259 New York opinions name it 10 courts 1887–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Loomis v. Civetta Corinno Construction Corp.green2 sentences2024NO. 94 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/08/2024 ANALYSIS \\In the absence of prejudice, a motion to amend the ad damnum clause, whether made before or after the trial, should generally be granted" (Heller v Louis Provenzano, Inc., 303 AD2d 20, 22 [1st Dept 2003] citing Loomis v Civetta Corinne Const. Corp., 54 NY2d 18 [1981]; see Brennan v City of New York, 99 AD2d 445 [1st 1984]. 2007The Loomis court therefore concluded that a trial court presented with a motion to amend an ad damnum clause should weigh the same considerations as applied when considering a motion to amend a complaint and allow the amendment at any stage of the proceedings if no prejudice to the defendant has been shown. ( 54 NY2d at 23 .) Here, the proposed amendment is limited in scope; plaintiff seeks only to add an express demand for punitive damages. | 16 | 60 |
Huston v. Raogreen2 sentences2003(See e.g., Huston v Rao, supra; Pulerwitz v Rand, 141 AD2d 623 [2d Dept 1988]; Mittman v International Menswear, 125 AD2d 377 [2d Dept 1986].) A motion to increase the ad damnum clause must be made in Supreme Court because Civil Court does not have the power to grant such relief. 1999(See, e.g., Huston v Rao, 74 AD2d 127, 130 [2d Dept 1980] [where plaintiff, in action transferred to Civil Court pursuant to CPLR 325 (d), seeks to amend the ad damnum clause, plaintiff must first move to re-transfer the action to Supreme Court and then move to amend in Supreme Court]; Gordon v Board of Educ., 134 Misc 2d 284 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1987] [same].) It makes absolutely no sense, however, to punt this somewhat routine motion into the procedural quandary of transfer orders, where, as here, no countervailing judicial or party interest would be advanced thereby. | 3 | 8 |
In re Gardsteingreen2 sentences2024NO. 94 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/08/2024 ANALYSIS \\In the absence of prejudice, a motion to amend the ad damnum clause, whether made before or after the trial, should generally be granted" (Heller v Louis Provenzano, Inc., 303 AD2d 20, 22 [1st Dept 2003] citing Loomis v Civetta Corinne Const. Corp., 54 NY2d 18 [1981]; see Brennan v City of New York, 99 AD2d 445 [1st 1984]. 2004While leave to amend a complaint should be liberally granted (see CPLR 3025 [b]), “a plaintiff does not have the absolute right to amend the complaint by increasing the ad damnum clause at any time, to any amount, subject to defeat only by the defendant coming forward with proof of actual prejudice” (Dolan v Garden City Union Free School Dist., 113 AD2d 781, 784 [1985]; see Brennan v City of New York, 99 AD2d 445, 446 [1984]). | 3 | 5 |
Key International Manufacturing, Inc. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc.green2 sentences2007Mfg. v Morsel Diesel, Inc. ( 142 AD2d 448 [1988]), “the rule permitting the claim of a newly joined plaintiff to relate back to the earlier claim of a preexisting plaintiff does not necessarily extend beyond those situations . . . where the substance of the claims of the newly joined plaintiff and those of [the] existing plaintiff are virtually identical, where the ad damnum clause is thus the same in the proposed amended complaint as in the original complaint, and where the newly joined plaintiff is closely related to the original plaintiff’ (id. at 458-459; see also Bellini v Gersalle Realty 1995Mfg. v Morse/Diesel, supra, at 458-459): "We emphasize, however, that the rule permitting the claim of a newly joined plaintiff to relate back to the earlier claim of a preexisting plaintiff does not necessarily extend beyond those situations, such as this case, where the substance of the claims of the newly joined plaintiff and those of existing plaintiff are virtually identical, where the ad damnum clause is thus the same in the proposed amended complaint as in the original complaint, and where the newly joined plaintiff is closely related to the original plaintiff. | 3 | 5 |
17 E. 80th Realty Corp. v. 68th Associatesgreen2 sentences2016“In the absence of a motion to amend the ad damnum clause, damages [were] limited to the amount sought in the complaint” (17 E. 80th Realty Corp. v 68th Assoc., 173 AD2d 245, 249 [1991]; see Bank of Richmondville v Terra Nova Ins. 2016“In the absence of a motion to amend the ad damnum clause, damages [were] limited to the amount sought in the complaint” (17 E. 80th Realty Corp. v 68th Assoc., 173 AD2d 245, 249 [1991]; see Bank of Richmondville v Terra Nova Ins. | 2 | 5 |
