fair report privilege in New Jersey

1999Under the doctrine expressed in Reilly v. Gillen, 176 N.J.Super. at 327 , 423 A. 2d 311 , the article unfairly and inaccurately insinuated that plaintiff had been adjudicated "guilty of wrongdoing." That it correctly reported plaintiff had been accused was not enough to cloak defendants in the fair-report privilege.

1999Under the doctrine expressed in Reilly v. Gillen, 176 N.J.Super. at 327 , 423 A. 2d 311 , the article unfairly and inaccurately insinuated that plaintiff had been adjudicated "guilty of wrongdoing." That it correctly reported plaintiff had been accused was not enough to cloak defendants in the fair-report privilege.

2008Whether that argument should be sustained requires consideration (1) of the purpose and scope of the fair report privilege, (2) whether defendants' report of the bankruptcy complaint was both accurate and fair, and (3) whether the fair report privilege applies to reports about the contents of initial pleadings. (1) The fair report privilege was thoroughly examined in Costello, supra, 136 N.J. at 606 , 643 A. 2d 1012 , where the Court summarized the privilege's legal underpinnings and the tension between competing policies it evokes in the following way: "The law of defamation embodies the impo

2008Whether that argument should be sustained requires consideration (1) of the purpose and scope of the fair report privilege, (2) whether defendants' report of the bankruptcy complaint was both accurate and fair, and (3) whether the fair report privilege applies to reports about the contents of initial pleadings. (1) The fair report privilege was thoroughly examined in Costello, supra, 136 N.J. at 606 , 643 A. 2d 1012 , where the Court summarized the privilege's legal underpinnings and the tension between competing policies it evokes in the following way: "The law of defamation embodies the impo

1995This doctrine, which has come to be known as the "fair report privilege," see Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F. 2d 134 (3d Cir.), cert. den. 454 U.S. 836 , 102 S.Ct. 139 , 70 L.Ed. 2d 116 (1981), developed as an exception to the common law rule that a person who republishes a defamation uttered by another was subject to liability as if he or she were the original defamer.

1984In Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F. 2d 134, 137-138 (3rd Cir.1981), cert. den. 454 U.S. 836 , 102 S.Ct. 139 , 70 L.Ed. 2d 116 (1981), the *21 Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated with respect to this privilege: The fair report privilege on which the district court relied developed as an exception to the common law rule that the republisher of a defamation was subject to liability similar to that risked by the original defamer.

1995This doctrine, which has come to be known as the "fair report privilege," see Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F. 2d 134 (3d Cir.), cert. den. 454 U.S. 836 , 102 S.Ct. 139 , 70 L.Ed. 2d 116 (1981), developed as an exception to the common law rule that a person who republishes a defamation uttered by another was subject to liability as if he or she were the original defamer.

1984In Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F. 2d 134, 137-138 (3rd Cir.1981), cert. den. 454 U.S. 836 , 102 S.Ct. 139 , 70 L.Ed. 2d 116 (1981), the *21 Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated with respect to this privilege: The fair report privilege on which the district court relied developed as an exception to the common law rule that the republisher of a defamation was subject to liability similar to that risked by the original defamer.

1995This doctrine, which has come to be known as the "fair report privilege," see Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F. 2d 134 (3d Cir.), cert. den. 454 U.S. 836 , 102 S.Ct. 139 , 70 L.Ed. 2d 116 (1981), developed as an exception to the common law rule that a person who republishes a defamation uttered by another was subject to liability as if he or she were the original defamer.

1984In Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F. 2d 134, 137-138 (3rd Cir.1981), cert. den. 454 U.S. 836 , 102 S.Ct. 139 , 70 L.Ed. 2d 116 (1981), the *21 Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated with respect to this privilege: The fair report privilege on which the district court relied developed as an exception to the common law rule that the republisher of a defamation was subject to liability similar to that risked by the original defamer.

2018We granted Wintermute's petition for certification. 229 N.J. 136 , 160 A.3d 694 (2017).

2018We granted Wintermute's petition for certification. 229 N.J. 136 , 160 A.3d 694 (2017).

2010Id. at 418, 421 , 958 A. 2d 1023 .

2010Id. at 418, 421 , 958 A.2d 1023 .

2010It is not a historical relic but remains important to the unique identity of every individual in our contemporary world. [ Senna v. Florimont, 196 N.J. 469, 490-91 , 958 A. 2d 427 (2008) (citation omitted).] At issue here is the fair-report privilege, which protects the publication of defamatory matters that appear in a report of an official action or proceeding, or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern.

2010It is not a historical relic but remains important to the unique identity of every individual in our contemporary world. [Senna v. Florimont, 196 N.J. 469, 490-91 , 958 A.2d 427 (2008) (citation omitted).] At issue here is the fair-report privilege, which protects the publication of defamatory matters that appear in a report of an official action or proceeding, or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern.

2010It is not a historical relic but remains important to the unique identity of every individual in our contemporary world. [ Senna v. Florimont, 196 N.J. 469, 490-91 , 958 A. 2d 427 (2008) (citation omitted).] At issue here is the fair-report privilege, which protects the publication of defamatory matters that appear in a report of an official action or proceeding, or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern.

2010It is not a historical relic but remains important to the unique identity of every individual in our contemporary world. [Senna v. Florimont, 196 N.J. 469, 490-91 , 958 A.2d 427 (2008) (citation omitted).] At issue here is the fair-report privilege, which protects the publication of defamatory matters that appear in a report of an official action or proceeding, or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern.

