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14 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Clevelandgreen2 sentences1997As the supreme court stated in State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 630 , 348 N.W.2d 512, 520 (1984): 1 We . . . wish to emphasize that the justification for dispensing with the announcement requirement *214 must be judged as of the time the warrant is executed. 1997As the supreme court stated in State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 630 , 348 N.W.2d 512, 520 (1984): 1 We . . . wish to emphasize that the justification for dispensing with the announcement requirement *214 must be judged as of the time the warrant is executed. | 3 | 6 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1993Our supreme court has stated in State v. Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, 986 , 485 N.W.2d 42, 48 (1992), that whenever the police officers at the time of the application for a search warrant possess sufficient information that justifies dispensing with the announcement rule, they should present such information to a judge for the determination whether to authorize the no-knock entry by police. 1993Our supreme court has stated in State v. Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, 986 , 485 N.W.2d 42, 48 (1992), that whenever the police officers at the time of the application for a search warrant possess sufficient information that justifies dispensing with the announcement rule, they should present such information to a judge for the determination whether to authorize the no-knock entry by police. | 1 | 5 |
Wilson v. Arkansasgreen2 sentences2000The announcement principle is not "an inflexible rule requiring announcement under all circumstances." Id. 2000The announcement principle is not "an inflexible rule requiring announcement under all circumstances." Id. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Longgreen2 sentences1992The state relies on language in State v. Long, 163 Wis. 2d 261, 266 , 471 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Ct. App. 1991), that "[c]ourts have refused to set a strict time limit for the announcement rule. 1992The state relies on language in State v. Long, 163 Wis. 2d 261, 266 , 471 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Ct. App. 1991), that "[c]ourts have refused to set a strict time limit for the announcement rule. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Easongreen2 sentences2007Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995); Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶ 17 . ¶ 9. 2007The announcement rule "requires the police to do three things before forcibly entering a home to execute a search warrant: 1) announce their identity; 2) announce their purpose; and 3) wait for either the occupants to refuse their admittance or [] allow the *788 occupants time to open the door." Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶ 17 (quotations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxationgreen2 sentences2003Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993). 2003Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Covingtongreen1 sentence1992For example, in United States v. Covington, 385 A.2d 164, 167 (D.C. 1978), the court said: This sort of ruse fulfills several purposes, all of which are consistent with the purposes of the announcement rule. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ernest R. Streeter, United States of America v. Robert Jay Collinsgreen1 sentence1992In United States v. Streeter, 907 F.2d 781, 788-89 (8th Cir. 1990), the officers shouted "Police, search warrant, open the door" repeatedly and then waited five to ten seconds after hearing activity inside the house that would indicate that their safety would be threatened if they waited longer before they forcibly entered. | 1 | 1 |
Dalia v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1992In Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979), the United States Supreme Court recognized that "it is generally left to the discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by warrant — subject of course to the general Fourth Amendment protection 'against unreasonable searches and seizures.' " However, whenever the police officers possess sufficient information at the time of the application for a search warrant that justifies dispensing with the announcement rule, they should present such information to a ju | 1 | 1 |
State v. Reedgreen2 sentences1991State v. Reed, 156 Wis. 2d 546, 551 , 457 N.W.2d 494, 496 (Ct. App. 1990). 2 The issue in this case is whether the officers, in executing the warrant, sufficiently complied with the announcement rule. 1991State v. Reed, 156 Wis. 2d 546, 551 , 457 N.W.2d 494, 496 (Ct. App. 1990). 2 The issue in this case is whether the officers, in executing the warrant, sufficiently complied with the announcement rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Valle
green
2 sentences2005When some local municipal by-law has been invaded the constitutional guaranty does not apply. . . . "[W]e are not now prepared to inaugurate the revolution that must follow the announcement of the doctrine that a jury trial is an indispensable requisite." Id. at 429-30 (quoting McInerney v. City of Denver, 29 P. 516 , 519 (Colo. 1892)) (emphasis added). 2005When some local municipal by-law has been invaded the constitutional guaranty does not apply. . .. "[W]e are not now prepared to inaugurate the revolution that must follow the announcement of the doctrine that a jury trial is an indispensable requisite." Id. at 429-30 (quoting McInerney v. City of Denver, 29 P. 516 , 519 (Colo. 1892)) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ogden v. City of Madison
green
2 sentences2005When some local municipal by-law has been invaded the constitutional guaranty does not apply. . . . "[W]e are not now prepared to inaugurate the revolution that must follow the announcement of the doctrine that a jury trial is an indispensable requisite." Id. at 429-30 (quoting McInerney v. City of Denver, 29 P. 516 , 519 (Colo. 1892)) (emphasis added). 2005When some local municipal by-law has been invaded the constitutional guaranty does not apply. . .. "[W]e are not now prepared to inaugurate the revolution that must follow the announcement of the doctrine that a jury trial is an indispensable requisite." Id. at 429-30 (quoting McInerney v. City of Denver, 29 P. 516 , 519 (Colo. 1892)) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Joseph Bonner, United States of America v. James Turner
green
1 sentence1991Bonner, 874 F.2d at 826 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.