equality clause in New York

1964The dismal story of man’s inhumanity to man will only be brought to a final close when race, creed, color and ancestry are no longer bars to economic opportunity and education, public accommodation and housing! ‘ Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. ’ (Rirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 .) When these bars have really been demolished, then our citizens will live in common dignity, security — and at peace.

1963The dismal story of man’s inhumanity to man will only be brought to a final close when race, creed, color and ancestry are no longer bars to economic opportunity and education, public accommodation and housing! ‘ ‘ Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” (Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 .) When these bars have really been demolished, then our citizens will live in common dignity, serenity — and at peace.

1970(See, also, Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 .) ” The court continued at page 220: “As we have already indicated in the companion case that a crime must be characterized as serious when the authorized punishment includes a possible term of imprisonment in excess of one year, the possibility of a young adult receiving a reformatory sentence creates an anomalous situation. .

1969(See, also, Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 .) Even assuming, arguendo, the correctness of appellant’s underlying premise that territorial discriminations cannot be sustained unless based on a reasonable classification, we would nevertheless reach the same result because it is our opinion that the overburdening caseload existing in the criminal courts of the highly populated City of New York has given rise to extraordinary and unique circumstances which manifests the reasonable basis for making such a distinction.

2007The equality requirement of the Supremacy Clause is satisfied in each of these situations because litigants stand on the same footing—regardless of whether they choose to invoke the authority of a state or federal court—and there is no incentive to engage in the repudiated practice of forum shopping that “frequently and predictably produce[s] different outcomes in federal civil rights litigation based solely on whether that litigation takes place in state or federal court” (Felder v Casey, 487 US at 141 ).

2007The equality requirement of the Supremacy Clause is satisfied in each of these situations because litigants stand on the same footing—regardless of whether they choose to invoke the authority of a state or federal court—and there is no incentive to engage in the repudiated practice of forum shopping that "frequently and predictably produce[s] different outcomes in federal civil rights litigation based solely on whether that litigation takes place in state or federal court" ( Felder v Casey, 487 US at 141 ).

2001However, it left open the door to an argument based on an adequacy principle, an argument based on the premise that the State must ensure an education to public school students that satisfies some basic minimum requirements (see Levittown, supra, 57 NY2d, at 38 ).

2001However, it left open the door to an argument based on an adequacy principle, an argument based on the premise that the State must ensure an education to public school students that satisfies some basic minimum requirements (see Levittown, supra, 57 NY2d, at 38 ).

1949Truax v. Corrigan ( 257 U. S. 312, 336 ), in speaking of classification in statutes, quotes Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank ( 170 U. S. 283 ) to this effect: “ The rule [i.e. of the equality clause] is not a substitute for municipal law; it only prescribes that that law have the attribute of equality of operation, and equality of operation does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to their relations.” Further in the decision the court quotes Southern Railway Co. v. Greene ( 216 U. S. 400 ) to this effect: “ While reasonable classificatio

1949Truax v. Corrigan ( 257 U. S. 312, 336 ), in speaking of classification in statutes, quotes Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank ( 170 U. S. 283 ) to this effect: “ The rule [i.e. of the equality clause] is not a substitute for municipal law; it only prescribes that that law have the attribute of equality of operation, and equality of operation does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to their relations.” Further in the decision the court quotes Southern Railway Co. v. Greene ( 216 U. S. 400 ) to this effect: “ While reasonable classificatio

1949Truax v. Corrigan ( 257 U. S. 312, 336 ), in speaking of classification in statutes, quotes Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank ( 170 U. S. 283 ) to this effect: “ The rule [i.e. of the equality clause] is not a substitute for municipal law; it only prescribes that that law have the attribute of equality of operation, and equality of operation does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to their relations.” Further in the decision the court quotes Southern Railway Co. v. Greene ( 216 U. S. 400 ) to this effect: “ While reasonable classificatio