2010In Ricciardi , for example, the panel held that once a court decides that a publication is full, fair, and accurate and thus subject to the fair-report privilege, a plaintiff may nevertheless overcome the privilege by “demonstrating that the statements were published with actual malice[.]” Supra, 350 N.J.Super. at 471 , 795 A.2d 914 .

2010In Ricciardi , for example, the panel held that once a court decides that a publication is full, fair, and accurate and thus subject to the fair-report privilege, a plaintiff may nevertheless overcome the privilege by “demonstrating that the statements were published with actual malice[.]” Supra, 350 N.J.Super. at 471 , 795 A.2d 914 .

2010See Costello, supra, 136 N.J. at 607, 643 A.2d 1012 ; Darakjian v. Hanna, 366 N.J.Super. 238, 245 , 840 A2d 959 (App.Div.2004); Fortenbaugh v. N.J.

2010See Costello, supra, 136 N.J. at 607, 643 A.2d 1012 ; Darakjian v. Hanna, 366 N.J.Super. 238, 245 , 840 A2d 959 (App.Div.2004); Fortenbaugh v. N.J.

2010We adopted the principles of sections 599 and 600 of the Restatement in Dairy Stores, supra, 104 N.J. at 151 , 516 A. 2d 220 , declaring that actual malice, which we denominated as "abuse of privilege," could defeat the conditional fair comment privilege. *796 What we did not have occasion to address directly in Dairy Stores is the question presented here: whether the fair-report privilege is the kind of conditional privilege that is subject to defeat by actual malice.

2010We adopted the principles of sections 599 and 600 of the Restatement in Dairy Stores, supra, 104 N.J. at 151 , 516 A. 2d 220 , declaring that actual malice, which we denominated as "abuse of privilege," could defeat the conditional fair comment privilege. *796 What we did not have occasion to address directly in Dairy Stores is the question presented here: whether the fair-report privilege is the kind of conditional privilege that is subject to defeat by actual malice.

2008In other words, when a defendant publishes "that a third person stated that plaintiff has committed a crime, it is no justification that the third party did in fact make that statement." Lawrence v. Bauer Publ'g & Printing Ltd., 89 N.J. 451, 461 , 446 A. 2d 469 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 , 103 S.Ct. 358 , 74 L.Ed. 2d 395 (1982); see also Fortenbaugh v. N.J.

2008In other words, when a defendant publishes "that a third person stated that plaintiff has committed a crime, it is no justification that the third party did in fact make that statement." Lawrence v. Bauer Publ'g & Printing Ltd., 89 N.J. 451, 461 , 446 A. 2d 469 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 , 103 S.Ct. 358 , 74 L.Ed. 2d 395 (1982); see also Fortenbaugh v. N.J.

2008In other words, when a defendant publishes "that a third person stated that plaintiff has committed a crime, it is no justification that the third party did in fact make that statement." Lawrence v. Bauer Publ'g & Printing Ltd., 89 N.J. 451, 461 , 446 A. 2d 469 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 , 103 S.Ct. 358 , 74 L.Ed. 2d 395 (1982); see also Fortenbaugh v. N.J.

2008In other words, when a defendant publishes "that a third person stated that plaintiff has committed a crime, it is no justification that the third party did in fact make that statement." Lawrence v. Bauer Publ'g & Printing Ltd., 89 N.J. 451, 461 , 446 A. 2d 469 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 , 103 S.Ct. 358 , 74 L.Ed. 2d 395 (1982); see also Fortenbaugh v. N.J.

2008Defendants are certainly correct that, absent application of the fair report privilege, the matter must be analyzed by determining whether the statements are false and, if so, whether they are susceptible to a defamatory meaning, Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 290 , 537 A. 2d 284 (1988), but they then confuse these requirements with the principles of the fair report privilege.

2008Defendants are certainly correct that, absent application of the fair report privilege, the matter must be analyzed by determining whether the statements are false and, if so, whether they are susceptible to a defamatory meaning, Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 290 , 537 A. 2d 284 (1988), but they then confuse these requirements with the principles of the fair report privilege.

2008In other words, when a defendant publishes "that a third person stated that plaintiff has committed a crime, it is no justification that the third party did in fact make that statement." Lawrence v. Bauer Publ'g & Printing Ltd., 89 N.J. 451, 461 , 446 A. 2d 469 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 , 103 S.Ct. 358 , 74 L.Ed. 2d 395 (1982); see also Fortenbaugh v. N.J.

2004The complaint, even with the especially indulgent treatment accorded contentions on motions to dismiss, see Printing Mart, supra, 116 N.J. at 773 , 563 A. 2d 31 , must also allege sufficient particularized facts to suggest that the insulation normally provided by the fair-report privilege is not available in the matter at hand, i.e., supporting the contention that the report *967 was not a substantially correct and fair account of what occurred or that it was published with knowledge of its falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the reported statement.

2004The complaint, even with the especially indulgent treatment accorded contentions on motions to dismiss, see Printing Mart, supra, 116 N.J. at 773 , 563 A. 2d 31 , must also allege sufficient particularized facts to suggest that the insulation normally provided by the fair-report privilege is not available in the matter at hand, i.e., supporting the contention that the report *967 was not a substantially correct and fair account of what occurred or that it was published with knowledge of its falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the reported statement.