Koi v. P. S. & M. Catering Corp.green2 sentences2012Catering Corp., 15 AD2d 775, 775 [1st Dept 1962].) On the other hand, as the Court of Appeals has recognized, “in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, a motion to amend the ad damnum clause, whether made before or after the trial, should generally be granted.” (Loomis v Civetta Corinno Constr. 2012Catering Corp., 15 AD2d 775, 775 [1st Dept 1962].) On the other hand, as the Court of Appeals has recognized, “in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, a motion to amend the ad damnum clause, whether made before or after the trial, should generally be granted.” (Loomis v Civetta Corinno Constr. | 2 | 4 |
Holst v. Liberatoregreen2 sentences2016It is axiomatic that “ £[l]eave to amend a pleading should be freely granted in the absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party where the amendment is not patently lacking in merit’ ” (Holst v Liberatore, 105 AD3d 1374, 1374 [2013]; see CPLR 3025 [b]; Meyer v University Neurology, 133 AD3d 1307, 1309 [2015]; McGrath v Town of Irondequoit, 120 AD3d 968 , 969 [2014]). 2016It is axiomatic that “ £[l]eave to amend a pleading should be freely granted in the absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party where the amendment is not patently lacking in merit’ ” (Holst v Liberatore, 105 AD3d 1374, 1374 [2013]; see CPLR 3025 [b]; Meyer v University Neurology, 133 AD3d 1307, 1309 [2015]; McGrath v Town of Irondequoit, 120 AD3d 968 , 969 [2014]). | 2 | 3 |
MEYER, M.D., MICHAEL v. UNIVERSITY NEUROLOGYgreen2 sentences2016It is axiomatic that “ £[l]eave to amend a pleading should be freely granted in the absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party where the amendment is not patently lacking in merit’ ” (Holst v Liberatore, 105 AD3d 1374, 1374 [2013]; see CPLR 3025 [b]; Meyer v University Neurology, 133 AD3d 1307, 1309 [2015]; McGrath v Town of Irondequoit, 120 AD3d 968 , 969 [2014]). 2016It is axiomatic that “ £[l]eave to amend a pleading should be freely granted in the absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party where the amendment is not patently lacking in merit’ ” (Holst v Liberatore, 105 AD3d 1374, 1374 [2013]; see CPLR 3025 [b]; Meyer v University Neurology, 133 AD3d 1307, 1309 [2015]; McGrath v Town of Irondequoit, 120 AD3d 968 , 969 [2014]). | 2 | 3 |
Miranda v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2014Since plaintiff established by affidavit of merit that her al leged damages were increased beyond Civil Court’s jurisdictional maximum as a result of events that transpired after she had filed her complaint in this matter in Civil Court, her motion to transfer the action to Supreme Court should have been granted (CPLR 325 [b]; see Matter of Miranda v City of New York, 81 AD2d 792, 792 [1st Dept 1981]; Williams v Williams, 23 AD2d 482, 482 [1st Dept 1965]). 2014Since plaintiff established by affidavit of merit that her al leged damages were increased beyond Civil Court’s jurisdictional maximum as a result of events that transpired after she had filed her complaint in this matter in Civil Court, her motion to transfer the action to Supreme Court should have been granted (CPLR 325 [b]; see Matter of Miranda v City of New York, 81 AD2d 792, 792 [1st Dept 1981]; Williams v Williams, 23 AD2d 482, 482 [1st Dept 1965]). | 2 | 3 |
| Insurance Co. of North America v. Hellmergreen | 2 | 2 |
| Vargas v. Rosal-Arcillasgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Bank of Richmondville v. Terra Nova Insurancegreen | 2 | 2 |
| Tomich v. Cohengreen | 2 | 2 |
Dusanenko v. Lefevergreen2 sentences2004While leave to amend a complaint should be liberally granted (see CPLR 3025 [b]), “a plaintiff does not have the absolute right to amend the complaint by increasing the ad damnum clause at any time, to any amount, subject to defeat only by the defendant coming forward with proof of actual prejudice” (Dolan v Garden City Union Free School Dist., 113 AD2d 781, 784 [1985]; see Brennan v City of New York, 99 AD2d 445, 446 [1984]). 1991In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion to increase the ad damnum clause of her complaint (see, Dolan v Garden City Union Free School Dist., 113 AD2d 781, 785 ). | 1 | 14 |
