Title VII claim in California

2025(Id. at pp. 1038–1039.) The court articulated the Title VII standard as follows: “ ‘Once an employer knows or should know of [coworker] harassment, a remedial obligation kicks in.’ [(Fuller, supra, 47 F.3d at p. 1528 .)] Such an employer will be liable for the hostile work environment created by the coworker unless ‘the employer . . . takes adequate remedial measures in order to avoid liability.’ [(Yamaguchi, supra, 109 F.3d at p. 1482 .)] The employer’s actions should be ‘reasonably calculated to end the harassment.’ [(Ellison, supra, 924 F.2d at p. 882 .)]” (Star, supra, 237 F.3d at p. 1038

2025(Id. at pp. 1038–1039.) The court articulated the Title VII standard as follows: “ ‘Once an employer knows or should know of [coworker] harassment, a remedial obligation kicks in.’ [(Fuller, supra, 47 F.3d at p. 1528 .)] Such an employer will be liable for the hostile work environment created by the coworker unless ‘the employer . . . takes adequate remedial measures in order to avoid liability.’ [(Yamaguchi, supra, 109 F.3d at p. 1482 .)] The employer’s actions should be ‘reasonably calculated to end the harassment.’ [(Ellison, supra, 924 F.2d at p. 882 .)]” (Star, supra, 237 F.3d at p. 1038

2025(Id. at pp. 1038–1039.) The court articulated the Title VII standard as follows: “ ‘Once an employer knows or should know of [coworker] harassment, a remedial obligation kicks in.’ [(Fuller, supra, 47 F.3d at p. 1528 .)] Such an employer will be liable for the hostile work environment created by the coworker unless ‘the employer . . . takes adequate remedial measures in order to avoid liability.’ [(Yamaguchi, supra, 109 F.3d at p. 1482 .)] The employer’s actions should be ‘reasonably calculated to end the harassment.’ [(Ellison, supra, 924 F.2d at p. 882 .)]” (Star, supra, 237 F.3d at p. 1038

2025(Ibid.) The court articulated the Title VII standard as follows: “In this circuit, as in others, ‘remedies [for sexual harassment] should be “reasonably calculated to end the harassment.” ’ [(Ellison, supra, 924 F.2d at p. 882 .)] The reasonableness of the remedy depends on its ability to: (1) ‘stop harassment by the person who engaged in harassment;’ and (2) ‘persuade potential harassers to refrain from unlawful conduct.’ [(Ellison, at p. 882.)] When the employer undertakes no remedy, or where the remedy does not end the current harassment and deter future harassment, liability attaches for b

2025(Id. at pp. 1038–1039.) The court articulated the Title VII standard as follows: “ ‘Once an employer knows or should know of [coworker] harassment, a remedial obligation kicks in.’ [(Fuller, supra, 47 F.3d at p. 1528 .)] Such an employer will be liable for the hostile work environment created by the coworker unless ‘the employer . . . takes adequate remedial measures in order to avoid liability.’ [(Yamaguchi, supra, 109 F.3d at p. 1482 .)] The employer’s actions should be ‘reasonably calculated to end the harassment.’ [(Ellison, supra, 924 F.2d at p. 882 .)]” (Star, supra, 237 F.3d at p. 1038

2025(Id. at pp. 1038–1039.) The court articulated the Title VII standard as follows: “ ‘Once an employer knows or should know of [coworker] harassment, a remedial obligation kicks in.’ [(Fuller, supra, 47 F.3d at p. 1528 .)] Such an employer will be liable for the hostile work environment created by the coworker unless ‘the employer . . . takes adequate remedial measures in order to avoid liability.’ [(Yamaguchi, supra, 109 F.3d at p. 1482 .)] The employer’s actions should be ‘reasonably calculated to end the harassment.’ [(Ellison, supra, 924 F.2d at p. 882 .)]” (Star, supra, 237 F.3d at p. 1038

2025(Id. at pp. 1038–1039.) The court articulated the Title VII standard as follows: “ ‘Once an employer knows or should know of [coworker] harassment, a remedial obligation kicks in.’ [(Fuller, supra, 47 F.3d at p. 1528 .)] Such an employer will be liable for the hostile work environment created by the coworker unless ‘the employer . . . takes adequate remedial measures in order to avoid liability.’ [(Yamaguchi, supra, 109 F.3d at p. 1482 .)] The employer’s actions should be ‘reasonably calculated to end the harassment.’ [(Ellison, supra, 924 F.2d at p. 882 .)]” (Star, supra, 237 F.3d at p. 1038

