ad damnum clause in Connecticut

2005As this case so clearly demonstrates, the act cannot meet its intended purpose of reducing litigation until all vendors take responsibility to make adequate disclosure regarding the condition ol' property. 7 “We may take judicial notice of the contents of the court’s file.” State v. Pagan, 75 Conn. App. 423, 431 , 816 A.2d 635 , cert. denied, 265 Conn. 901 , 829 A.2d 420 (2003). 8 The letter from the defendant’s counsel stated, in part: “On May 19, 2003, after deposing his clients, I suggested to [the plaintiffs’ counsel] that by including a negligent misrepresentation count, I might be able t

2005As this case so clearly demonstrates, the act cannot meet its intended purpose of reducing litigation until all vendors take responsibility to make adequate disclosure regarding the condition ol' property. 7 “We may take judicial notice of the contents of the court’s file.” State v. Pagan, 75 Conn. App. 423, 431 , 816 A.2d 635 , cert. denied, 265 Conn. 901 , 829 A.2d 420 (2003). 8 The letter from the defendant’s counsel stated, in part: “On May 19, 2003, after deposing his clients, I suggested to [the plaintiffs’ counsel] that by including a negligent misrepresentation count, I might be able t

2005As this case so clearly demonstrates, the act cannot meet its intended purpose of reducing litigation until all vendors take responsibility to make adequate disclosure regarding the condition ol' property. 7 “We may take judicial notice of the contents of the court’s file.” State v. Pagan, 75 Conn. App. 423, 431 , 816 A.2d 635 , cert. denied, 265 Conn. 901 , 829 A.2d 420 (2003). 8 The letter from the defendant’s counsel stated, in part: “On May 19, 2003, after deposing his clients, I suggested to [the plaintiffs’ counsel] that by including a negligent misrepresentation count, I might be able t

2005As this case so clearly demonstrates, the act cannot meet its intended purpose of reducing litigation until all vendors take responsibility to make adequate disclosure regarding the condition ol' property. 7 “We may take judicial notice of the contents of the court’s file.” State v. Pagan, 75 Conn. App. 423, 431 , 816 A.2d 635 , cert. denied, 265 Conn. 901 , 829 A.2d 420 (2003). 8 The letter from the defendant’s counsel stated, in part: “On May 19, 2003, after deposing his clients, I suggested to [the plaintiffs’ counsel] that by including a negligent misrepresentation count, I might be able t

1999Furthermore, "[a] claim for money damages in an appeal from a decision of a zoning board of appeals [is] not permitted. . . ." (Citation omitted.) Totino v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 41 Conn. Sup. 398 , 401 , 578 A.2d 681 (1990).

1999Furthermore, "[a] claim for money damages in an appeal from a decision of a zoning board of appeals [is] not permitted. . . ." (Citation omitted.) Totino v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 41 Conn. Sup. 398 , 401 , 578 A.2d 681 (1990).

1998II The function of a motion to strike "is to test the legal CT Page 347 sufficiency of a pleading." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp. , 231 Conn. 381 , 384 (1994); Practice Book § 152.

1996Id., 763 n. 7; General Statutes § 51-164s .

1989He quoted the statement in Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 104 , 138 A.2d 713 (1958), 6 that “[i]t is a matter of common knowledge that ordinarily the amount of damages laid in the complaint is much in excess of any sum which the plaintiff hopes to receive.” He concluded that “[t]o inform the jury of the amount sued for serves no useful purpose.” Cooley v. Crispino, supra. The concern expressed in Cooley over the effect of submitting the ad damnum clause to the jury led eventually to the adoption of Practice Book § 313, 7 which provides in part that “[i]n any action seeking damages for injury to

1989He quoted the statement in Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 104 , 138 A.2d 713 (1958), 6 that “[i]t is a matter of common knowledge that ordinarily the amount of damages laid in the complaint is much in excess of any sum which the plaintiff hopes to receive.” He concluded that “[t]o inform the jury of the amount sued for serves no useful purpose.” Cooley v. Crispino, supra. The concern expressed in Cooley over the effect of submitting the ad damnum clause to the jury led eventually to the adoption of Practice Book § 313, 7 which provides in part that “[i]n any action seeking damages for injury to

1989In Cooley v. Crispino, 21 Conn. Sup. 150 , 147 A.2d 497 (1958), however, former Chief Justice Cotter, while a trial judge, criticized severely the practice of submitting the ad damnum clause to the jury under any circumstances.

1989In Cooley v. Crispino, 21 Conn. Sup. 150 , 147 A.2d 497 (1958), however, former Chief Justice Cotter, while a trial judge, criticized severely the practice of submitting the ad damnum clause to the jury under any circumstances.

1978The plaintiff in turn submitted special damages of $7329.45 and advised counsel and the judge that because of the high special damages, the degree of permanent disability, the low ad damnum, and the problems which had confronted the plaintiff’s counsel in the recent case of Deedy v. Marsden, 172 Conn. 568 , 375 A.2d 1032 , she intended to file a motion to increase the ad damnum clause. *127 After the pretrial hearing, the plaintiff’s counsel requested his office staff to contact Shanley’s office to determine his availability for trial.

1978The plaintiff in turn submitted special damages of $7329.45 and advised counsel and the judge that because of the high special damages, the degree of permanent disability, the low ad damnum, and the problems which had confronted the plaintiff’s counsel in the recent case of Deedy v. Marsden, 172 Conn. 568 , 375 A.2d 1032 , she intended to file a motion to increase the ad damnum clause. *127 After the pretrial hearing, the plaintiff’s counsel requested his office staff to contact Shanley’s office to determine his availability for trial.

1958The amount returned must be based upon the jury’s application of the rule of fair, just and reasonable compensation which will fully compensate the plaintiff for what he has suffered; Flood v. Smith, 126 Conn. 644, 647 ; since a more specific or definite standard is impossible.

1946Newtown v. Danbury, 3 Conn. 553, 558 ; Lockwood v. Knapp, 4 Conn. 257, 258 .

1946Newtown v. Danbury, 3 Conn. 553, 558 ; Lockwood v. Knapp, 4 Conn. 257, 258 .

1903The cases of Beveau v. Skidmore, 47 Conn. 19 , and Denton v. Danbury, 48 id. 368, are cited as sustaining the action of the court in refusing to allow the amendment.

1894In Grether v. Klock, 39 Conn,, 133—135, the rule is stated in this way: “ If it appeal’ on the face of the declaration, either as originally drawn, or as afterwards amended, that the plaintiff cannot recover all the damages laid in the ad damnum clause of his writ, then the matter in demand will be the highest sum which the plaintiff on the-face of ids declaration appears to be entitled to recover.” This rule is approved in Hunt v. Rockwell, 41 Conn., 51 , and in Camp v. Stevens, 45 id., 92 ; Davis v. Seymour, 59 id., 531.

1894In Grether v. Klock, 39 Conn,, 133—135, the rule is stated in this way: “ If it appeal’ on the face of the declaration, either as originally drawn, or as afterwards amended, that the plaintiff cannot recover all the damages laid in the ad damnum clause of his writ, then the matter in demand will be the highest sum which the plaintiff on the-face of ids declaration appears to be entitled to recover.” This rule is approved in Hunt v. Rockwell, 41 Conn., 51 , and in Camp v. Stevens, 45 id., 92 ; Davis v. Seymour, 59 id., 531.