Keyspan defendant in New York

2014The Keyspan defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that they did not perform any work in the area where the accident occurred and that they did not create the alleged defect (see Loughlin v City of New York, 74 AD3d 757, 758 [2010]; Garcia v City of New York, 53 AD3d 644 [2008]; Jones v City of New York, 45 AD3d 735 [2007]; Cendales v City of New York, 25 AD3d 579, 580-581 [2006]).

2014The Keyspan defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that they did not perform any work in the area where the accident occurred and that they did not create the alleged defect (see Loughlin v City of New York, 74 AD3d 757, 758 [2010]; Garcia v City of New York, 53 AD3d 644 [2008]; Jones v City of New York, 45 AD3d 735 [2007]; Cendales v City of New York, 25 AD3d 579, 580-581 [2006]).

2014The Keyspan defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that they did not perform any work in the area where the accident occurred and that they did not create the alleged defect (see Loughlin v City of New York, 74 AD3d 757, 758 [2010]; Garcia v City of New York, 53 AD3d 644 [2008]; Jones v City of New York, 45 AD3d 735 [2007]; Cendales v City of New York, 25 AD3d 579, 580-581 [2006]).

2014The Keyspan defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that they did not perform any work in the area where the accident occurred and that they did not create the alleged defect (see Loughlin v City of New York, 74 AD3d 757, 758 [2010]; Garcia v City of New York, 53 AD3d 644 [2008]; Jones v City of New York, 45 AD3d 735 [2007]; Cendales v City of New York, 25 AD3d 579, 580-581 [2006]).

2014Where none is present, a party cannot be held liable for injuries caused by the dangerous or defective condition of the property’ ” (Aversano v City of New York, 265 AD2d 437 [1999], quoting Turrisi v Ponderosa, Inc., 179 AD2d 956, 957 [1992]).

2014Where none is present, a party cannot be held liable for injuries caused by the dangerous or defective condition of the property’ ” (Aversano v City of New York, 265 AD2d 437 [1999], quoting Turrisi v Ponderosa, Inc., 179 AD2d 956, 957 [1992]).

2013In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to the applicability of an exception to the statute of limitations, or as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled or the causes of action were interposed within the applicable limitations period (see Shalik v Hewlett Assoc., L.P., 93 AD3d at 778 ; East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 90 AD3d at 822 ).

2013In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to the applicability of an exception to the statute of limitations, or as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled or the causes of action were interposed within the applicable limitations period (see Shalik v Hewlett Assoc., L.P., 93 AD3d at 778 ; East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 90 AD3d at 822 ).

2013In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to the applicability of an exception to the statute of limitations, or as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled or the causes of action were interposed within the applicable limitations period (see Shalik v Hewlett Assoc., L.P., 93 AD3d at 778 ; East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 90 AD3d at 822 ).

2013In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to the applicability of an exception to the statute of limitations, or as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled or the causes of action were interposed within the applicable limitations period (see Shalik v Hewlett Assoc., L.P., 93 AD3d at 778 ; East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 90 AD3d at 822 ).

2021Realty Corp. , 114 AD3d 674 [2014]; Cajas-Romero v Ward , 106 AD3d 850, 852 [2013]).

2020Accordingly, the boilerplate "no third-party beneficiaries" language in the contract is unenforceable as against them, since the contract otherwise manifests an intent to benefit and afford contractual rights to third parties who incur expenses in relocating utilities ( see Diamond Castle Partners IV PRC, L.P. v IAC/InterActivecorp , 82 AD3d 421, 421-423 ).

2020The Keyspan defendants and the AT & T defendants established that they were third-party beneficiaries of the contract by demonstrating " (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for [their] benefit and (3) that the benefit to [them] is sufficiently immediate, rather than incidental, to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate [them] if the benefit is lost'" ( Mendel v Henry Phipps Plaza W., Inc. , 6 NY3d 783, 786 , quoting Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v Lindner , 59 NY2d 314, 336 ; see

2020A fair reading of the subject contract reveals an intent to benefit utility owners such as the Keyspan defendants and the AT & T defendants by providing compensation for their utility relocation expenses ( see generally Bethpage Water Dist. v Hendrickson Bros., Inc. , 138 AD2d 660, 661 ).

