middle-tier test (New Hampshire) · Go Syfert
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middle-tier test in New Hampshire

11 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2008 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
Carson v. Maurerred
nh · 1980 · cited in 6 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 1985–2006
2 sentences

2006Although in the trial court the petitioners urged application of a middle-tier analysis, relying upon Carson, 120 N.H. at 932 , they make no such argument in their brief to this court.

1988In addressing this State equal protection claim, the plaintiffs are principally concerned to persuade us to review the effect of subparagraph (d) under the so-called middle-tier test of Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931-33 , 424 A.2d 825, 830-31 (1980), which requires that legislation restricting the enjoyment of an “important substantive right” be reasonable, not arbitrary, and justified by a “fair and substantial” relationship to the effectuation of a legitimate governmental objective.

46
Town of Chesterfield v. Brooksgreen
nh · 1985 · cited in 2 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 1992–2006
2 sentences

1992However, under the New Hampshire Constitution, a middle tier analysis is employed, and in order for a classification in a zoning ordinance to be constitutional it “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” Town of Chesterfield v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 64, 69 , 489 A.2d 600, 604 (1985) (citations and quotations omitted).

1992However, under the New Hampshire Constitution, a middle tier analysis is employed, and in order for a classification in a zoning ordinance to be constitutional it “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” Town of Chesterfield v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 64, 69 , 489 A.2d 600, 604 (1985) (citations and quotations omitted).

22
Gould v. Concord Hospitalgreen
nh · 1985 · cited in 2 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 1999–2008
2 sentences

2008We noted that we had “previously ... elected to apply a middle tier standard to an estate’s right to recover under the wrongful death statute.” Id,.; see Gould v. Concord Hospital, 126 N.H. 405, 408-09 (1985).

1999Gould, 126 N.H. at 408-09 , 493 A.2d at 1196 .

12
Dow v. Town of Effinghamgreen
nh · 2002 · cited in 1 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
1 sentence

2006See Dow, 148 N.H. at 124-25 ; Town of Chesterfield v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 64, 67-69 (1985).

11
Asselin v. Town of Conwaygreen
nh · 1992 · cited in 1 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
2 sentences

1995“Under the New Hampshire Constitution, a middle tier analysis is employed, and in order for a classification in a zoning ordinance to be constitutional it must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” Asselin v. Town of Conway, 135 N.H. 576, 577 , 607 A.2d 132, 133 (1992) (quotation omitted).

1995“Under the New Hampshire Constitution, a middle tier analysis is employed, and in order for a classification in a zoning ordinance to be constitutional it must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” Asselin v. Town of Conway, 135 N.H. 576, 577 , 607 A.2d 132, 133 (1992) (quotation omitted).

11
Califano v. Goldfarbgreen
scotus · 1977 · cited in 1 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
1 sentence

1988See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).

11
State v. Scovillegreen
nh · 1973 · cited in 1 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
2 sentences

1986See State v. Scoville, 113 N.H. 161, 163-64 , 304 A.2d 366, 368-69 (1973) (“reasonable, not arbitrary [having a] fair and substantial relation” test assumed to be equivalent to rational basis test; classification of seventeen-year-old violators as adult criminals is rational and consistent with constitutional principles).

1986See State v. Scoville, 113 N.H. 161, 163-64 , 304 A.2d 366, 368-69 (1973) (“reasonable, not arbitrary [having a] fair and substantial relation” test assumed to be equivalent to rational basis test; classification of seventeen-year-old violators as adult criminals is rational and consistent with constitutional principles).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Hampshire. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Belkner v. Preston green
nh · 1975
2 sentences

1985Indeed, taking this broader view, the result would be the same whether we judged these equal protection claims under the rational basis test, see Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661 , 406 A.2d 704 (1979); Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15 , 332 A.2d 168 (1975), or under the middle tier test of Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925 , 424 A.2d 825 (1980).

1985Indeed, taking this broader view, the result would be the same whether we judged these equal protection claims under the rational basis test, see Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661 , 406 A.2d 704 (1979); Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15 , 332 A.2d 168 (1975), or under the middle tier test of Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925 , 424 A.2d 825 (1980).

11985–1985
Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester green
nh · 1979
2 sentences

1985Indeed, taking this broader view, the result would be the same whether we judged these equal protection claims under the rational basis test, see Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661 , 406 A.2d 704 (1979); Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15 , 332 A.2d 168 (1975), or under the middle tier test of Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925 , 424 A.2d 825 (1980).

1985Indeed, taking this broader view, the result would be the same whether we judged these equal protection claims under the rational basis test, see Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661 , 406 A.2d 704 (1979); Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15 , 332 A.2d 168 (1975), or under the middle tier test of Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925 , 424 A.2d 825 (1980).

11985–1985
LaBounty v. American Insurance Co. green
nh · 1982
2 sentences

1985I therefore respectfully dissent from the application of the narrow Park analysis of quid pro quo, which leads the majority to strike down a provision that this court in LaBounty v. American Insurance Co., 122 N.H. 738 , 451 A.2d 161 (1982), declared to be the better rule of substantive law.

1985I therefore respectfully dissent from the application of the narrow Park analysis of quid pro quo, which leads the majority to strike down a provision that this court in LaBounty v. American Insurance Co., 122 N.H. 738 , 451 A.2d 161 (1982), declared to be the better rule of substantive law.

11985–1985

Where else courts name it

NH 11 (1985–2008) CT 9 (1983–2025) MT 7 (1986–1997) NY 3 (1979–1983) CA 2 (1979–1993)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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