London v. Mooregreen2 sentences2003A motion to increase the ad damnum clause based on a claim of increased injuries must be supported by two affidavits: (1) one by the plaintiffs that demonstrates “the merits of the case, the reasons for the delay, and the fact that the increase is warranted by reason of facts which have recently come to the attention of the plaintiff [s] and excusing the failure or negligence necessitating the amendment so far as these facts are within the knowledge of the plaintiff[s]” and (2) one by a doctor showing a causal connection between the injuries and the underlying accident and a consistent course 1983The trend in this court has been to stress prejudice to the defendant over mere delay as a basis for denying a motion to increase the ad damnum clause of a complaint (compare Strobel v Dailey, 84 AD2d 748 , and Brewster v City of New York, 78 AD2d 667 , with Posselt v Rosa, 60 AD2d 854 , and London v Moore, 32 AD2d 543 ), and in this case no actual prejudice to the defendants has been demonstrated. | 1 | 9 |
Reid v. Weir-Metro Ambulance Service, Inc.green2 sentences2011Additionally, since the ad damnum clause did not contain a specific amount, but rather sought damages “in excess of $15 million” (cf. Reid v Weir-Metro Ambulance Serv., 191 AD2d 309, 310 [1993]), no amendment was required. 2006Absent a formal motion by defendants to amend the ad damnum clause in their counterclaim, their damages for nonpayment must be limited to the amount sought in the counterclaim, namely $112,749.99 (see Reid v Weir-Metro Ambulance Serv., 191 AD2d 309 [1993]). | 1 | 4 |
Lopez v. Alexandergreen2 sentences2005To demonstrate their entitlement to this relief, the plaintiffs were required to submit evidence showing the merits of the case, the reasons for the delay in asserting the present claims, and that the increase in damages resulted from facts that only recently came to their attention (see Barsoum v Wilson, 255 AD2d 537 [1998]; Lopez v Alexander, 251 AD2d 297 [1998]; Gambino v Swan, 152 AD2d 620 [1989]). 2003A motion to increase the ad damnum clause based on a claim of increased injuries must be supported by two affidavits: (1) one by the plaintiffs that demonstrates “the merits of the case, the reasons for the delay, and the fact that the increase is warranted by reason of facts which have recently come to the attention of the plaintiff [s] and excusing the failure or negligence necessitating the amendment so far as these facts are within the knowledge of the plaintiff[s]” and (2) one by a doctor showing a causal connection between the injuries and the underlying accident and a consistent course | 1 | 4 |
Francilion v. Epsteingreen2 sentences2018In the absence of an application to increase the ad damnum clause, the plaintiff's motion to remove the action to the Supreme Court should have been denied ( see id .; Francilion v Epstein , 144 AD2d 633, 633-634 ). [*2]Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, to restore the matter to the Civil Court, Kings County. 1991In the absence of an application to increase the ad damnum clause, the Supreme Court’s denial of removal was proper (see, Francilion v Epstein, 144 AD2d 633, 633-634 ; Huston v Rao, 74 AD2d 127, 130, 131 ; 1 Weinstein- Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 325.11; Siegel, NY Prac § 25). | 1 | 3 |
| Braun v. Ahmedgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Mathiesen v. Meadgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Super Value, Inc.green | 1 | 2 |
| Wyso v. City of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Naujokas v. Careygreen | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pica v. Pica
neutral
2 sentences1989Corp., 54 NY2d 18 , rearg denied 55 NY2d 801 ; Grcic v City of New York, 139 AD2d 621, 626 ), we conclude that, in view of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court acted properly in denying the plaintiffs application seeking to increase the amount demanded in the ad damnum clause of the complaint and in reducing the total jury verdict to $5,000,000 by reducing that portion of the verdict for the plaintiff’s past and future and medical expenses to $2,318,000. 1987Corp. ( 54 NY2d 18 , rearg denied 55 NY2d 801 ), held that a motion could be made after the verdict to increase the ad damnum clause to conform to the amount of the verdict. | 16 | 1983–2020 |
Koupash v. Grand Union Co.