2020As the plaintiff observes, utility owners have a common-law obligation to relocate their facilities and lines at their own expense when public health, safety, or convenience requires such relocation ( see City of New York v Verizon N.Y., Inc. , 4 NY3d 255, 258 ; Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v Lindsay , 24 NY2d 309, 316-317 ; Transit Commn. v Long Is.

2020As the plaintiff observes, utility owners have a common-law obligation to relocate their facilities and lines at their own expense when public health, safety, or convenience requires such relocation ( see City of New York v Verizon N.Y., Inc. , 4 NY3d 255, 258 ; Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v Lindsay , 24 NY2d 309, 316-317 ; Transit Commn. v Long Is.

2020The Keyspan defendants and the AT & T defendants established that they were third-party beneficiaries of the contract by demonstrating " (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for [their] benefit and (3) that the benefit to [them] is sufficiently immediate, rather than incidental, to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate [them] if the benefit is lost'" ( Mendel v Henry Phipps Plaza W., Inc. , 6 NY3d 783, 786 , quoting Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v Lindner , 59 NY2d 314, 336 ; see

2020The Keyspan defendants and the AT & T defendants established that they were third-party beneficiaries of the contract by demonstrating " (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for [their] benefit and (3) that the benefit to [them] is sufficiently immediate, rather than incidental, to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate [them] if the benefit is lost'" ( Mendel v Henry Phipps Plaza W., Inc. , 6 NY3d 783, 786 , quoting Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v Lindner , 59 NY2d 314, 336 ; see

2018The Keyspan defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them by demonstrating, through the submission of various records and the deposition testimony of their consultant, that they did not perform work prior to the subject accident in the area where the plaintiff allegedly fell ( see Lewis v City of New York , 82 AD3d 1054 ; Flores v City of New York , 29 AD3d 356 ).

2018Triumph similarly established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it based on the affidavit of its project manager, which demonstrated that Triumph performed no work prior to the subject accident in the crosswalk or roadway where the accident allegedly occurred ( see Arrucci v City of New York , 45 AD3d 617, 618 ; Kleeberg v City of New York , 305 AD2d 549 ; see also Amarosa v City of New York , 51 AD3d 596, 596-597 ; Piccinich v New York Stock Exch. , 257 AD2d 438, 439 ).

2018Triumph similarly established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it based on the affidavit of its project manager, which demonstrated that Triumph performed no work prior to the subject accident in the crosswalk or roadway where the accident allegedly occurred ( see Arrucci v City of New York , 45 AD3d 617, 618 ; Kleeberg v City of New York , 305 AD2d 549 ; see also Amarosa v City of New York , 51 AD3d 596, 596-597 ; Piccinich v New York Stock Exch. , 257 AD2d 438, 439 ).

2018Triumph similarly established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it based on the affidavit of its project manager, which demonstrated that Triumph performed no work prior to the subject accident in the crosswalk or roadway where the accident allegedly occurred ( see Arrucci v City of New York , 45 AD3d 617, 618 ; Kleeberg v City of New York , 305 AD2d 549 ; see also Amarosa v City of New York , 51 AD3d 596, 596-597 ; Piccinich v New York Stock Exch. , 257 AD2d 438, 439 ).

2018In opposition to this prima facie showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to the fault of the Keyspan defendants in the happening of the accident ( see Zuckerman v City of New York , 49 NY2d 557, 562 ).

2018In opposition to this prima facie showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to the fault of the Keyspan defendants in the happening of the accident ( see Zuckerman v City of New York , 49 NY2d 557, 562 ).