harmful error in Georgia

1989“Harmful error results when an inapplicable instruction might reasonably draw the jury away from the true issues in dispute or if the erroneous instruction is inapplicable to a vital issue in the case.” General GMC Trucks v. Crockett, 145 Ga. App. 503 (3) ( 244 SE2d 78 ).

1989“Harmful error results when an inapplicable instruction might reasonably draw the jury away from the true issues in dispute or if the erroneous instruction is inapplicable to a vital issue in the case.” General GMC Trucks v. Crockett, 145 Ga. App. 503 (3) ( 244 SE2d 78 ).

2018Although Phoenix argues that the continuance was necessary to allow an expert the time to formulate an effective defense, he has "made no showing as to who the expert would be, what his or her testimony would be expected to show, or how that testimony would benefit him." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Foster v. State , 299 Ga. 691 , 693 (2), 791 S.E.2d 826 (2016) ; see also Wynn v. State , 322 Ga. App. 66 , 69 (3), 744 S.E.2d 64 (2013) ("To show harm, [a party is] required to specifically identify what other evidence or witnesses he would have put forth in his defense if his counsel had b

2018Although Phoenix argues that the continuance was necessary to allow an expert the time to formulate an effective defense, he has "made no showing as to who the expert would be, what his or her testimony would be expected to show, or how that testimony would benefit him." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Foster v. State , 299 Ga. 691 , 693 (2), 791 S.E.2d 826 (2016) ; see also Wynn v. State , 322 Ga. App. 66 , 69 (3), 744 S.E.2d 64 (2013) ("To show harm, [a party is] required to specifically identify what other evidence or witnesses he would have put forth in his defense if his counsel had b

2013See generally Rojas v. State, 280 Ga. 139, 140-141 (4) ( 625 SE2d 750 ) (2006); Sherrod v. State, 157 Ga. App. 351, 352 (3) ( 277 SE2d 335 ) (1981) (“Harmful error results when an inapplicable instruction might reasonably draw the jury away from the true issues in dispute or if the erroneous instruction is inapplicable to a vital issue in the case.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2013See generally Rojas v. State, 280 Ga. 139, 140-141 (4) ( 625 SE2d 750 ) (2006); Sherrod v. State, 157 Ga. App. 351, 352 (3) ( 277 SE2d 335 ) (1981) (“Harmful error results when an inapplicable instruction might reasonably draw the jury away from the true issues in dispute or if the erroneous instruction is inapplicable to a vital issue in the case.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2013See generally Rojas v. State, 280 Ga. 139, 140-141 (4) ( 625 SE2d 750 ) (2006); Sherrod v. State, 157 Ga. App. 351, 352 (3) ( 277 SE2d 335 ) (1981) (“Harmful error results when an inapplicable instruction might reasonably draw the jury away from the true issues in dispute or if the erroneous instruction is inapplicable to a vital issue in the case.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2013See generally Rojas v. State, 280 Ga. 139, 140-141 (4) ( 625 SE2d 750 ) (2006); Sherrod v. State, 157 Ga. App. 351, 352 (3) ( 277 SE2d 335 ) (1981) (“Harmful error results when an inapplicable instruction might reasonably draw the jury away from the true issues in dispute or if the erroneous instruction is inapplicable to a vital issue in the case.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2003In Julian v. State, 134 Ga. App. 592, 597-598 (2) ( 215 SE2d 496 ) (1975), this court found harmful error in the trial court’s decision to allow testimony from only five of the defendant’s sixty character witnesses.

2003In Julian v. State, 134 Ga. App. 592, 597-598 (2) ( 215 SE2d 496 ) (1975), this court found harmful error in the trial court’s decision to allow testimony from only five of the defendant’s sixty character witnesses.

1998Harmful error results when an inapplicable instruction might reasonably draw the jury away from the true issues in dispute or if the erroneous instruction is inapplicable to a vital issue in the case." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hopkins v. First Union Bank, etc., 193 Ga.App. 109, 112 , 387 S.E.2d 144 (1989).

1998Harmful error results when an inapplicable instruction might reasonably draw the jury away from the true issues in dispute or if the erroneous instruction is inapplicable to a vital issue in the case." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hopkins v. First Union Bank, etc., 193 Ga.App. 109, 112 , 387 S.E.2d 144 (1989).

