preinterrogation warning in New York

1994Under all the circumstances, we find that " 'the entire confrontation was designed to deliberately subjugate the defendant to the authority of the police and to extract a confession without the benefit of the preinterrogation warnings’ ” (People v Weaver, 177 AD2d 809, 810 , quoting from People v McIntyre, 138 AD2d 634, 636 ).

1991In our view, "the entire confrontation was designed to deliberately subjugate the defendant to the authority of the police and to extract a confession without the benefit of the preinterrogation warnings” (People v McIntyre, 138 AD2d 634, 636 , lv denied 72 NY2d 959 ).

1980Recognizing that the preinterrogation warnings mandated by Miranda v Arizona ( 384 US 436 , supra) cannot ensure that an accused will not "waive” an important constitutional right out of ignorance, confusion or fear, we have held that, in certain situations, the right to counsel in New York includes the right of an accused to have an attorney present while he is considering whether to waive his rights.

1978The defendant was told he was under arrest and was given the preinterrogation warnings prescribed in Miranda v Arizona ( 384 US 436 ).

1994Under all the circumstances, we find that " 'the entire confrontation was designed to deliberately subjugate the defendant to the authority of the police and to extract a confession without the benefit of the preinterrogation warnings’ ” (People v Weaver, 177 AD2d 809, 810 , quoting from People v McIntyre, 138 AD2d 634, 636 ).

1994The statements made by the defendant prior to the Miranda warnings should be suppressed along with any statements made after the warnings were issued, as the defendant was in continuous police custody, and there was not such a pronounced break in interrogation that the defendant was returned in effect to the status of one who was not under the influence of questioning (see, People v Chappie, 38 NY2d 112 ; People v Daniels, 189 AD2d 892 ; People v Anderson, 178 AD2d 605 ).

1994The statements made by the defendant prior to the Miranda warnings should be suppressed along with any statements made after the warnings were issued, as the defendant was in continuous police custody, and there was not such a pronounced break in interrogation that the defendant was returned in effect to the status of one who was not under the influence of questioning (see, People v Chappie, 38 NY2d 112 ; People v Daniels, 189 AD2d 892 ; People v Anderson, 178 AD2d 605 ).

1994The statements made by the defendant prior to the Miranda warnings should be suppressed along with any statements made after the warnings were issued, as the defendant was in continuous police custody, and there was not such a pronounced break in interrogation that the defendant was returned in effect to the status of one who was not under the influence of questioning (see, People v Chappie, 38 NY2d 112 ; People v Daniels, 189 AD2d 892 ; People v Anderson, 178 AD2d 605 ).

1988The question of whether a particular interrogation is custodial is largely a question of fact and the hearing court’s findings should not be disturbed unless they are against the weight of the evidence (see, People v Oates, 104 AD2d 907 ; People v Lopez, 95 AD2d 241 ).

1988The question of whether a particular interrogation is custodial is largely a question of fact and the hearing court’s findings should not be disturbed unless they are against the weight of the evidence (see, People v Oates, 104 AD2d 907 ; People v Lopez, 95 AD2d 241 ).

1988Under the circumstances, we conclude that the entire confrontation was designed to deliberately subjugate the defendant to the authority of the police and to extract a confession without the benefit of the preinterrogation warnings (see, Matter of Kwok T., supra, at 218; People v Rodney P., 21 NY2d 1, 5-6 ).

1988Determination of the issue as to whether a particular individual is in custody prior to receiving the preinterrogation warnings turns on "not what the [accused] thought, but rather what a reasonable [person], innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the [accused’s] position” (People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 , mot to amend remittitur denied 26 NY2d 883 , cert denied 400 US 851 ; see, Matter of Kwok T., 43 NY2d 213, 220 ).

1988Determination of the issue as to whether a particular individual is in custody prior to receiving the preinterrogation warnings turns on "not what the [accused] thought, but rather what a reasonable [person], innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the [accused’s] position” (People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 , mot to amend remittitur denied 26 NY2d 883 , cert denied 400 US 851 ; see, Matter of Kwok T., 43 NY2d 213, 220 ).

1988Determination of the issue as to whether a particular individual is in custody prior to receiving the preinterrogation warnings turns on "not what the [accused] thought, but rather what a reasonable [person], innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the [accused’s] position” (People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 , mot to amend remittitur denied 26 NY2d 883 , cert denied 400 US 851 ; see, Matter of Kwok T., 43 NY2d 213, 220 ).

1984Defendant’s contention that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel in view of his representation in an unrelated criminal proceeding must be rejected inasmuch as there is no evidence in the record that the interrogating police officers had any knowledge of the unrelated proceeding or of defendant’s representation by counsel therein (People v Kinchen, 60 NY2d 772 ).

1981The court below held, on the papers submitted, that this case fell within the rule of Payton v New York ( 445 US 573 ).

1980(See People v Newson, 68 AD2d 377 .) However, as defendant concedes, this claim was not raised at the suppression hearing, when the People would have had an opportunity to meet it.

1980Such a rule, we have stated, "breathes life into the requirement that a waiver of a constitutional right must be competent, intelligent and voluntary” (People v Hobson, supra, at p 484 ).

1976It is true that the assertion of a defendant’s right to remain silent, or to be free from questioning until his lawyer is present, does not bar any subsequent questioning after he has once again been advised of his rights (Michigan v Mosley, 423 US 96 , supra; People v Gary, 31 NY2d 68 , supra).

1976It is true that the assertion of a defendant’s right to remain silent, or to be free from questioning until his lawyer is present, does not bar any subsequent questioning after he has once again been advised of his rights (Michigan v Mosley, 423 US 96 , supra; People v Gary, 31 NY2d 68 , supra).