11 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Reynagagreen2 sentences2006See Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶ 27 , 138 N.M. 9 , 116 P.3d 80 . {37} “[T]he reasonableness of the manner of execution of a warrant must be evaluated in the light of each of the interests served by the announcement rule.” Reynaga, 2000-NMCA-053 , ¶ 13, 129 N.M. 257 , 5 P.3d 579 . 2006See Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶ 27 , 138 N.M. 9 , 116 P.3d 80 . {37} “[T]he reasonableness of the manner of execution of a warrant must be evaluated in the light of each of the interests served by the announcement rule.” Reynaga, 2000-NMCA-053 , ¶ 13, 129 N.M. 257 , 5 P.3d 579 . | 2 | 3 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2006See Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶ 27 , 138 N.M. 9 , 116 P.3d 80 . {37} “[T]he reasonableness of the manner of execution of a warrant must be evaluated in the light of each of the interests served by the announcement rule.” Reynaga, 2000-NMCA-053 , ¶ 13, 129 N.M. 257 , 5 P.3d 579 . 2006See Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶ 27 , 138 N.M. 9 , 116 P.3d 80 . {37} “[T]he reasonableness of the manner of execution of a warrant must be evaluated in the light of each of the interests served by the announcement rule.” Reynaga, 2000-NMCA-053 , ¶ 13, 129 N.M. 257 , 5 P.3d 579 . | 2 | 2 |
cluster 676510green1 sentence2005Id. accord United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 882 (4th Cir.1994) (“[T]he law has uniformly recognized that substantial dealers in narcotics possess firearms and that entrance into a situs of drug trafficking activity carries all too real dangers to law enforcement officers.”) (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxationgreen2 sentences2001See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); see also State v. Dick, 1999-NMCA-062 , ¶¶ 13-14, 127 N.M. 382 , 981 P.2d 796 (applying Venetie analysis on appeal of case in which trial court used Watchman analysis); cf. Clark v. Tansy 118 N.M. 486, 491 , 882 P.2d 527, 532 (1994) (holding that when a habeas petitioner in a criminal case can show that there has been an intervening change of law, relitigation of an issue decided adversely on direct appeal is not barred). 2001See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); see also State v. Dick, 1999-NMCA-062 , ¶¶ 13-14, 127 N.M. 382 , 981 P.2d 796 (applying Venetie analysis on appeal of case in which trial court used Watchman analysis); cf. Clark v. Tansy 118 N.M. 486, 491 , 882 P.2d 527, 532 (1994) (holding that when a habeas petitioner in a criminal case can show that there has been an intervening change of law, relitigation of an issue decided adversely on direct appeal is not barred). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dickgreen2 sentences2001See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); see also State v. Dick, 1999-NMCA-062 , ¶¶ 13-14, 127 N.M. 382 , 981 P.2d 796 (applying Venetie analysis on appeal of case in which trial court used Watchman analysis); cf. Clark v. Tansy 118 N.M. 486, 491 , 882 P.2d 527, 532 (1994) (holding that when a habeas petitioner in a criminal case can show that there has been an intervening change of law, relitigation of an issue decided adversely on direct appeal is not barred). 2001See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); see also State v. Dick, 1999-NMCA-062 , ¶¶ 13-14, 127 N.M. 382 , 981 P.2d 796 (applying Venetie analysis on appeal of case in which trial court used Watchman analysis); cf. Clark v. Tansy 118 N.M. 486, 491 , 882 P.2d 527, 532 (1994) (holding that when a habeas petitioner in a criminal case can show that there has been an intervening change of law, relitigation of an issue decided adversely on direct appeal is not barred). | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Tansygreen2 sentences2001See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); see also State v. Dick, 1999-NMCA-062 , ¶¶ 13-14, 127 N.M. 382 , 981 P.2d 796 (applying Venetie analysis on appeal of case in which trial court used Watchman analysis); cf. Clark v. Tansy 118 N.M. 486, 491 , 882 P.2d 527, 532 (1994) (holding that when a habeas petitioner in a criminal case can show that there has been an intervening change of law, relitigation of an issue decided adversely on direct appeal is not barred). 2001See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); see also State v. Dick, 1999-NMCA-062 , ¶¶ 13-14, 127 N.M. 382 , 981 P.2d 796 (applying Venetie analysis on appeal of case in which trial court used Watchman analysis); cf. Clark v. Tansy 118 N.M. 486, 491 , 882 P.2d 527, 532 (1994) (holding that when a habeas petitioner in a criminal case can show that there has been an intervening change of law, relitigation of an issue decided adversely on direct appeal is not barred). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsongreen2 sentences2000LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.8(b) at pp. 604-05 (3rd ed.1996) (indicating that the purposes of the knock and announce requirement are not offended by entry by ruse); State v. Williamson, 42 Wash.App. 208 , 710 P.2d 205, 207 (1985) (stating that when entry is gained by ruse, there is neither breaking nor entry without valid permission). {18} I do not believe that we need to decide in this case whether a blanket ruse exception to the announcement rule is inconsistent with Attaway 's directive that noncompliance with the announcement rule must be justified on a case-by-case basis by a particul 2000LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.8(b) at pp. 604-05 (3rd ed.1996) (indicating that the purposes of the knock and announce requirement are not offended by entry by ruse); State