2025(Id. at pp. 1038–1039.) The court articulated the Title VII standard as follows: “ ‘Once an employer knows or should know of [coworker] harassment, a remedial obligation kicks in.’ [(Fuller, supra, 47 F.3d at p. 1528 .)] Such an employer will be liable for the hostile work environment created by the coworker unless ‘the employer . . . takes adequate remedial measures in order to avoid liability.’ [(Yamaguchi, supra, 109 F.3d at p. 1482 .)] The employer’s actions should be ‘reasonably calculated to end the harassment.’ [(Ellison, supra, 924 F.2d at p. 882 .)]” (Star, supra, 237 F.3d at p. 1038

2025(Ibid.) The court articulated the Title VII standard as follows: “In this circuit, as in others, ‘remedies [for sexual harassment] should be “reasonably calculated to end the harassment.” ’ [(Ellison, supra, 924 F.2d at p. 882 .)] The reasonableness of the remedy depends on its ability to: (1) ‘stop harassment by the person who engaged in harassment;’ and (2) ‘persuade potential harassers to refrain from unlawful conduct.’ [(Ellison, at p. 882.)] When the employer undertakes no remedy, or where the remedy does not end the current harassment and deter future harassment, liability attaches for b

2025(Ibid.) The court articulated the Title VII standard as follows: “In this circuit, as in others, ‘remedies [for sexual harassment] should be “reasonably calculated to end the harassment.” ’ [(Ellison, supra, 924 F.2d at p. 882 .)] The reasonableness of the remedy depends on its ability to: (1) ‘stop harassment by the person who engaged in harassment;’ and (2) ‘persuade potential harassers to refrain from unlawful conduct.’ [(Ellison, at p. 882.)] When the employer undertakes no remedy, or where the remedy does not end the current harassment and deter future harassment, liability attaches for b

2000In Alexander, supra, 415 U.S. 36 , 94 S.Ct. 1011 , 39 L.Ed.2d 147 , the United States Supreme Court held that an arbitrator's decision is not binding on an employee's Title VII claim when the employee pursues the grievance "to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement." ( Id. at p. 49, 94 S.Ct. 1011 .) As clarified in a later case, Alexander and its progeny concerned the arbitration of contract-based rather than statutory claims.

2000In Alexander, supra, 415 U.S. 36 , 94 S.Ct. 1011 , 39 L.Ed.2d 147 , the United States Supreme Court held that an arbitrator's decision is not binding on an employee's Title VII claim when the employee pursues the grievance "to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement." ( Id. at p. 49, 94 S.Ct. 1011 .) As clarified in a later case, Alexander and its progeny concerned the arbitration of contract-based rather than statutory claims.

2025(See, e.g., Okonowsky, supra, 109 F.4th at pp. 1180–1181 [“evidence of management-level, intra- workplace ratification of or acquiescence to offsite conduct by employees, customers, or third parties can be particularly relevant to both the hostile work environment and employer liability elements of a Title VII claim”].) This constitutes substantial evidence supporting the jury’s factual finding that the harassing conduct occurred in a work-related context. (b) Severe or pervasive harassment As we have stated, to prevail on a sexual harassment claim, the plaintiff must show that the harassing c

2025(See, e.g., Okonowsky, supra, 109 F.4th at pp. 1180–1181 [“evidence of management-level, intra- workplace ratification of or acquiescence to offsite conduct by employees, customers, or third parties can be particularly relevant to both the hostile work environment and employer liability elements of a Title VII claim”].) This constitutes substantial evidence supporting the jury’s factual finding that the harassing conduct occurred in a work-related context. (b) Severe or pervasive harassment As we have stated, to prevail on a sexual harassment claim, the plaintiff must show that the harassing c

2025(Slone, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173.) “Unless this is done the error is deemed to be waived.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid., quoting Foreman, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881 .) For instance, Bala does not address the humiliation Ramirez experienced upon learning that the video had been circulating at the prison for over a year and that she had likely been face to face with numerous officers who had viewed and distributed it.

2025(See, e.g., Okonowsky, supra, 109 F.4th at pp. 1180–1181 [“evidence of management-level, intra- workplace ratification of or acquiescence to offsite conduct by employees, customers, or third parties can be particularly relevant to both the hostile work environment and employer liability elements of a Title VII claim”].) This constitutes substantial evidence supporting the jury’s factual finding that the harassing conduct occurred in a work-related context. (b) Severe or pervasive harassment As we have stated, to prevail on a sexual harassment claim, the plaintiff must show that the harassing c

2025(See, e.g., Okonowsky, supra, 109 F.4th at pp. 1180–1181 [“evidence of management-level, intra- workplace ratification of or acquiescence to offsite conduct by employees, customers, or third parties can be particularly relevant to both the hostile work environment and employer liability elements of a Title VII claim”].) This constitutes substantial evidence supporting the jury’s factual finding that the harassing conduct occurred in a work-related context. (b) Severe or pervasive harassment As we have stated, to prevail on a sexual harassment claim, the plaintiff must show that the harassing c