2018Although Phoenix argues that the continuance was necessary to allow an expert the time to formulate an effective defense, he has "made no showing as to who the expert would be, what his or her testimony would be expected to show, or how that testimony would benefit him." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Foster v. State , 299 Ga. 691 , 693 (2), 791 S.E.2d 826 (2016) ; see also Wynn v. State , 322 Ga. App. 66 , 69 (3), 744 S.E.2d 64 (2013) ("To show harm, [a party is] required to specifically identify what other evidence or witnesses he would have put forth in his defense if his counsel had b

2018Although Phoenix argues that the continuance was necessary to allow an expert the time to formulate an effective defense, he has "made no showing as to who the expert would be, what his or her testimony would be expected to show, or how that testimony would benefit him." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Foster v. State , 299 Ga. 691 , 693 (2), 791 S.E.2d 826 (2016) ; see also Wynn v. State , 322 Ga. App. 66 , 69 (3), 744 S.E.2d 64 (2013) ("To show harm, [a party is] required to specifically identify what other evidence or witnesses he would have put forth in his defense if his counsel had b

2006However, the reason the jury requested that the tape be re-played is not in the record, nor does the re-playing of the tape alter the status of the evidence as a whole. [1] Yancey v. State, 275 Ga. 550, 558 , 570 S.E.2d 269 (2002) (emphasis added); see also Brawner v. State, 278 Ga. 316, 319 , 602 S.E.2d 612 (2004) ("[w]hether a constitutional violation constitutes harmless error depends on whether the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict."). [2] 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). [3] Orr v. State, 281 Ga. 112 , 636 S.E.2

2006However, the reason the jury requested that the tape be re-played is not in the record, nor does the re-playing of the tape alter the status of the evidence as a whole. [1] Yancey v. State, 275 Ga. 550, 558 , 570 S.E.2d 269 (2002) (emphasis added); see also Brawner v. State, 278 Ga. 316, 319 , 602 S.E.2d 612 (2004) ("[w]hether a constitutional violation constitutes harmless error depends on whether the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict."). [2] 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). [3] Orr v. State, 281 Ga. 112 , 636 S.E.2

2025We disagree. 2 As our Supreme Court has held, “a trial court does not err in denying a motion to bifurcate a felony-murder count from the rest of a defendant’s trial, where the felony-murder count is predicated on a felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge and the defendant is charged with both felony murder and malice murder of the same victim.” Charles v. State, 315 Ga. 651, 659 (4) ( 884 SE2d 363 ) (2023).

2025We disagree. 2 As our Supreme Court has held, “a trial court does not err in denying a motion to bifurcate a felony-murder count from the rest of a defendant’s trial, where the felony-murder count is predicated on a felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge and the defendant is charged with both felony murder and malice murder of the same victim.” Charles v. State, 315 Ga. 651, 659 (4) ( 884 SE2d 363 ) (2023).

2020“In reviewing a challenge to the trial court’s jury instruction, we view the charge as a whole to determine whether the jury was fully and fairly instructed on the law of the case.” Walker v. State, 308 Ga. 33, 36 (2) ( 838 SE2d 792 ) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2020“In reviewing a challenge to the trial court’s jury instruction, we view the charge as a whole to determine whether the jury was fully and fairly instructed on the law of the case.” Walker v. State, 308 Ga. 33, 36 (2) ( 838 SE2d 792 ) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2016Jones v. State, 303 Ga. App. 366, 367 (1) ( 693 SE2d 549 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote omitted).

2016Jones v. State, 303 Ga. App. 366, 367 (1) ( 693 SE2d 549 ) (2010) (punctuation and footnote omitted).

2016See Martin, 218 Ga. App. at 804 (2) (affirming trial court’s exclusion of parol evidence as “inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms of the written documents” requiring written consent to harvest timber); Lee v. White, 249 Ga. 99, 101 (1) (b) ( 286 SE2d 723 ) (1982) (affirming grant of motion in limine to exclude parol evidence when such evidence was not admissible to modify the terms of an unambiguous written contract and when party offering parol evidence had unclean hands).

2016See Martin, 218 Ga. App. at 804 (2) (affirming trial court’s exclusion of parol evidence as “inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms of the written documents” requiring written consent to harvest timber); Lee v. White, 249 Ga. 99, 101 (1) (b) ( 286 SE2d 723 ) (1982) (affirming grant of motion in limine to exclude parol evidence when such evidence was not admissible to modify the terms of an unambiguous written contract and when party offering parol evidence had unclean hands).

