equality doctrine in California

2001(Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995) 515 U.S. 200, 227 [ 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2112-2113 , 132 L.Ed.2d 158 ] (Adarand).) Over the years, the United States Supreme Court “has consistently repudiated ‘[distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’” (Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 11 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ], citing Hirabayashi v. United States (1943) 320 U.S. 81, 100 [ 63 S.Ct. 1375, 1385 , 87 L.Ed. 1774 ].) The Band and amici curiae contend that the ICWA inv

2001(Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995) 515 U.S. 200, 227 [ 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2112-2113 , 132 L.Ed.2d 158 ] (Adarand).) Over the years, the United States Supreme Court “has consistently repudiated ‘[distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’” (Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 11 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ], citing Hirabayashi v. United States (1943) 320 U.S. 81, 100 [ 63 S.Ct. 1375, 1385 , 87 L.Ed. 1774 ].) The Band and amici curiae contend that the ICWA inv

2001(Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995) 515 U.S. 200, 227 [ 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2112-2113 , 132 L.Ed.2d 158 ] (Adarand).) Over the years, the United States Supreme Court “has consistently repudiated ‘[distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’” (Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 11 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ], citing Hirabayashi v. United States (1943) 320 U.S. 81, 100 [ 63 S.Ct. 1375, 1385 , 87 L.Ed. 1774 ].) The Band and amici curiae contend that the ICWA inv

2001(Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995) 515 U.S. 200, 227 [ 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2112-2113 , 132 L.Ed.2d 158 ] (Adarand).) Over the years, the United States Supreme Court “has consistently repudiated ‘[distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’” (Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 11 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ], citing Hirabayashi v. United States (1943) 320 U.S. 81, 100 [ 63 S.Ct. 1375, 1385 , 87 L.Ed. 1774 ].) The Band and amici curiae contend that the ICWA inv

2001(Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995) 515 U.S. 200, 227 [ 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2112-2113 , 132 L.Ed.2d 158 ] (Adarand).) Over the years, the United States Supreme Court “has consistently repudiated ‘[distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’” (Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 11 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ], citing Hirabayashi v. United States (1943) 320 U.S. 81, 100 [ 63 S.Ct. 1375, 1385 , 87 L.Ed. 1774 ].) The Band and amici curiae contend that the ICWA inv

2001(Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995) 515 U.S. 200, 227 [ 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2112-2113 , 132 L.Ed.2d 158 ] (Adarand).) Over the years, the United States Supreme Court “has consistently repudiated ‘[distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’” (Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 11 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ], citing Hirabayashi v. United States (1943) 320 U.S. 81, 100 [ 63 S.Ct. 1375, 1385 , 87 L.Ed. 1774 ].) The Band and amici curiae contend that the ICWA inv

2001For legislation concerning a "suspect" classification involving an immutable characteristic, such as race, ethnicity, or ancestry, courts have been directed to apply strict scrutiny and to uphold the legislation only if its classification is precisely tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. ( Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995) 515 U.S. 200, 227 , 115 S.Ct. 2097 , 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (Adarand) .) Over the years, the United States Supreme Court "has consistently repudiated `[distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry' as being `odious to a free people whose

2001For legislation concerning a "suspect" classification involving an immutable characteristic, such as race, ethnicity, or ancestry, courts have been directed to apply strict scrutiny and to uphold the legislation only if its classification is precisely tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. ( Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995) 515 U.S. 200, 227 , 115 S.Ct. 2097 , 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (Adarand) .) Over the years, the United States Supreme Court "has consistently repudiated `[distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry' as being `odious to a free people whose

2001From those opinions, we can distill certain principles that have been endorsed by a majority of the United States Supreme Court and must guide our consideration of the validity of the statutory schemes involved here. 2 The equal protection clause recognizes that distinctions between persons based solely upon their ancestry “ ‘are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’ [Citation.]’’ (Shaw v. Reno, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 643 [ 113 S.Ct. at p. 2824 , 125 L.Ed.2d at p. 526 ] (maj. opn.); Bakke II, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 290-291 [9

2001From those opinions, we can distill certain principles that have been endorsed by a majority of the United States Supreme Court and must guide our consideration of the validity of the statutory schemes involved here. 2 The equal protection clause recognizes that distinctions between persons based solely upon their ancestry “ ‘are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’ [Citation.]’’ (Shaw v. Reno, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 643 [ 113 S.Ct. at p. 2824 , 125 L.Ed.2d at p. 526 ] (maj. opn.); Bakke II, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 290-291 [9

2001(Croson, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 495 [109 S.Ct. at pp. 722-723, 102 L.Ed.2d at p. 883 ] (plur. opn.); Wygant, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 277 [106 S.Ct. at pp. 1848-1849, 90 L.Ed.2d at p. 270 ] (plur. opn.).) Where the government proposes to assure participation of “some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid.

2001(Croson, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 495 [109 S.Ct. at pp. 722-723, 102 L.Ed.2d at p. 883 ] (plur. opn.); Wygant, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 277 [106 S.Ct. at pp. 1848-1849, 90 L.Ed.2d at p. 270 ] (plur. opn.).) Where the government proposes to assure participation of “some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid.

2001(Croson, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 495 [109 S.Ct. at pp. 722-723, 102 L.Ed.2d at p. 883 ] (plur. opn.); Wygant, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 277 [106 S.Ct. at pp. 1848-1849, 90 L.Ed.2d at p. 270 ] (plur. opn.).) Where the government proposes to assure participation of “some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid.

2001(Croson, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 495 [109 S.Ct. at pp. 722-723, 102 L.Ed.2d at p. 883 ] (plur. opn.); Wygant, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 277 [106 S.Ct. at pp. 1848-1849, 90 L.Ed.2d at p. 270 ] (plur. opn.).) Where the government proposes to assure participation of “some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid.