neutral
2 sentences1997Inasmuch as plaintiff has proffered no competent evidence establishing that his 1992 stroke was causally related to his fall some six years earlier, and his request to increase the ad damnum clause was premised, to a large degree, upon that theory (compare, Koupash v Grand Union Co., 34 AD2d 695 ), that aspect of the motion should have been denied, with leave to renew upon a proper evidentiary showing (see, Sylvester v Stephens, 148 AD2d 523, 524 ). 1983Moreover, leave to increase the ad damnum clause has been permitted based solely upon an update (Cardone v University Hosp., 78 AD2d 645 ; Hillenbrand v 3801 Review Place, 72 AD2d 554 ) or a re-evaluation of the original injuries (Wagner v Huntington Hosp., 65 AD2d 771 ) where, as here, the proof is sufficient to warrant an increase (see Koupash v Grand Union Co., 34 AD2d 695 ; Bird v Board of Educ., 29 AD2d 812 ; cf. Beras v Beras, 82 AD2d 843 ; Carlisle v County of Nassau, 75 AD2d 593 ). | 9 | 1976–1997 |
Hillenbrand v. 3801 Review Place, Inc.
green
2 sentences1985We are not unmindful of cases in this Department which appear to dispense with the latter requirement where the requested increase in the ad damnum clause is based "solely upon an update of original injuries” (Hillenbrand v 3801 Review Place, 72 AD2d 554 ; Church v Catholic Med. 1983Moreover, leave to increase the ad damnum clause has been permitted based solely upon an update (Cardone v University Hosp., 78 AD2d 645 ; Hillenbrand v 3801 Review Place, 72 AD2d 554 ) or a re-evaluation of the original injuries (Wagner v Huntington Hosp., 65 AD2d 771 ) where, as here, the proof is sufficient to warrant an increase (see Koupash v Grand Union Co., 34 AD2d 695 ; Bird v Board of Educ., 29 AD2d 812 ; cf. Beras v Beras, 82 AD2d 843 ; Carlisle v County of Nassau, 75 AD2d 593 ). | 9 | 1980–1985 |
O'Haire v. O'Haire
green
2 sentences1983Moreover, leave to increase the ad damnum clause has been permitted based solely upon an update (Cardone v University Hosp., 78 AD2d 645 ; Hillenbrand v 3801 Review Place, 72 AD2d 554 ) or a re-evaluation of the original injuries (Wagner v Huntington Hosp., 65 AD2d 771 ) where, as here, the proof is sufficient to warrant an increase (see Koupash v Grand Union Co., 34 AD2d 695 ; Bird v Board of Educ., 29 AD2d 812 ; cf. Beras v Beras, 82 AD2d 843 ; Carlisle v County of Nassau, 75 AD2d 593 ). 1981While an increase in the ad damnum clause may be granted upon an update (Cardone v University Hosp., 78 AD2d 645 ; Hillenbrand v 3801 Review Place, 72 AD2d 554 ) or re-evaluation of injuries (Wagner v Huntington Hosp., 65 AD2d 771 ), it is still the movant’s obligation to submit proof that such an update or reevaluation has been made (see Carlisle v County of Nassau, 75 AD2d 593 ). | 8 | 1979–1983 |
People v. Black
neutral
2 sentences1978Where, as here, the motion merely seeks to re-evaluate the amount of damages or to correct an undervaluation, an increase in the amount sought in the ad damnum clause of a complaint should be permitted (Zoizack v Holland Hitch Co., 58 AD2d 980 ; Koupash v Grand Union Co., 34 AD2d 695 ; Ryan v Collins, 33 AD2d 966 ; Bird v Board of Educ., 29 AD2d 812 ). 1977Where the motion merely seeks to re-evaluate the amount of damages or to correct an undervaluation an increase in the amount of the ad damnum clause should be permitted (Ryan v Collins, 33 AD2d 966 ; Koupash v Grand Union Co., 34 AD2d 695 ). | 5 | 1977–1981 |
Murray v. City of New York
green
2 sentences1985While the amendment provisions of the CPLR must be liberally construed (see, Murray v City of New York, 43 NY2d 400, 404-405 ), a plaintiff does not have the absolute right to amend the complaint by increasing the ad damnum clause at any time, to any amount, subject to defeat only by the defendant coming forward with proof of actual prejudice (see, Matter of Schwartz v New York City Tr. 1983In permitting an amendment to increase the ad damnum clause, the courts, adhering to the rule in Murray v City of New York ( 43 NY2d 400 , supra), have consistently held “there must be some indication that the defendant has been hindered in the preparation of his case or has been prevented from taking some measure in support of his position” (Loomis v Civetta Corinno Constr. | 4 | 1980–1985 |
