appeal was designed test in Connecticut

2011Whether or not this is true, it is well established that “when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test.” Carpenter v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 581, 598 , 409 A.2d 1029 (1979).

2011Whether or not this is true, it is well established that “when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test.” Carpenter v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 581, 598 , 409 A.2d 1029 (1979).

1999This issue was directly addressed in Astarita v. Licquor Control Commission , 165 Conn. 185 (1973): We have frequently held that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test McNish v. American Brass Co. , 139 Conn. 44 , 53 ; State Water Commission v. Nonvich , 141 Conn. 442 , 44' The power of [the zoning board of appeals] to review, on appeal, under 8-6 (1) of the General Statutes, any decision of the zoning enforce

1977The defendants cite the many decisions of this court wherein we have held that “when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test.” Country Lands, Inc. v. Swinnerton, 151 Conn. 27, 33 , 193 A.2d 483 ; State Water Commission v. Norwich, 141 Conn. 442, 447 , 107 A.2d 270 ; McNish v. American Brass Co., 139 Conn. 44, 53 , 89 A.2d 566 .

1999This issue was directly addressed in Astarita v. Licquor Control Commission , 165 Conn. 185 (1973): We have frequently held that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test McNish v. American Brass Co. , 139 Conn. 44 , 53 ; State Water Commission v. Nonvich , 141 Conn. 442 , 44' The power of [the zoning board of appeals] to review, on appeal, under 8-6 (1) of the General Statutes, any decision of the zoning enforce

1977The defendants cite the many decisions of this court wherein we have held that “when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test.” Country Lands, Inc. v. Swinnerton, 151 Conn. 27, 33 , 193 A.2d 483 ; State Water Commission v. Norwich, 141 Conn. 442, 447 , 107 A.2d 270 ; McNish v. American Brass Co., 139 Conn. 44, 53 , 89 A.2d 566 .

2000II The defendant also claims that it is too late for the plaintiffs to challenge the imposition of the 1966 condition either because the plaintiffs have waived their right to do so or because the “finality of zoning decisions” concept, as discussed in Upjohn Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 224 Conn. 96 , prevents the trial court from overturning a 1966 zoning decision. 7 “We have frequently stated that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the

1999Moreover, even if the zoning department denies the application, "when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Upjohn Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 224 Conn. 96 , 102 , 616 A.2d 793 (1992).

1998The exhaustion doctrine reflects the legislative intent that such issues be handled in the first instance by local administrative officials in order to provide aggrieved persons with full and adequate administrative relief. . ." (Internal quotations omitted; Citations omitted.) Simko v. Ervin , 234 Conn. 498 , 503-04 , 661 A.2d 1018 (1995). "[The Court has] frequently CT Page 10895 held that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal

1998The exhaustion doctrine reflects the legislative intent that such issues be handled in the first instance by local administrative officials in order to provide aggrieved persons with full and adequate administrative relief. . ." (Internal quotations omitted; Citations omitted.) Simko v. Ervin , 234 Conn. 498 , 503-04 , 661 A.2d 1018 (1995). "[The Court has] frequently CT Page 10895 held that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal

1999It is also well settled that "where a statutory right of appeal from an administrative decision exists, an aggrieved party may not bypass the statutory procedure and instead bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Chase , 18 Conn. App. 85 , 90 , 557 A.2d 134 (1989), citing Carpenter v. Planning Zoning Commission , 176 Conn. 581 , 598 , 409 A.2d 1029 (1979); see also Garrett v. Groton Zoning Board of Appeals , Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 523119, (May 31 1

1999It is also well settled that "where a statutory right of appeal from an administrative decision exists, an aggrieved party may not bypass the statutory procedure and instead bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Chase , 18 Conn. App. 85 , 90 , 557 A.2d 134 (1989), citing Carpenter v. Planning Zoning Commission , 176 Conn. 581 , 598 , 409 A.2d 1029 (1979); see also Garrett v. Groton Zoning Board of Appeals , Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 523119, (May 31 1

2025We endorsed the ‘‘general rule’’ that ‘‘[w]hen a particular statute authorizes an administrative agency to act in a particu- lar situation it necessarily confers upon such agency authority to determine whether the situation is such as to authorize the agency to act—that is, to determine the coverage of the statute—and this question need not, and in fact cannot, be initially decided by a court. . . . [W]hen a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal w

2025We endorsed the ‘‘general rule’’ that ‘‘[w]hen a particular statute authorizes an administrative agency to act in a particu- lar situation it necessarily confers upon such agency authority to determine whether the situation is such as to authorize the agency to act—that is, to determine the coverage of the statute—and this question need not, and in fact cannot, be initially decided by a court. . . . [W]hen a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal w

1999This issue was directly addressed in Astarita v. Licquor Control Commission , 165 Conn. 185 (1973): We have frequently held that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test McNish v. American Brass Co. , 139 Conn. 44 , 53 ; State Water Commission v. Nonvich , 141 Conn. 442 , 44' The power of [the zoning board of appeals] to review, on appeal, under 8-6 (1) of the General Statutes, any decision of the zoning enforce