1982It follows that in the event the government classifies citizens with *310 regard to employment opportunities by virtue of their race, the legislation may be upheld only if it (1) is justified by a compelling state interest, and (2) is necessary for the furtherance of that compelling state interest (Weber v. City Council (1973) 9 Cal.3d 950, 959 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 553 , 513 P.2d 601 ]; McLaughlin v. Florida (1964) 379 U.S. 184 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 222 , 85 S.Ct. 283 ]).

1982It follows that in the event the government classifies citizens with *310 regard to employment opportunities by virtue of their race, the legislation may be upheld only if it (1) is justified by a compelling state interest, and (2) is necessary for the furtherance of that compelling state interest (Weber v. City Council (1973) 9 Cal.3d 950, 959 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 553 , 513 P.2d 601 ]; McLaughlin v. Florida (1964) 379 U.S. 184 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 222 , 85 S.Ct. 283 ]).

1973The court continued in the following sentence: "For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection." In Oyama v. California (1948) 332 U.S. 633, 646 [ 92 L.Ed. 249 , 259, 68 S.Ct. 269 ], the court referred to Hirabayashi as abrogating "discrimination between citizens on the basis of their racial descent." Moreover, if classifications based on the general fact of descent, as opposed to racial classification, were viewed as suspect, established areas of the law, as for example the statutes of succession, would

1973The court continued in the following sentence: "For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection." In Oyama v. California (1948) 332 U.S. 633, 646 [ 92 L.Ed. 249 , 259, 68 S.Ct. 269 ], the court referred to Hirabayashi as abrogating "discrimination between citizens on the basis of their racial descent." Moreover, if classifications based on the general fact of descent, as opposed to racial classification, were viewed as suspect, established areas of the law, as for example the statutes of succession, would

1973The court continued in the following sentence: "For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection." In Oyama v. California (1948) 332 U.S. 633, 646 [ 92 L.Ed. 249 , 259, 68 S.Ct. 269 ], the court referred to Hirabayashi as abrogating "discrimination between citizens on the basis of their racial descent." Moreover, if classifications based on the general fact of descent, as opposed to racial classification, were viewed as suspect, established areas of the law, as for example the statutes of succession, would

1973The court continued in the following sentence: "For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection." In Oyama v. California (1948) 332 U.S. 633, 646 [ 92 L.Ed. 249 , 259, 68 S.Ct. 269 ], the court referred to Hirabayashi as abrogating "discrimination between citizens on the basis of their racial descent." Moreover, if classifications based on the general fact of descent, as opposed to racial classification, were viewed as suspect, established areas of the law, as for example the statutes of succession, would

1971They rely on a long series of United States Supreme Court cases which have held, in the words of the most recent case, “a qualified voter has a constitutional right to' vote in elections without having his vote wrongfully denied, debased, or diluted.” (Hadley v. Junior College District, supra, 397 U.S. 50, 52 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 45, 49 ], and cases cited therein; see also Avery v. Midland County, supra, 390 U.S. 474, 480 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 45, 50-51 ]; Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 554-555 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 522-524 ].) Although those cases involved district malapportionment we have concluded that

1971They rely on a long series of United States Supreme Court cases which have held, in the words of the most recent case, “a qualified voter has a constitutional right to' vote in elections without having his vote wrongfully denied, debased, or diluted.” (Hadley v. Junior College District, supra, 397 U.S. 50, 52 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 45, 49 ], and cases cited therein; see also Avery v. Midland County, supra, 390 U.S. 474, 480 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 45, 50-51 ]; Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 554-555 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 522-524 ].) Although those cases involved district malapportionment we have concluded that

1971They rely on a long series of United States Supreme Court cases which have held, in the words of the most recent case, “a qualified voter has a constitutional right to' vote in elections without having his vote wrongfully denied, debased, or diluted.” (Hadley v. Junior College District, supra, 397 U.S. 50, 52 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 45, 49 ], and cases cited therein; see also Avery v. Midland County, supra, 390 U.S. 474, 480 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 45, 50-51 ]; Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 554-555 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 522-524 ].) Although those cases involved district malapportionment we have concluded that

1971They rely on a long series of United States Supreme Court cases which have held, in the words of the most recent case, “a qualified voter has a constitutional right to' vote in elections without having his vote wrongfully denied, debased, or diluted.” (Hadley v. Junior College District, supra, 397 U.S. 50, 52 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 45, 49 ], and cases cited therein; see also Avery v. Midland County, supra, 390 U.S. 474, 480 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 45, 50-51 ]; Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 554-555 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 522-524 ].) Although those cases involved district malapportionment we have concluded that

1971They rely on a long series of United States Supreme Court cases which have held, in the words of the most recent case, “a qualified voter has a constitutional right to' vote in elections without having his vote wrongfully denied, debased, or diluted.” (Hadley v. Junior College District, supra, 397 U.S. 50, 52 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 45, 49 ], and cases cited therein; see also Avery v. Midland County, supra, 390 U.S. 474, 480 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 45, 50-51 ]; Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 554-555 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 522-524 ].) Although those cases involved district malapportionment we have concluded that

1971They rely on a long series of United States Supreme Court cases which have held, in the words of the most recent case, “a qualified voter has a constitutional right to' vote in elections without having his vote wrongfully denied, debased, or diluted.” (Hadley v. Junior College District, supra, 397 U.S. 50, 52 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 45, 49 ], and cases cited therein; see also Avery v. Midland County, supra, 390 U.S. 474, 480 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 45, 50-51 ]; Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 554-555 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 522-524 ].) Although those cases involved district malapportionment we have concluded that