decision after hearing in New York

1995This Court has previously stated that a "petitioner’s cause of action, 'essentially to compel prompt compliance with a decision after a hearing [is] not a bona fide civil rights cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983’ ” (Matter of Cuevas v Perales, 183 AD2d 715 , quoting Matter of Ferraro v Perales, 166 AD2d 443, 444 ).

1992The petitioner’s cause of action, "essentially to compel prompt compliance with a decision after a hearing, was not a bona fide civil rights cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983” (Matter of Ferraro v Perales, 166 AD2d 443, 444 ; Matter of Middleton v Perales, 160 AD2d 800 , cert denied — US —, 112 S Ct 174 ; Matter of Rashid v Perales, 156 AD2d 692 ; Matter of Rozier v Perales, 149 AD2d 710 ; Matter of Gelin v Perales, 149 AD2d 593 ).

1992The petitioner’s cause of action, "essentially to compel prompt compliance with a decision after a hearing, was not a bona fide civil rights cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983” (Matter of Ferraro v Perales, 166 AD2d 443, 444 ; Matter of Middleton v Perales, 160 AD2d 800 , cert denied — US —, 112 S Ct 174 ; Matter of Rashid v Perales, 156 AD2d 692 ; Matter of Rozier v Perales, 149 AD2d 710 ; Matter of Gelin v Perales, 149 AD2d 593 ).

1990The petitioner’s cause of action, essentially to compel prompt compliance with a decision after a hearing, was not a bona fide civil rights cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see, Matter of Rashid v Perales, 156 AD2d 692 ; see also, Matter of Ehrman v Perales, 162 AD2d 598 ; Matter of Middleton v Perales, 160 AD2d 800 ).

1992The petitioner’s cause of action, "essentially to compel prompt compliance with a decision after a hearing, was not a bona fide civil rights cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983” (Matter of Ferraro v Perales, 166 AD2d 443, 444 ; Matter of Middleton v Perales, 160 AD2d 800 , cert denied — US —, 112 S Ct 174 ; Matter of Rashid v Perales, 156 AD2d 692 ; Matter of Rozier v Perales, 149 AD2d 710 ; Matter of Gelin v Perales, 149 AD2d 593 ).

1990The petitioner’s cause of action, essentially to compel prompt compliance with a decision after a hearing, was not a bona fide civil rights cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see, Matter of Rashid v Perales, 156 AD2d 692 ; see also, Matter of Ehrman v Perales, 162 AD2d 598 ; Matter of Middleton v Perales, 160 AD2d 800 ).

2011Because the motion therefore remains “under consideration by the court” until the court renders a decision after the hearing, the adjournment for a hearing ordered on a pretrial suppression motion is expressly excludable under the statute (see GPL 30.30 [4] [a]; Taylor, 16 Misc 3d at 341 ).

2009Turning to the later decision after hearing, we note that a fact-finding court’s decision “should not be disturbed upon ap peal unless it is obvious that the court’s conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 , 545 [1990], quoted in Thoreson v Penthouse Intl., 80 NY2d 490, 495 [1992]).

2004The ALJ determined: (1) that DSS did have the requisite regulatory authority to conduct the audit and to adjust petitioner's {** 4 Misc 3d at 398 }ADHC program Medicaid reimbursement rate which was based upon budgeted costs; (2) that the statute of limitations prohibited the State from auditing the 1989 and 1990 rate years, but the State could audit the 1991 and later rate years based upon its notification contained within the June 18, 1997 draft audit report; and (3) that petitioner had deleted transportation services from its ADHC program.

1995This Court has previously stated that a "petitioner’s cause of action, 'essentially to compel prompt compliance with a decision after a hearing [is] not a bona fide civil rights cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983’ ” (Matter of Cuevas v Perales, 183 AD2d 715 , quoting Matter of Ferraro v Perales, 166 AD2d 443, 444 ).

1992The recent decision of the Court of Appeals in Matter of Thomasel v Perales ( 78 NY2d 561 ) does not compel a different result.

1992The petitioner’s cause of action, "essentially to compel prompt compliance with a decision after a hearing, was not a bona fide civil rights cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983” (Matter of Ferraro v Perales, 166 AD2d 443, 444 ; Matter of Middleton v Perales, 160 AD2d 800 , cert denied — US —, 112 S Ct 174 ; Matter of Rashid v Perales, 156 AD2d 692 ; Matter of Rozier v Perales, 149 AD2d 710 ; Matter of Gelin v Perales, 149 AD2d 593 ).

1992The petitioner’s cause of action, "essentially to compel prompt compliance with a decision after a hearing, was not a bona fide civil rights cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983” (Matter of Ferraro v Perales, 166 AD2d 443, 444 ; Matter of Middleton v Perales, 160 AD2d 800 , cert denied — US —, 112 S Ct 174 ; Matter of Rashid v Perales, 156 AD2d 692 ; Matter of Rozier v Perales, 149 AD2d 710 ; Matter of Gelin v Perales, 149 AD2d 593 ).

1992The petitioner’s cause of action, "essentially to compel prompt compliance with a decision after a hearing, was not a bona fide civil rights cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983” (Matter of Ferraro v Perales, 166 AD2d 443, 444 ; Matter of Middleton v Perales, 160 AD2d 800 , cert denied — US —, 112 S Ct 174 ; Matter of Rashid v Perales, 156 AD2d 692 ; Matter of Rozier v Perales, 149 AD2d 710 ; Matter of Gelin v Perales, 149 AD2d 593 ).

1990It is undisputed that Gramercy never received notice of the Commissioner’s first appeal until well after the statutory period had expired (cf., Matter of Lebron [Ross], 72 AD2d 886 ).

1989L, 46 NY2d 1024 ; Rosen Trust v Rosen, 53 AD2d 342 , affd 43 NY2d 693 ).

1989L, 46 NY2d 1024 ; Rosen Trust v Rosen, 53 AD2d 342 , affd 43 NY2d 693 ).

1989L, 46 NY2d 1024 ; Rosen Trust v Rosen, 53 AD2d 342 , affd 43 NY2d 693 ).

1988Upon judicial review of a board’s decision after a hearing, the issue presented for the court’s consideration is limited to whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence upon the entire record (see, CPLR 7803 [4]; Matter of Purdy v Kreisberg, 47 NY2d 354 ).

1975The Appellate Division reversed, directing a hearing "to determine if the proceeding is time-barred.” (Matter of Schlaifer v Kaiser, 46 AD2d 850 .) This is the decision after such hearing.

1961It is true that the examination was conducted in connection with the forgery charge, which, so far as appears, was never disposed of, but the results of the examination were relevant in the disposition of the subsequent burglary charge. “ The initiating of an investigation under § 658 of the Code as to the mental condition of the defendant rests wholly or in the discretion of the court and the failure of the court to initiate such an investigation under the circumstances here presented cannot be made the basis of a motion to vacate the conviction and sentence.” A decision after a hearing on an

1961It is true that the examination was conducted in connection with the forgery charge, which, so far as appears, was never disposed of, but the results of the examination were relevant in the disposition of the subsequent burglary charge. “ The initiating of an investigation under § 658 of the Code as to the mental condition of the defendant rests wholly or in the discretion of the court and the failure of the court to initiate such an investigation under the circumstances here presented cannot be made the basis of a motion to vacate the conviction and sentence.” A decision after a hearing on an