prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge in New York

1998Moreover, the defense counsel’s argument that the number of African-Americans in Dutchess County is so small so as to make statistical evidence inherently unreliable, did not lessen his burden (see, People v Childress, supra, at 267 ).

1997Although the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to strike one black female prospective juror, that fact alone is not sufficient to establish a “ ‘pattern of purposeful exclusion sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination’ ” (People v Childress, 81 NY2d 263, 267 ; see, People v Secrest, 236 AD2d 839 , lv denied 90 NY2d 863 ).

1997We conclude, however, that reversal is necessary because the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner (see, Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 ), and in our view the proffered explanation for excluding an Hispanic pro spective juror was pretextual (see, People v Hernandez, 75 NY2d 350, 356 , affd 500 US 352 ).

1990Although defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination by demonstrating that the prosecutor removed four of six prospective black jurors (see, People v Burnett, 152 AD2d 910 ), the prosecution proffered specific, race-neutral reasons for excusing the one challenged juror (see, Batson v Kentucky, supra, at 96-97; People v Hernandez, 75 NY2d 350 ; People v Jones, 156 AD2d 954 ).

2026Black v New York</i>, 563 US 947 [2011]).</p> <p>During jury selection, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to prospective juror No. 95 and then prospective juror No. 53 — the only two individuals in the venire who appeared to be Black, like defendant.

2025We conclude, however, that defendant's contention is moot inasmuch as "no alternates participated in the deliberation" ( People v Pinero , [*2] 143 AD3d 428, 429 [1st Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 1000 [2017]; see also People v Haardt , 129 AD3d 1322, 1322-1323 [3d Dept 2015]; People v Rivera , 7 AD3d 358, 359 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 741 [2004]).

2025Both the People and defendant were given two peremptory challenges per alternate juror and, after the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge with respect to another prospective alternate juror, the court remarked that "the People have used their peremptories for the first alternate." CPL 270.15 (2) provides that the People "must exercise their peremptory challenges first and may not, after the defendant has exercised [their] peremptory challenges, make such a challenge to any remaining prospective juror who is then in the jury box." Defendant, relying on, inter alia, People v Alston ( 88

2025Both the People and defendant were given two peremptory challenges per alternate juror and, after the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge with respect to another prospective alternate juror, the court remarked that "the People have used their peremptories for the first alternate." CPL 270.15 (2) provides that the People "must exercise their peremptory challenges first and may not, after the defendant has exercised [their] peremptory challenges, make such a challenge to any remaining prospective juror who is then in the jury box." Defendant, relying on, inter alia, People v Alston ( 88

2025We conclude, however, that defendant's contention is moot inasmuch as "no alternates participated in the deliberation" ( People v Pinero , [*2] 143 AD3d 428, 429 [1st Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 1000 [2017]; see also People v Haardt , 129 AD3d 1322, 1322-1323 [3d Dept 2015]; People v Rivera , 7 AD3d 358, 359 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 741 [2004]).

2009Even though a prima facie showing of discrimination “may be made based on the peremptory challenge of a single juror that gives rise to an inference of discrimination” (People v Smocum, 99 NY2d 418, 422 [2003]), if a numerical argument, in and of itself, fails to raise an inference of discrimination the party raising a Batson claim must present “other facts or circumstances suggesting intentional discrimination” (People v Harris, 55 AD3d 503, 504 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 925 [2009]) in order to meet the first requirement of the three-prong Batson analysis.

2009People v Rosado, 45 AD3d 508 [2007] [where the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against all four Hispanic panelists remaining in the venire]), numbers alone may not automatically establish such a showing.

1998The defense counsel’s bare assertion during the first round of jury selection that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against the only minority venireperson, without more, failed to establish a pattern of purposeful exclusion sufficient to raise an inference of racial discrimination (see, People v Bolling, 79 NY2d 317 ).

1995We further find that reversal is not warranted because of the prosecutor’s comments during summation (see, People v D’Alessandro, 184 AD2d 114 ).

1995The defendant’s contention that he was deprived of a fair trial on the ground that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner is unpreserved for appellate review (see, People v Cruz, 200 AD2d 581 ).

1994We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, "defendants] presence at the side-bar questioning would have been of no benefit” and defendant’s "absence during such questioning would not have had a substantial effect on [defendant’s] ability to defend” (People v Sloan, 79 NY2d 386, 393 ; see, People v Velasco, 77 NY2d 469, 473 ; People v Hines, 205 AD2d 468 , lv denied 84 NY2d 868 ; People v Castro-Garcia, 203 AD2d 899 , lv denied 83 NY2d 965 ; People v Arnold, 201 AD2d 965, 965-966 , lv denied 83 NY2d 849 ).

1994We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, "defendants] presence at the side-bar questioning would have been of no benefit” and defendant’s "absence during such questioning would not have had a substantial effect on [defendant’s] ability to defend” (People v Sloan, 79 NY2d 386, 393 ; see, People v Velasco, 77 NY2d 469, 473 ; People v Hines, 205 AD2d 468 , lv denied 84 NY2d 868 ; People v Castro-Garcia, 203 AD2d 899 , lv denied 83 NY2d 965 ; People v Arnold, 201 AD2d 965, 965-966 , lv denied 83 NY2d 849 ).

1994We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, "defendants] presence at the side-bar questioning would have been of no benefit” and defendant’s "absence during such questioning would not have had a substantial effect on [defendant’s] ability to defend” (People v Sloan, 79 NY2d 386, 393 ; see, People v Velasco, 77 NY2d 469, 473 ; People v Hines, 205 AD2d 468 , lv denied 84 NY2d 868 ; People v Castro-Garcia, 203 AD2d 899 , lv denied 83 NY2d 965 ; People v Arnold, 201 AD2d 965, 965-966 , lv denied 83 NY2d 849 ).

1994We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, "defendants] presence at the side-bar questioning would have been of no benefit” and defendant’s "absence during such questioning would not have had a substantial effect on [defendant’s] ability to defend” (People v Sloan, 79 NY2d 386, 393 ; see, People v Velasco, 77 NY2d 469, 473 ; People v Hines, 205 AD2d 468 , lv denied 84 NY2d 868 ; People v Castro-Garcia, 203 AD2d 899 , lv denied 83 NY2d 965 ; People v Arnold, 201 AD2d 965, 965-966 , lv denied 83 NY2d 849 ).

1990Although defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination by demonstrating that the prosecutor removed four of six prospective black jurors (see, People v Burnett, 152 AD2d 910 ), the prosecution proffered specific, race-neutral reasons for excusing the one challenged juror (see, Batson v Kentucky, supra, at 96-97; People v Hernandez, 75 NY2d 350 ; People v Jones, 156 AD2d 954 ).

1990Although defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination by demonstrating that the prosecutor removed four of six prospective black jurors (see, People v Burnett, 152 AD2d 910 ), the prosecution proffered specific, race-neutral reasons for excusing the one challenged juror (see, Batson v Kentucky, supra, at 96-97; People v Hernandez, 75 NY2d 350 ; People v Jones, 156 AD2d 954 ).