Title VII claim in New Jersey

2025In articulating a standard for actionable adverse employment consequences, in Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555 (2010), our Supreme Court adopted the Title VII standard established by the United States Supreme Court in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61, 68 (2006).

2025Roa, 200 N.J. at 575 .

2015Super. 569 (App. Div. 1996), aff’d, 155 N.J. 44 (1998), is not to the contrary.

2015Super. 162, 187 (App. Div. 2003) (anticipating adoption of Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, and holding that “there is no barrier to the application of a Title VII defense [based on Ellerth/Faragher] to an LAD action”).8 8 The Appellate Division opinion on which our dissenting colleagues rely, Schmidt v. Smith, 294 N.J.

2003Indeed, to the contrary, as the Court stated in Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 97 , 570 A. 2d 903 (1990): In a variety of contexts involving allegations of unlawful discrimination, this Court has looked to federal law as a key source of interpretive authority.

2003Indeed, to the contrary, as the Court stated in Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 97 , 570 A. 2d 903 (1990): In a variety of contexts involving allegations of unlawful discrimination, this Court has looked to federal law as a key source of interpretive authority.

1998Further, as the Third Circuit noted in Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383 , 388 n. 7 (3d Cir.1995), also involving a Title VII claim, “the possibility that the denial of a retaliation claim for conduct not related to an employment relationship will discourage Title VII activity is slight because se3Úous retaliatory conduct unrelated to an employment relationship will be actionable under state law.” That rationale is equally applicable here.

1993The court held that no evidence of sexual harassment directed specifically toward the plaintiff was necessary for a claim under Title VII: "Even a woman who was never herself the object of harassment might have a Title VII claim if she were forced to work in an atmosphere where such harassment was pervasive.” Id. at 146 .

1992In reaching his decision in that case, the trial judge relied upon Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 581 F. 2d 335 (3rd Cir.1978), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1014 , 103 S.Ct. 1256 , 75 L.Ed. 2d 484 (1983) which had applied a six-year statute to a Title VII claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 .

1992However, subsequent to the Law Division decision in Leese v. Doe , the Davis ruling was overruled by the Supreme Court in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 , 107 S.Ct. 2617 , 96 L.Ed. 2d 572 (1987), where the Court concluded that the Pennsylvania personal injury statute of limitations applied to a § 1981 claim.

1992However, subsequent to the Law Division decision in Leese v. Doe , the Davis ruling was overruled by the Supreme Court in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 , 107 S.Ct. 2617 , 96 L.Ed. 2d 572 (1987), where the Court concluded that the Pennsylvania personal injury statute of limitations applied to a § 1981 claim.

1992In reaching his decision in that case, the trial judge relied upon Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 581 F. 2d 335 (3rd Cir.1978), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1014 , 103 S.Ct. 1256 , 75 L.Ed. 2d 484 (1983) which had applied a six-year statute to a Title VII claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 .

1992In reaching his decision in that case, the trial judge relied upon Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 581 F. 2d 335 (3rd Cir.1978), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1014 , 103 S.Ct. 1256 , 75 L.Ed. 2d 484 (1983) which had applied a six-year statute to a Title VII claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 .

1992In reaching his decision in that case, the trial judge relied upon Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 581 F. 2d 335 (3rd Cir.1978), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1014 , 103 S.Ct. 1256 , 75 L.Ed. 2d 484 (1983) which had applied a six-year statute to a Title VII claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 .

1990Recently the Supreme Court itself, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, — U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 1775 , 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), looked to classic EPA analysis for guidance in ruling that Title VII demands that in situations in which an employee shows that her gender played a part in her not receiving a promotion, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken plaintiff’s gender into account.” Id. at-, 109 S.Ct. at 1795 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 293 .

1990Recently the Supreme Court itself, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, — U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 1775 , 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), looked to classic EPA analysis for guidance in ruling that Title VII demands that in situations in which an employee shows that her gender played a part in her not receiving a promotion, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken plaintiff’s gender into account.” Id. at-, 109 S.Ct. at 1795 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 293 .

1990The court accepted the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs and their male co-workers “were assigned to perform essentially the same task” and concluded that the plaintiffs met their burden of establishing a prima facie case of substantial job equality. 226 N.J.Super. at 531 , 545 A. 2d 185 .

1990The court accepted the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs and their male co-workers “were assigned to perform essentially the same task” and concluded that the plaintiffs met their burden of establishing a prima facie case of substantial job equality. 226 N.J.Super. at 531 , 545 A. 2d 185 .

1990Similarly, in Jansen v. Food Circus, 110 N.J. 363 , 541 A.2d 682 (1988), also a handicap employment-discrimination case, we employed the EPA affirmative defenses and shift of the burden of proof, rather than a Title VII framework.

1990Similarly, in Jansen v. Food Circus, 110 N.J. 363 , 541 A.2d 682 (1988), also a handicap employment-discrimination case, we employed the EPA affirmative defenses and shift of the burden of proof, rather than a Title VII framework.