harmful error in Ohio

2005The trial court committed harmful error in refusing to strike the testimony of dr. robert belding as the witness was clearly unqualified to testify as an expert in pathology as it relates to the autopsy of the victim herein." I, II {¶ 12} Appellant's first and second assignments of error raise common and interrelated issues; therefore, we will address the assignments together. {¶ 13} Appellant argues the jury's verdict is against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. {¶ 14} In State v. Jenks (1981), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , 574 N.E.2d 492 , the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the standa

2005The trial court committed harmful error in refusing to strike the testimony of dr. robert belding as the witness was clearly unqualified to testify as an expert in pathology as it relates to the autopsy of the victim herein." I, II {¶ 12} Appellant's first and second assignments of error raise common and interrelated issues; therefore, we will address the assignments together. {¶ 13} Appellant argues the jury's verdict is against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. {¶ 14} In State v. Jenks (1981), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , 574 N.E.2d 492 , the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the standa

2008Id. at 691 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 . {¶ 14} Appellant's argument of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on nothing but speculation arising from some random ideas that trial counsel put in a memo in 1998.

2008Id. at 691 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 . {¶ 14} Appellant's argument of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on nothing but speculation arising from some random ideas that trial counsel put in a memo in 1998.

2005We disagree. {¶ 18} Appellant argues that the videotape in the instant case was destroyed and that the destruction of evidence required the dismissal of the charges against him because he was denied his due-process rights. {¶ 19} In Arizona v. Youngblood (1988), 488 U.S. 51 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 , the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a criminal defendant is denied due process of law by a state’s failure to preserve evidence.

2005We disagree. {¶ 18} Appellant argues that the videotape in the instant case was destroyed and that the destruction of evidence required the dismissal of the charges against him because he was denied his due-process rights. {¶ 19} In Arizona v. Youngblood (1988), 488 U.S. 51 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 , the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a criminal defendant is denied due process of law by a state’s failure to preserve evidence.

2005In the case of Ornelas v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 , the United States Supreme Court held that in reviewing a motion to suppress, the ultimate questions of whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop and whether an officer had probable cause to make a warrantless search are reviewed by an appellate court de novo.

2005In the case of Ornelas v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 , the United States Supreme Court held that in reviewing a motion to suppress, the ultimate questions of whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop and whether an officer had probable cause to make a warrantless search are reviewed by an appellate court de novo.

2005The trial court committed harmful error when it refused to deliver proper jury instructions regarding eyewitness testimony, as requested by appellant." {¶ 26} In his second assignment of error, Howard claims that the trial court erred when it refused to issue a proper Telfaire jury instruction concerning eyewitness identifications. {¶ 27} In United States v. Telfaire (C.A.D.C. 1972), 469 F.2d 552 , the court of appeals set forth a model special instruction on identification, which it attached as an appendix to its opinion.

2005In addition, he claims that he was prejudiced by the trial court's decisions to permit the prosecution to test the shotgun that was found at the scene and to reopen its case and by his counsel's failure to call two defense witness. {¶ 119} "The question of opening up a case for the presentation of further testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court's action in that regard will not be disturbed on appeal unless under the circumstances it amounted to an abuse of discretion." Columbus v. Grant (1981), 1 Ohio App.3d 96 , 97 , 439 N.E.2d 907 ; see State v. Gaskins, Se

2005In addition, he claims that he was prejudiced by the trial court's decisions to permit the prosecution to test the shotgun that was found at the scene and to reopen its case and by his counsel's failure to call two defense witness. {¶ 119} "The question of opening up a case for the presentation of further testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court's action in that regard will not be disturbed on appeal unless under the circumstances it amounted to an abuse of discretion." Columbus v. Grant (1981), 1 Ohio App.3d 96 , 97 , 439 N.E.2d 907 ; see State v. Gaskins, Se

2005State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173 .

2005Appellant urges that the trial court did not order that the sentences be served consecutively at the time of the original sentencing hearing. {¶ 5} In State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134 , 2004-Ohio-4746 , 814 N.E.2d 837 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B) and 2929.15(B), a trial court sentencing an offender to community-control sanctions must, at the time of the • sentencing, notify the offender of the specific prison term it may impose for violations of the conditions of the sanction as a prerequisite to imposing a prison term on the offender for a subsequent viola

2005Appellant urges that the trial court did not order that the sentences be served consecutively at the time of the original sentencing hearing. {¶ 5} In State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134 , 2004-Ohio-4746 , 814 N.E.2d 837 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B) and 2929.15(B), a trial court sentencing an offender to community-control sanctions must, at the time of the • sentencing, notify the offender of the specific prison term it may impose for violations of the conditions of the sanction as a prerequisite to imposing a prison term on the offender for a subsequent viola

2005Appellant urges that the trial court did not order that the sentences be served consecutively at the time of the original sentencing hearing. {¶ 5} In State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134 , 2004-Ohio-4746 , 814 N.E.2d 837 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B) and 2929.15(B), a trial court sentencing an offender to community-control sanctions must, at the time of the • sentencing, notify the offender of the specific prison term it may impose for violations of the conditions of the sanction as a prerequisite to imposing a prison term on the offender for a subsequent viola

2005Appellant urges that the trial court did not order that the sentences be served consecutively at the time of the original sentencing hearing. {¶ 5} In State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134 , 2004-Ohio-4746 , 814 N.E.2d 837 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B) and 2929.15(B), a trial court sentencing an offender to community-control sanctions must, at the time of the • sentencing, notify the offender of the specific prison term it may impose for violations of the conditions of the sanction as a prerequisite to imposing a prison term on the offender for a subsequent viola

2004Specifically, appellant claims he was unreasonably seized during the initial stop, and the officer lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity pursuant to Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1 .

2004We disagree. {¶ 10} Appellant bases his argument primarily upon Estelle v. Williams, (1976), 425 U.S. 501 , 96 S.Ct. 1691 , 48 L.Ed.2d 126 .

2004We disagree. {¶ 10} Appellant bases his argument primarily upon Estelle v. Williams, (1976), 425 U.S. 501 , 96 S.Ct. 1691 , 48 L.Ed.2d 126 .

2002We agree. {¶ 22} "The constitutionally protected right to the assistance of counsel is absolute." State v. Tymcio (1975) 42 Ohio St.2d 39 , 43 , citing Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) 407 U.S. 25 , 37 .

2002We agree. {¶ 22} "The constitutionally protected right to the assistance of counsel is absolute." State v. Tymcio (1975) 42 Ohio St.2d 39 , 43 , citing Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) 407 U.S. 25 , 37 .

1999In State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404 , the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that R.C.