1986Contrary to the Appellate Court’s decision, we have long adhered to the rule that, where a statutory right of appeal from an administrative decision exists, an aggrieved party may not bypass the statutory procedure and instead bring an independent action “to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test.” Carpenter v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 581, 598 , 409 A.2d 1029 (1979); Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac, 194 Conn. 677, 685 , 485 A.2d 1272 (1984); Greenwich v. Liquor Control Commission, 191 Conn. 528, 543 , 469 A.2d 382 (1983); Powers v. Ulichny, 185 Conn. 145, 147 , 440

1993Greenwich v. Kristoff, 180 Conn. 575, 578 , 430 A.2d 1294 (1980); see also General Statutes § 8-7. “[Wjhen a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test.” Country Lands, Inc. v. Swinnerton, 151 Conn. 27, 33 , 193 A.2d 483 (1963); Cummings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67, 78 , 527 A.2d 1230 (1987).

1993Greenwich v. Kristoff, 180 Conn. 575, 578 , 430 A.2d 1294 (1980); see also General Statutes § 8-7. “[Wjhen a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test.” Country Lands, Inc. v. Swinnerton, 151 Conn. 27, 33 , 193 A.2d 483 (1963); Cummings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67, 78 , 527 A.2d 1230 (1987).

1986Contrary to the Appellate Court’s decision, we have long adhered to the rule that, where a statutory right of appeal from an administrative decision exists, an aggrieved party may not bypass the statutory procedure and instead bring an independent action “to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test.” Carpenter v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 581, 598 , 409 A.2d 1029 (1979); Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac, 194 Conn. 677, 685 , 485 A.2d 1272 (1984); Greenwich v. Liquor Control Commission, 191 Conn. 528, 543 , 469 A.2d 382 (1983); Powers v. Ulichny, 185 Conn. 145, 147 , 440

1986Contrary to the Appellate Court’s decision, we have long adhered to the rule that, where a statutory right of appeal from an administrative decision exists, an aggrieved party may not bypass the statutory procedure and instead bring an independent action “to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test.” Carpenter v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 581, 598 , 409 A.2d 1029 (1979); Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac, 194 Conn. 677, 685 , 485 A.2d 1272 (1984); Greenwich v. Liquor Control Commission, 191 Conn. 528, 543 , 469 A.2d 382 (1983); Powers v. Ulichny, 185 Conn. 145, 147 , 440

1992See also Merlo v. Planning Zoning Commission, 196 Conn. 676 ; Butzgy v. Glastonbury, 203 Conn. 109 , 119 .

1991The Defendants' Claim that the Plaintiff's Sole Remedy, if One Exists, is to Appeal the Decision of the Defendant Inland Wetlands and Watercourse Commission The defendants argue that where a party has a statutory right of appeal from a decision of an administrative agency, the party's sole remedy is by way of appeal, citing Carpenter v. Planning and Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 581 , 598 (1979), and that a party may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test, citing Butzgy v. Glastonbury, 203 Conn. 109 , 116 (1987).

1981Blum v. Lisbon Leasing Corporation, 173 Conn. 175, 180 , 377 A.2d 280 [1977]; Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Co., 106 Conn. 475, 482 , 138 A. 483 [1927]; see also, 3 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning (4th Ed.) c. 66.” Furthermore, in Bianco v. Darien, 157 Conn. 548, 553-55 , 254 A.2d 898 (1969), an action to restrain a town from interfering with the operation of a garbage collection facility on private premises, we refused to apply the rule that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency he may not bring an independent action to t

1981Blum v. Lisbon Leasing Corporation, 173 Conn. 175, 180 , 377 A.2d 280 [1977]; Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Co., 106 Conn. 475, 482 , 138 A. 483 [1927]; see also, 3 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning (4th Ed.) c. 66.” Furthermore, in Bianco v. Darien, 157 Conn. 548, 553-55 , 254 A.2d 898 (1969), an action to restrain a town from interfering with the operation of a garbage collection facility on private premises, we refused to apply the rule that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency he may not bring an independent action to t

2014In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed. . . . [W]hen a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instéad of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Caltabiano v. L & L Real Estate Holdings II, LLC, 122 Conn. App. 751, 758-59 , 998 A.2d 1256 (2010).

2014In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed. . . . [W]hen a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instéad of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Caltabiano v. L & L Real Estate Holdings II, LLC, 122 Conn. App. 751, 758-59 , 998 A.2d 1256 (2010).

2011“For example, when a statute provides for an adequate remedy, we have long adhered to the rule that, where a statutory right of appeal from an administrative decision exists, an aggrieved party may not bypass the statutory procedure and instead bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) School Administrators of Waterbury v. Waterbury Financial Planning & Assistance Board, 276 Conn. 355, 368 , 885 A.2d 1219 (2005).

