury, orally or in writing, upon all matters of law arising in the case but shall not, during the trial, including the charge, express an opinion upon issues of fact arising in the case, and such an expression of opinion is sufficient cause for a new trial if either party aggrieved thereby

2025We have interpreted section 1105 to prohibit a trial court from directly or indirectly “suggesting that [it] endorses the cause of one side over that of the other side by emphasizing specific evidence in the case” or “by giving the jury a one-sided summation of the evidence,” from “disparag[ing] in the minds of the jury the accused’s theory of the case,” and from “creat[ing] the impression with the jury that [the court] entertains doubts as to the defendant’s veracity.” Bachelder, 403 A.2d at 759 . 10 Comment on the evidence by the trial court in the jury’s presence is rarely necessary or advi

1979See State v. Roy, Me., 385 A.2d 795, 798, n. 2 (1978); State v. Toppi, Me., 275 A.2d 805, 813 (1971) (admissibility of prior convictions); State v. Chapman, Me., 358 A.2d 387 (1976) (admissibility of in-court identification); State v. McDonough, Me., 350 A.2d 556 (1976) (admissibility of polygraph examination results); State v. Bragg, Me., 334 A.2d 507 (1975) (admissibility of crucial physical evidence); State v. Robbins, Me., 318 A.2d 51, 57 (1974) (determination of possible self-incrimination where constitutional privilege is invoked). 10 . 14 M.R.S.A., § 1105 provides: During a jury trial t

1979See State v. Roy, Me., 385 A.2d 795, 798, n. 2 (1978); State v. Toppi, Me., 275 A.2d 805, 813 (1971) (admissibility of prior convictions); State v. Chapman, Me., 358 A.2d 387 (1976) (admissibility of in-court identification); State v. McDonough, Me., 350 A.2d 556 (1976) (admissibility of polygraph examination results); State v. Bragg, Me., 334 A.2d 507 (1975) (admissibility of crucial physical evidence); State v. Robbins, Me., 318 A.2d 51, 57 (1974) (determination of possible self-incrimination where constitutional privilege is invoked). 10 . 14 M.R.S.A., § 1105 provides: During a jury trial t

1979See State v. Roy, Me., 385 A.2d 795, 798, n. 2 (1978); State v. Toppi, Me., 275 A.2d 805, 813 (1971) (admissibility of prior convictions); State v. Chapman, Me., 358 A.2d 387 (1976) (admissibility of in-court identification); State v. McDonough, Me., 350 A.2d 556 (1976) (admissibility of polygraph examination results); State v. Bragg, Me., 334 A.2d 507 (1975) (admissibility of crucial physical evidence); State v. Robbins, Me., 318 A.2d 51, 57 (1974) (determination of possible self-incrimination where constitutional privilege is invoked). 10 . 14 M.R.S.A., § 1105 provides: During a jury trial t

1979Our determination that the Superior Court Justice’s finding, that McCarthy was a Sun employee, is clearly erroneous is supported further by Mr. Whittier’s testimony that “McCarthy was not hired by us to drive the vehicles.” Significantly, the presiding Justice stated at hearing that, absent the finding he erroneously believed to be compelled by Cumberland Cold Storage, supra, he was satisfied that there was, in fact, “an independent contractual relationship.” In light of our determination that McCarthy was the employee of an independent contractor, we must now review the terms of the two relev

1978(Rule 51 M.R.Civ.P.) Defendant however, invokes the exception recognized by this Court that a party asking for a new trial may be granted it, notwithstanding his procedural default in having failed to object to a claimed erroneous instruction, “. . .if the error has deprived the party of a fair trial and has resulted in injustice.” Wescott v. Vickerson, Me., 284 A.2d 902, 904 (1971) See Hixon v. Mathiea, Me., 377 A.2d 112, 115, 116 (1977); cf. Johnson v. Parsons, 153 Me. 103 , 135 A.2d 273 (1957).

1978(Rule 51 M.R.Civ.P.) Defendant however, invokes the exception recognized by this Court that a party asking for a new trial may be granted it, notwithstanding his procedural default in having failed to object to a claimed erroneous instruction, “. . .if the error has deprived the party of a fair trial and has resulted in injustice.” Wescott v. Vickerson, Me., 284 A.2d 902, 904 (1971) See Hixon v. Mathiea, Me., 377 A.2d 112, 115, 116 (1977); cf. Johnson v. Parsons, 153 Me. 103 , 135 A.2d 273 (1957).

1974Later, in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) the Court held that a sua sponte declaration of mistrial by a presiding Justice was a bar to reprosecution.

1974Later, in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) the Court held that a sua sponte declaration of mistrial by a presiding Justice was a bar to reprosecution.

1973State v. Carleton, 148 Me. 237 , 92 A.2d 327 (1952).

1973State v. Carleton, 148 Me. 237 , 92 A.2d 327 (1952).

1959In the case of Palmer v. Barker, 11 Me. 338 , decided in 1834, the court was concerned with a law of the road statute which required travelers to keep “ ‘to the right of the centre of the travelled part of the road.’ ” The court said, on page 339: “The design of the law is to prevent travellers, when going on the road in opposite directions from obstructing each other, or so interfering as to produce injury or expose them to danger.” Winter v. Harris, 23 R.

1958Such is not the law now as was pointed out in the case of Labbe v. Cyr, 150 Me. 342 ; 111 A. (2nd) 330; and the cases cited in State v. Simpson , in support of the foregoing statement are no longer applicable by virtue of statutory changes cited in Labbe v. Cyr, supra. The next case to be considered is that of State v. Power, 123 Me. 223 ; 122 A. 572 .

1958Such is not the law now as was pointed out in the case of Labbe v. Cyr, 150 Me. 342 ; 111 A. (2nd) 330; and the cases cited in State v. Simpson , in support of the foregoing statement are no longer applicable by virtue of statutory changes cited in Labbe v. Cyr, supra. The next case to be considered is that of State v. Power, 123 Me. 223 ; 122 A. 572 .

1958Such is not the law now as was pointed out in the case of Labbe v. Cyr, 150 Me. 342 ; 111 A. (2nd) 330; and the cases cited in State v. Simpson , in support of the foregoing statement are no longer applicable by virtue of statutory changes cited in Labbe v. Cyr, supra. The next case to be considered is that of State v. Power, 123 Me. 223 ; 122 A. 572 .

1958Such is not the law now as was pointed out in the case of Labbe v. Cyr, 150 Me. 342 ; 111 A. (2nd) 330; and the cases cited in State v. Simpson , in support of the foregoing statement are no longer applicable by virtue of statutory changes cited in Labbe v. Cyr, supra. The next case to be considered is that of State v. Power, 123 Me. 223 ; 122 A. 572 .