McGrath v. Town of Irondequoit
green
2 sentences2016It is axiomatic that “ £[l]eave to amend a pleading should be freely granted in the absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party where the amendment is not patently lacking in merit’ ” (Holst v Liberatore, 105 AD3d 1374, 1374 [2013]; see CPLR 3025 [b]; Meyer v University Neurology, 133 AD3d 1307, 1309 [2015]; McGrath v Town of Irondequoit, 120 AD3d 968 , 969 [2014]). 2016It is axiomatic that “ £[l]eave to amend a pleading should be freely granted in the absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party where the amendment is not patently lacking in merit’ ” (Holst v Liberatore, 105 AD3d 1374, 1374 [2013]; see CPLR 3025 [b]; Meyer v University Neurology, 133 AD3d 1307, 1309 [2015]; McGrath v Town of Irondequoit, 120 AD3d 968 , 969 [2014]). | 3 | 2016–2016 |
Kolnacki v. State
green
2 sentences2007In light of the recent amendment of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) (L 2007, ch 606, § 1), retroactively abrogating Kolnacki v State of New York ( 8 NY3d 277 [2007]), the instant claim was not jurisdictionally defective notwithstanding the absence of an ad damnum clause. 2007In light of the recent amendment of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) (L 2007, ch 606, § 1), retroactively abrogating Kolnacki v State of New York ( 8 NY3d 277 [2007]), the instant claim was not jurisdictionally defective notwithstanding the absence of an ad damnum clause. | 3 | 2007–2007 |
Tate v. Colabello
green
2 sentences2000Furthermore, during summation in a personal injury action, plaintiff’s counsel may ask for a specific amount for pain and suffering in the form of a lump-sum figure as stated in the ad damnum clause of the complaint, or a figure based on the evidence as a matter of fair comment (see, Tate v Colabello, 58 NY2d 84 [1983]; Braun v Ahmed, 127 AD2d 418 [2d Dept 1987]). 1987Of course, counsel still may not ask for damages in an amount exceeding the sum demanded in the ad damnum clause (Tate v Colabello, supra). | 3 | 1983–2000 |
Robbins v. Sperlazza
neutral
2 sentences1996Corp., 54 NY2d 18 , rearg denied 55 NY2d 801 ; Maddox v City of New York, 90 AD2d 535 ; cf., Robbins v Sperlazza, 72 AD2d 558 ). 1981The trend of this court is to stress prejudice to the defendant over mere delay as a basis for denying an increase in the ad damnum clause of a complaint (see Hillenbrand v 3801 Review Place, 72 AD2d 554 ; Robbins v Sperlazza, 72 AD2d 558 ). | 3 | 1981–1996 |
Kingsbury Wastepaper Co. v. National Shredder Co.
neutral
2 sentences1996Corp., 54 NY2d 18 , rearg denied 55 NY2d 801 ; Maddox v City of New York, 90 AD2d 535 ; cf., Robbins v Sperlazza, 72 AD2d 558 ). 1991Since our examination of the record indicates that there is merit to plaintiffs application to increase the ad damnum clause, in view of the fact that she has only recently learned that she may possibly have to undergo further surgery to replace her hip, and the defendants have not persuasively established that such an increase will unduly prejudice them, we find that the IAS court abused its discretion in denying the motion for leave to amend the ad damnum clause (Maddox v City of New York, 90 AD2d 535 [1982]). | 3 | 1983–1996 |
Davis v. City of Troy
neutral
2 sentences1992Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to increase the ad damnum clause from $100,000 to $1,000,000 (see, Beuschel v Malm, 114 AD2d 569 ; cf., Davis v City of Troy, 57 AD2d 990 ). 1988Moreover, plaintiff did not seek to increase the ad damnum clause of the complaint, thereby obviating the requirement of the submission of a physician’s affidavit (cf., Dolan v Garden City Union Free School Dist, supra; Davis v City of Troy, 57 AD2d 990 ). | 3 | 1978–1992 |