2011“For example, when a statute provides for an adequate remedy, we have long adhered to the rule that, where a statutory right of appeal from an administrative decision exists, an aggrieved party may not bypass the statutory procedure and instead bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) School Administrators of Waterbury v. Waterbury Financial Planning & Assistance Board, 276 Conn. 355, 368 , 885 A.2d 1219 (2005).

2010In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) George v. Watertown, 85 Conn. App. 606, 609-10 , 858 A.2d 800 , cert. denied, 272 Conn. 911 , 863 A.2d 702 (2004). *759 As an initial matter, the second count of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, which considers decisions of the board and zoning commission concerning Flat Rock, is devoid of any reference to an underlying administrative appeal. “[W]hen a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an ind

2010In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) George v. Watertown, 85 Conn. App. 606, 609-10 , 858 A.2d 800 , cert. denied, 272 Conn. 911 , 863 A.2d 702 (2004). *759 As an initial matter, the second count of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, which considers decisions of the board and zoning commission concerning Flat Rock, is devoid of any reference to an underlying administrative appeal. “[W]hen a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an ind

2010In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) George v. Watertown, 85 Conn. App. 606, 609-10 , 858 A.2d 800 , cert. denied, 272 Conn. 911 , 863 A.2d 702 (2004). *759 As an initial matter, the second count of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, which considers decisions of the board and zoning commission concerning Flat Rock, is devoid of any reference to an underlying administrative appeal. “[W]hen a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an ind

2010In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) George v. Watertown, 85 Conn. App. 606, 609-10 , 858 A.2d 800 , cert. denied, 272 Conn. 911 , 863 A.2d 702 (2004). *759 As an initial matter, the second count of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, which considers decisions of the board and zoning commission concerning Flat Rock, is devoid of any reference to an underlying administrative appeal. “[W]hen a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an ind

2006This court long has held that when “a statute has established a procedure to redress a particular wrong, a person must follow the specified remedy and may not institute a proceeding that might have been permissible in the absence of such a statutory procedure.” Norwich v. Lebanon, 200 Conn. 697, 708 , 513 A.2d 77 (1986); see also LaCroix v. Board of Education, 199 *280 Conn. 70, 78, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986) (when “a statutory right of appeal from an administrative decision exists, an aggrieved party may not bypass the statutory procedure and instead bring an independent action to test the very iss

2006This court long has held that when “a statute has established a procedure to redress a particular wrong, a person must follow the specified remedy and may not institute a proceeding that might have been permissible in the absence of such a statutory procedure.” Norwich v. Lebanon, 200 Conn. 697, 708 , 513 A.2d 77 (1986); see also LaCroix v. Board of Education, 199 *280 Conn. 70, 78, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986) (when “a statutory right of appeal from an administrative decision exists, an aggrieved party may not bypass the statutory procedure and instead bring an independent action to test the very iss

1998The exhaustion doctrine reflects the legislative intent that such issues be handled in the first instance by local administrative officials in order to provide aggrieved persons with full and adequate administrative relief. . ." (Internal quotations omitted; Citations omitted.) Simko v. Ervin , 234 Conn. 498 , 503-04 , 661 A.2d 1018 (1995). "[The Court has] frequently CT Page 10895 held that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal

1998The exhaustion doctrine reflects the legislative intent that such issues be handled in the first instance by local administrative officials in order to provide aggrieved persons with full and adequate administrative relief. . ." (Internal quotations omitted; Citations omitted.) Simko v. Ervin , 234 Conn. 498 , 503-04 , 661 A.2d 1018 (1995). "[The Court has] frequently CT Page 10895 held that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal

1997Also see Greater Bridgeport District v. CHRO , 211 Conn. 129 (1989); CHRO v. Archdiocesan School Office , 202 Conn. 601 (1987).

1997Also see Greater Bridgeport District v. CHRO , 211 Conn. 129 (1989); CHRO v. Archdiocesan School Office , 202 Conn. 601 (1987).

1997Although it is true that "[w]hen a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test" Gelinas v. West Hartford, 225 Conn. 575 , 595 , 626 A.2d 259 (1993); it is equally true that "[t]here is no absolute right of appeal to the courts from a decision of an administrative agency." Fairfield v. Connecticut Siting Council, 238 Conn. 361 , 368 , 679 A.2d 354 (1996); see also Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmen

1997Although it is true that "[w]hen a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test" Gelinas v. West Hartford, 225 Conn. 575 , 595 , 626 A.2d 259 (1993); it is equally true that "[t]here is no absolute right of appeal to the courts from a decision of an administrative agency." Fairfield v. Connecticut Siting Council, 238 Conn. 361 , 368 , 679 A.2d 354 (1996); see also Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmen

1997Judicial review of administrative agency decisions is granted "only in certain limited and well delineated circumstances." Lewis v. Gaming Policy Board, 224 Conn. 693 , 699-700 , 620 A.2d 780 (1993).

1997Judicial review of administrative agency decisions is granted "only in certain limited and well delineated circumstances." Lewis v. Gaming Policy Board, 224 Conn. 693 , 699-700 , 620 A.2d 780 (1993).