ad damnum clause in New Jersey

1958Defendant's counsel takes the position that the verdicts should be set aside in view of the Botta decision by virtue of R.R. 1:5-3( c ) which provides: "The court may notice plain errors affecting substantial rights of a party, although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court." It is noted that prior to the Botta decision the decision in the cases of Rhodehouse v. Director General, 95 N.J.L. 355 ( Sup. Ct. 1920); Lukasiewicz v. Haddad, 24 N.J.

1956It has been held in Rhodehouse v. Director General, 95 N.J.L. 355 ( Sup. Ct. 1920): "We see no legal impropriety in this.

1958Super. 399 ( App. Div. 1953), which hold that it is not improper for counsel to advise the jury as to the amount of the ad damnum clause of the complaint; also with Kulodzej v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 39 N.J.

1958Super. 399 ( App. Div. 1953), which hold that it is not improper for counsel to advise the jury as to the amount of the ad damnum clause of the complaint; also with Kulodzej v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 39 N.J.

1997As noted, defendant submitted those cards to a handwriting analyst, who provided defendant with an expert opinion that the cards were probably sent to defendant by plaintiff. 4 When reviewing a dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to plead a cause of action, we must search the complaint or counterclaim in depth and with liberality to determine whether a cause of action can be gleaned “even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary.” Printing Mart-Morristowm v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 , 563 A.2d 31 (1989) (quoting Di Cristofaro v.

1997As noted, defendant submitted those cards to a handwriting analyst, who provided defendant with an expert opinion that the cards were probably sent to defendant by plaintiff. 4 When reviewing a dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to plead a cause of action, we must search the complaint or counterclaim in depth and with liberality to determine whether a cause of action can be gleaned “even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary.” Printing Mart-Morristowm v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 , 563 A.2d 31 (1989) (quoting Di Cristofaro v.

1997As noted, defendant submitted those cards to a handwriting analyst, who provided defendant with an expert opinion that the cards were probably sent to defendant by plaintiff. 4 When reviewing a dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to plead a cause of action, we must search the complaint or counterclaim in depth and with liberality to determine whether a cause of action can be gleaned “even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary.” Printing Mart-Morristowm v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 , 563 A.2d 31 (1989) (quoting Di Cristofaro v.

1997As noted, defendant submitted those cards to a handwriting analyst, who provided defendant with an expert opinion that the cards were probably sent to defendant by plaintiff. 4 When reviewing a dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to plead a cause of action, we must search the complaint or counterclaim in depth and with liberality to determine whether a cause of action can be gleaned “even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary.” Printing Mart-Morristowm v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 , 563 A.2d 31 (1989) (quoting Di Cristofaro v.

1992We are satisfied the Court would take the same course in regard to the "bottom line" problem. [2] But see amended R. 1:7-1(b). [1] Indeed, logically it could be argued that the expert might just as well do the calculations since it is simple mathematics. [2] Justice Pashman in Tenore observed ( 67 N.J. at 483 , 341 A. 2d 613 ): As to the prejudicial capacity before a jury of gross dollar totals submitted in this manner, compare Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 104 [ 138 A. 2d 713 ] (1958) where the court said: We know that as a matter of practice when the ad damnum clause is brought to the attent

1992We are satisfied the Court would take the same course in regard to the "bottom line" problem. [2] But see amended R. 1:7-1(b). [1] Indeed, logically it could be argued that the expert might just as well do the calculations since it is simple mathematics. [2] Justice Pashman in Tenore observed ( 67 N.J. at 483 , 341 A. 2d 613 ): As to the prejudicial capacity before a jury of gross dollar totals submitted in this manner, compare Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 104 [ 138 A. 2d 713 ] (1958) where the court said: We know that as a matter of practice when the ad damnum clause is brought to the attent

1972Randazzo v. Bacque, 37 N.J.

1958Super. 268 ( App. Div. 1956), sanctioning *104 a statement to the jury in summation of counsel's opinion as to the sum which should be awarded to the plaintiff; and with Budden v. Goldstein, supra, 43 N.J.

1958Defendant's counsel takes the position that the verdicts should be set aside in view of the Botta decision by virtue of R.R. 1:5-3( c ) which provides: "The court may notice plain errors affecting substantial rights of a party, although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court." It is noted that prior to the Botta decision the decision in the cases of Rhodehouse v. Director General, 95 N.J.L. 355 ( Sup. Ct. 1920); Lukasiewicz v. Haddad, 24 N.J.

1954Cf. Watson v. World of Mirth Shows, 4 F.R.D. 31 ( D.C.S.D.

1935Kanouse v. Martin , 56 U.S. (15 How .) 198; 14 L.Ed. 660 .