announcement rule in Pennsylvania

1980“The purpose of this announcement rule is that ‘. . . the dignity and privacy protected by the fourth amendment demand a certain propriety on the part of policemen even after they have been authorized to invade an individual’s privacy.’ ” Commonwealth v. DeMichel, supra, 442 Pa. at 561 , 277 A.2d at 163 , quoting United States ex rel Ametrane v. Gable, 276 F.Supp. 555, 559 (E.D.Pa.1967) aff’d, United States ex rel Ametrane v. Gable, 401 F.2d 765 (3rd Cir. 1968).

1980"The purpose of this announcement rule is that `... the dignity and privacy protected by the fourth amendment demand a certain propriety on the part of policemen even after they have been authorized to invade an individual's privacy.'" Commonwealth v. DeMichel, supra, 442 Pa. at 561 , 277 A.2d at 163 , quoting United States ex rel Ametrane v. Gable, 276 F.Supp. 555, 559 (E.D.Pa. 1967) aff'd, United States ex rel Ametrane v. Gable, 401 F.2d 765 (3rd Cir. 1968).

1986Thus, `[a]n unauthorized entry by means of a passkey is equivalent to a forcible entry.' Commonwealth v. Cerulla, 223 Pa.Super. 24 , 27 n. 5, 296 A.2d 858 , 859 n. 5 (1972).

1973The purpose of this announcement rule is that ‘ . . . the dignity and privacy protected by the fourth amendment demand a certain propriety on the part of policemen even after they have been authorized to invade an individual’s privacy.’ ” (Italics supplied.) The Superior Court recently recognized the same requirements in Commonwealth v. Cerulla, 223 Pa. Superior Ct. 24, 27 (1972), as follows: “The issue presented by these facts is whether a forcible entry into an occupied apartment by police, without a prior announcement of presence, identity, or purpose, is unreasonable under the Fourth Amend

1986The announcement doctrine is designed to protect the privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment; an intrusion is no less an intrusion `whether officers break down a door, force open a chain lock on a partially open door, open a locked door by use of a passkey, or . . . open a closed but unlocked door.' Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 590 , 88 S.Ct. 1755, 1758 , 20 L.Ed.2d 828, 834 (1968).

1986The announcement doctrine is designed to protect the privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment; an intrusion is no less an intrusion `whether officers break down a door, force open a chain lock on a partially open door, open a locked door by use of a passkey, or . . . open a closed but unlocked door.' Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 590 , 88 S.Ct. 1755, 1758 , 20 L.Ed.2d 828, 834 (1968).

1977See my dissent in Commonwealth v. Lee, 470 Pa. 401 , 368 A.2d 690 (1977), joined by JONES, C.

1977See my dissent in Commonwealth v. Lee, 470 Pa. 401 , 368 A.2d 690 (1977), joined by JONES, C.

1996I’m quoting from Commonwealth v. Clemson, 234 Pa.Super. 191, 338 A.2d 649 , 651: The announcement doctrine is designed to protect the privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment.

1996I’m quoting from Commonwealth v. Clemson, 234 Pa.Super. 191, 338 A.2d 649 , 651: The announcement doctrine is designed to protect the privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment.

1991See Commonwealth v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 444 , 240 A.2d 795, 796-97 (1968). [3] With respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, the suppression court noted that the Commonwealth's only evidence was a "general concern[] about the presence of weapons and the destruction of evidence[;] there was no specific evidence in this case with regard to those concerns." (Trial Court Opinion, at 11). [4] Rule 2007 codifies the announcement requirement created by the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.

1971However, as the Supreme Court of this Commonwealth stated in Commonwealth v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441 , 240 A. 2d 795 (1968) : “The fact that *76 some lottery paraphernalia is easily destroyed does not justify the suspension of the Fourth Amendment in all lottery prosecutions.

1991See Commonwealth v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 444 , 240 A.2d 795, 796-97 (1968). [3] With respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, the suppression court noted that the Commonwealth's only evidence was a "general concern[] about the presence of weapons and the destruction of evidence[;] there was no specific evidence in this case with regard to those concerns." (Trial Court Opinion, at 11). [4] Rule 2007 codifies the announcement requirement created by the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.

1971However, as the Supreme Court of this Commonwealth stated in Commonwealth v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441 , 240 A. 2d 795 (1968) : “The fact that *76 some lottery paraphernalia is easily destroyed does not justify the suspension of the Fourth Amendment in all lottery prosecutions.

1972Such a waiver would in reality be an announcement that error can be committed without the possibility of correction on appellate review. [6] The United States Supreme Court has clearly indicated which is the most important of the three criteria for determining the retroactivity of constitutional rights of criminal defendants: "Foremost among these factors is the purpose to be served by the new constitutional rule." Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 , 89 S. Ct. 1030, 1033 (1969).

1972Such a waiver would in reality be an announcement that error can be committed without the possibility of correction on appellate review. [6] The United States Supreme Court has clearly indicated which is the most important of the three criteria for determining the retroactivity of constitutional rights of criminal defendants: "Foremost among these factors is the purpose to be served by the new constitutional rule." Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 , 89 S. Ct. 1030, 1033 (1969).

2015See Langanella, supra at 101-02.

1991Commonwealth v. Golden, 277 Pa.Super. 180, 184 , 419 A.2d 721, 723 (1980).

1991Commonwealth v. Golden, 277 Pa.Super. 180, 184 , 419 A.2d 721, 723 (1980).

1978In addition, it bears repeating that the application of this exclusionary rule "is not a response to police activity in disregard of a rule of law which they knew or should have known, for the arrest and interrogation here involved took place prior to this Court's announcement of the rule in Commonwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389 , 329 A.2d 286 (1974), and its progeny." Commonwealth v. Harvell, 473 Pa. 418, 423 , 374 A.2d 1282, 1285 (1977) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting, joined by Eagen, C.J.).

1978In addition, it bears repeating that the application of this exclusionary rule "is not a response to police activity in disregard of a rule of law which they knew or should have known, for the arrest and interrogation here involved took place prior to this Court's announcement of the rule in Commonwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389 , 329 A.2d 286 (1974), and its progeny." Commonwealth v. Harvell, 473 Pa. 418, 423 , 374 A.2d 1282, 1285 (1977) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting, joined by Eagen, C.J.).

1977See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492 ,-, 372 A.2d 797, 804-06 (1977) (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J., joined by Eagen, C.

1977See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492 ,-, 372 A.2d 797, 804-06 (1977) (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J., joined by Eagen, C.

1977See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492 , ___, 372 A.2d 797, 804-06 (1977) (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J., joined by Eagen, C.J.); Commonwealth v. Lee, 470 Pa. 401, 406-408 , 368 A.2d 690, 693-94 (1977) (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J., joined by Jones, C.J., and Eagen, J.); Commonwealth v. Chaney, 465 Pa. 407, 409-10 , 350 A.2d 829, 831 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J., joned by Jones, C.J., and Eagen, J.).

1977See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492 , ___, 372 A.2d 797, 804-06 (1977) (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J., joined by Eagen, C.J.); Commonwealth v. Lee, 470 Pa. 401, 406-408 , 368 A.2d 690, 693-94 (1977) (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J., joined by Jones, C.J., and Eagen, J.); Commonwealth v. Chaney, 465 Pa. 407, 409-10 , 350 A.2d 829, 831 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J., joned by Jones, C.J., and Eagen, J.).