Stevens v. Feitknecht
neutral
2 sentences1989The plaintiffs were later granted permission to increase the ad damnum clause to $495 million (see, Kenford Co. v County of Erie, 93 AD2d 998 ). . 1984Corp., 54 NY2d 18 ; Kenford Co. v County of Erie, 93 AD2d 998 ; Stornelli v Aakron Rule Corp., 89 AD2d 1060 ). | 3 | 1983–1989 |
People v. Clayton
green
2 sentences1986Co. v City of New York, 60 NY2d 957 ; Rivera v Berkeley Super Wash, 44 AD2d 316 , affd 37 NY2d 395 ; Stornelli v Aakron Rule Corp., 89 AD2d 1060 ; Cardy v Frey, 86 AD2d 968 ), and the court’s directive that any amendment to the bill of particulars be limited to the new theories of negligence and strict liability was reasonable and proper (Cardy v Frey, supra). 1986(Stornelli v Aakron Rule Corp., 89 AD2d 1060 [4th Dept 1982].) In our view, the inclusion of Kingsbury was a mistake, the correction of which does not prejudice defendants. | 3 | 1984–1986 |
In re the Claim of Lebovic
neutral
2 sentences1983Moreover, leave to increase the ad damnum clause has been permitted based solely upon an update (Cardone v University Hosp., 78 AD2d 645 ; Hillenbrand v 3801 Review Place, 72 AD2d 554 ) or a re-evaluation of the original injuries (Wagner v Huntington Hosp., 65 AD2d 771 ) where, as here, the proof is sufficient to warrant an increase (see Koupash v Grand Union Co., 34 AD2d 695 ; Bird v Board of Educ., 29 AD2d 812 ; cf. Beras v Beras, 82 AD2d 843 ; Carlisle v County of Nassau, 75 AD2d 593 ). 1978Where, as here, the motion merely seeks to re-evaluate the amount of damages or to correct an undervaluation, an increase in the amount sought in the ad damnum clause of a complaint should be permitted (Zoizack v Holland Hitch Co., 58 AD2d 980 ; Koupash v Grand Union Co., 34 AD2d 695 ; Ryan v Collins, 33 AD2d 966 ; Bird v Board of Educ., 29 AD2d 812 ). | 3 | 1977–1983 |
| People ex rel. Cole v. Johnston neutral | 3 | 1976–1981 |
Silbert v. Silbert
neutral
2 sentences1981There is little doubt that in an ordinary civil action the plaintiff cannot recover more than the amount specified in the ad damnum clause of his complaint (Michalowski v Ey, 7 NY2d 71, 75 ; Corning v Corning, 6 NY2d 97, 105 ; Silbert v Silbert, 22 AD2d 893, 895 , affd 16 NY2d 564 ; see 3 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 3017.06, p 30-366). 1981Postverdict motions to amend the ad damnum clause, on the other hand, uniformly have been denied (see Naujokas v Carey High School, 33 AD2d 703 ; Wyman v Morone, 33 AD2d 168 ; Silbert v Silbert, 22 AD2d 893 , affd 16 NY2d 564 ). | 3 | 1976–1981 |
| Calautti v. National Transportation Co. neutral | 3 | 1978–1980 |
| Kerlin v. Green neutral | 3 | 1976–1978 |
| Meyerson v. Rathbun & Bird Co. neutral | 3 | 1976–1978 |
| Martin v. Waldbaum's Supermarket neutral | 2 | 1997–2018 |
| Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp. v. Barletta neutral | 2 | 2015–2015 |
| Cohen v. Kim neutral | 2 | 2012–2012 |
| Raffone v. Town of Islip green | 2 | 1982–2006 |
| Vincent Esposito v. Time Motor Sales, Inc. green | 2 | 1983–2006 |
| Barski v. State green | 2 | 1983–2005 |
| McCabe v. State green | 2 | 1983–2005 |
| Wyman v. Morone green | 2 | 1981–1999 |
| Anderson v. Monticup green | 2 | 1999–1999 |
| Chemical Bank v. Vazquez green | 2 | 1999–1999 |
| Century Resources Corp. v. Weir neutral | 2 | 1992–1998 |
| De Mund v. Martin green | 2 | 1986–1997 |
| In re Emilio M. green | 2 | 1980–1996 |
| Deitcher v. Shuldman neutral | 2 | 1984–1996 |
| Schwartz v. New York City Transit Authority neutral | 2 | 1985–1994 |
| MATTER OF SCHWARTZ v. New York City Transit Auth. neutral | 2 | 1985–1994 |
| Coerbell v. City of New York green | 2 | 1990–1993 |
| Cesnavicius v. State neutral | 2 | 1992–1992 |
| Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. green | 2 | 1989–1992 |
| Beck v. General Tire & Rubber Co. neutral | 2 | 1987–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.