2025(See, e.g., Okonowsky, supra, 109 F.4th at pp. 1180–1181 [“evidence of management-level, intra- workplace ratification of or acquiescence to offsite conduct by employees, customers, or third parties can be particularly relevant to both the hostile work environment and employer liability elements of a Title VII claim”].) This constitutes substantial evidence supporting the jury’s factual finding that the harassing conduct occurred in a work-related context. (b) Severe or pervasive harassment As we have stated, to prevail on a sexual harassment claim, the plaintiff must show that the harassing c

2022As the court explained, the premise of academic deference is that the decision was made in good faith and for a genuinely academic reason, but “a Title VII claim requires a court to evaluate whether a university’s decision to deny tenure was made in good faith (i.e., for academic reasons rather than for an impermissible reason such as the applicant’s race).” (Id. at p. 865.) By way of background, the court noted that when “Congress passed Title VII in 1964, educational institutions were exempt ‘with respect to the employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activit

2022As the court explained, the premise of academic deference is that the decision was made in good faith and for a genuinely academic reason, but “a Title VII claim requires a court to evaluate whether a university’s decision to deny tenure was made in good faith (i.e., for academic reasons rather than for an impermissible reason such as the applicant’s race).” (Id. at p. 865.) By way of background, the court noted that when “Congress passed Title VII in 1964, educational institutions were exempt ‘with respect to the employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activit

2022Circuit proceeded to analyze the plaintiff’s Title VII claim, which was before it on summary judgment, using “the standard three-step burden-shifting 21 framework set forth in [McDonnell Douglas].” (Mawakana, supra, 926 F.3d at p. 866 .) Under the facts of the case, the court went to the third step, explaining, “the University has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying Mawakana tenure.

2020(Landgraf v. USI Film Products (1994) 511 U.S. 244, 281 (Landgraf); Schering-Plough Corp., supra, 779 F.Supp.2d at p. 237 ; Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Spencer Handbags Corp. (2d Cir. 1985) 165 F.2d 966 , 971–972.) Landgraf addressed a section of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 creating a right to recover compensatory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; previously, only equitable relief had been available for a title VII violation.

2013(Id. at p. 634.) The court also observed that “absent applicable California case law on the issue of whether the FEHA applies to volunteers, it is instructive to look to federal law. ‘“‘Because the antidiscrimination objectives and relevant wording of title VII . . . [and other federal antidiscrimination statutes] are similar to those of the FEHA, California courts often look to federal decisions interpreting these statutes for assistance in interpreting the FEHA.’” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] [¶] Title VII succinctly defines ‘employee’ as an ‘individual employed by an employer.’ (42 U.S.C. § 20

2013(Id. at p. 634.) The court also observed that “absent applicable California case law on the issue of whether the FEHA applies to volunteers, it is instructive to look to federal law. ‘“‘Because the antidiscrimination objectives and relevant wording of title VII . . . [and other federal antidiscrimination statutes] are similar to those of the FEHA, California courts often look to federal decisions interpreting these statutes for assistance in interpreting the FEHA.’” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] [¶] Title VII succinctly defines ‘employee’ as an ‘individual employed by an employer.’ (42 U.S.C. § 20

2013(Id. at p. 634.) The court also observed that “absent applicable California case law on the issue of whether the FEHA applies to volunteers, it is instructive to look to federal law. ‘“‘Because the antidiscrimination objectives and relevant wording of title VII . . . [and other federal antidiscrimination statutes] are similar to those of the FEHA, California courts often look to federal decisions interpreting these statutes for assistance in interpreting the FEHA.’” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] [¶] Title VII succinctly defines ‘employee’ as an ‘individual employed by an employer.’ (42 U.S.C. § 20

2006(Waiters v. Robert Bosch Corp. (4th Cir. 1982) 683 F.2d 89, 92 ; see also Carter v. Smith Food King (9th Cir. 1985) 765 F.2d 916, 924 [“[A] claimant’s right to pursue a civil ‘action is not to be prejudiced’ by the EEOC’s failure to properly process a grievance after it has been filed.”].) Since Employee did not then hire or retain counsel, she was not obliged to serve a copy of her June 2004 administrative complaint form. “ ‘[Requiring a claimant to hire a lawyer to complete a discrimination claim form would be antithetical to the purposes of the legislation.’ ” (Saavedra, supra, 11 Cal.App.4

2004Decisions regarding who is promoted and why are central to maintenance of the military’s hierarchy.” (Mier, supra, 57 F.3d at p. 751 .) Similarly, decisions regarding fitness to serve in the military are integrally related to the military’s unique mission.

2004Hosp. of San Jose (9th Cir. 1983) 698 F.2d 1019 , a case on which the AMA decision relied, the plaintiff, a Hispanic physician, was permitted to assert a title VII claim against the defendant hospital for interfering with his employment opportunities, although the defendant was not his direct employer.