v. Williamson, 42 Wash.App. 208 , 710 P.2d 205, 207 (1985) (stating that when entry is gained by ruse, there is neither breaking nor entry without valid permission). {18} I do not believe that we need to decide in this case whether a blanket ruse exception to the announcement rule is inconsistent with Attaway 's directive that noncompliance with the announcement rule must be justified on a case-by-case basis by a particul | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences1994The requirement that officers executing a search warrant announce their identity and purpose and be denied admission is a critical component of a reasonable search under Article II, Section 10. [6] As we stated in State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 444 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1065 (1993), "we observe that Article II, Section 10 expresses the fundamental notion that every person in this state is entitled to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions." The announcement requirement advances important Article II, Section 10 values by preventing needless destruction of private property, eliminating u 1994The requirement that officers executing a search warrant announce their identity and purpose and be denied admission is a critical component of a reasonable search under Article II, Section 10. [6] As we stated in State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 444 , 863 P.2d 1052, 1065 (1993), "we observe that Article II, Section 10 expresses the fundamental notion that every person in this state is entitled to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions." The announcement requirement advances important Article II, Section 10 values by preventing needless destruction of private property, eliminating u | 1 | 1 |
Robert Allan Cornell, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. State of Iowa, Appellant/cross-Appelleegreen1 sentence1981As stated by the Eighth Circuit in Cornell v. State of Iowa, 628 F.2d 1044, 1047 (8th Cir. 1980): When read in the light of the rationale suggested in Burton, we think the rule in Brasfield is more easily understood, not as an announcement of a mandatory principle of substantive constitutional doctrine, but as an administrative admonition to the lower federal courts based upon carefully considered notions of sound judicial practice. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Attaway
green
2 sentences2005In the present case, the officers believed that the occupants, including an alleged drug-dealer, had weapons consisting of “fully automatic Mini-14’s and sawed-off shotguns.” The specific, articulable facts in the present matter of multiple “fully automatic Mini-14’s and sawed-off shotguns,” as well as the allegation that the resident was a drug dealer, viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances, was the basis for the officers’ reasonable suspicion that the occupants had a propensity for violence and justified the exigency exception to the announcement rule. {26} In Attaway, this Court c 2005In the present case, the officers believed that the occupants, including an alleged drug-dealer, had weapons consisting of “fully automatic Mini-14’s and sawed-off shotguns.” The specific, articulable facts in the present matter of multiple “fully automatic Mini-14’s and sawed-off shotguns,” as well as the allegation that the resident was a drug dealer, viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances, was the basis for the officers’ reasonable suspicion that the occupants had a propensity for violence and justified the exigency exception to the announcement rule. {26} In Attaway, this Court c | 6 | 2000–2006 |
State v. Vargas
green
1 sentence2019It also “protects the sanctity of the home and individual 13 privacy.” Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Vargas
green
2 sentences2004Thus, in Vargas, police officers properly found exigency where they had information that the defendants had specific firearms, that they were convicted felons, and that they had challenged officers in the past. 1996-NMCA-016 , ¶¶ 9-13, 121 N.M. 316 , 910 P.2d 950 . 2004Thus, in Vargas, police officers properly found exigency where they had information that the defendants had specific firearms, that they were convicted felons, and that they had challenged officers in the past. 1996-NMCA-016 , ¶¶ 9-13, 121 N.M. 316 , 910 P.2d 950 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004Beavers, 118 N.M. at 397 n. 7, 881 P.2d at 1382 n. 7. 2004Beavers, 118 N.M. at 397 n. 7, 881 P.2d at 1382 n. 7. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Richards v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2000The United States Supreme Court has previously rejected a blanket drug investigation exception to the Fourth Amendment's announcement requirement, see Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997) and we believe a blanket mobile home exception clearly is unwarranted based upon the showing made by the State in the trial court. {12} We disagree with the State's argument that the knock-and-announce requirement serves no purpose once someone inside a mobile home is alerted to the presence of police. 2000The United States Supreme Court has previously rejected a blanket drug investigation exception to the Fourth Amendment's announcement requirement, see Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997) and we believe a blanket mobile home exception clearly is unwarranted based upon the showing made by the State in the trial court. {12} We disagree with the State's argument that the knock-and-announce requirement serves no purpose once someone inside a mobile home is alerted to the presence of police. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.