2016See Martin, 218 Ga. App. at 804 (2) (affirming trial court’s exclusion of parol evidence as “inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms of the written documents” requiring written consent to harvest timber); Lee v. White, 249 Ga. 99, 101 (1) (b) ( 286 SE2d 723 ) (1982) (affirming grant of motion in limine to exclude parol evidence when such evidence was not admissible to modify the terms of an unambiguous written contract and when party offering parol evidence had unclean hands).

2014The record discloses that early in the trial, Lindsey acknowledged that the State wanted to admit the evidence as prior consistent statements by Hankerson, yet acquiesced to the jury hearing the content of the taped statement, and merely requested that it do so by a reading of a transcript of the statement rather than by playing the tape. 9 Later during trial, Lindsey voiced no objection whatsoever when the trial court stated that the tape would be played for the *350 jury. 10 And, at the time the State tendered the tape and asked that it be played for the jury, Lindsey’s only objection was to

2014The record discloses that early in the trial, Lindsey acknowledged that the State wanted to admit the evidence as prior consistent statements by Hankerson, yet acquiesced to the jury hearing the content of the taped statement, and merely requested that it do so by a reading of a transcript of the statement rather than by playing the tape. 9 Later during trial, Lindsey voiced no objection whatsoever when the trial court stated that the tape would be played for the *350 jury. 10 And, at the time the State tendered the tape and asked that it be played for the jury, Lindsey’s only objection was to

2014The record discloses that early in the trial, Lindsey acknowledged that the State wanted to admit the evidence as prior consistent statements by Hankerson, yet acquiesced to the jury hearing the content of the taped statement, and merely requested that it do so by a reading of a transcript of the statement rather than by playing the tape. 9 Later during trial, Lindsey voiced no objection whatsoever when the trial court stated that the tape would be played for the *350 jury. 10 And, at the time the State tendered the tape and asked that it be played for the jury, Lindsey’s only objection was to

2014The record discloses that early in the trial, Lindsey acknowledged that the State wanted to admit the evidence as prior consistent statements by Hankerson, yet acquiesced to the jury hearing the content of the taped statement, and merely requested that it do so by a reading of a transcript of the statement rather than by playing the tape. 9 Later during trial, Lindsey voiced no objection whatsoever when the trial court stated that the tape would be played for the *350 jury. 10 And, at the time the State tendered the tape and asked that it be played for the jury, Lindsey’s only objection was to

2013J., and Branch, J., concur. 9 Neal v. State, 290 Ga. 563, 566 (3) ( 722 SE2d 765 ) (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted). 10 See generally Rojas v. State, 280 Ga. 139, 140-141 (4) ( 625 SE2d 750 ) (2006); Sherrod v. State, 157 Ga. App. 351, 352 (3) ( 277 SE2d 335 ) (1981) (“Harmful error results when an inapplicable instruction might reasonably draw the jury away from the true issues in dispute or if the erroneous instruction is inapplicable to a vital issue in the case.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 9

2013J., and Branch, J., concur. 9 Neal v. State, 290 Ga. 563, 566 (3) ( 722 SE2d 765 ) (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted). 10 See generally Rojas v. State, 280 Ga. 139, 140-141 (4) ( 625 SE2d 750 ) (2006); Sherrod v. State, 157 Ga. App. 351, 352 (3) ( 277 SE2d 335 ) (1981) (“Harmful error results when an inapplicable instruction might reasonably draw the jury away from the true issues in dispute or if the erroneous instruction is inapplicable to a vital issue in the case.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 9

2011In denying Abie’s motion for new trial, the trial court ruled that the instruction as given was correct and was supported by the evidence. (a) Having reviewed the evidence presented, we agree with the trial court’s finding that there was some evidence to support a jury instruction on “deliberate ignorance.” See Polite v. State, 273 Ga. App. 235, 242 (8) ( 614 SE2d 849 ) (2005) (“To authorize a jury *260 instruction on a subject, there need only be produced at trial slight evidence supporting the theory of the charge.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). (b) The “deliberate ignorance” instruct

2011In denying Abie’s motion for new trial, the trial court ruled that the instruction as given was correct and was supported by the evidence. (a) Having reviewed the evidence presented, we agree with the trial court’s finding that there was some evidence to support a jury instruction on “deliberate ignorance.” See Polite v. State, 273 Ga. App. 235, 242 (8) ( 614 SE2d 849 ) (2005) (“To authorize a jury *260 instruction on a subject, there need only be produced at trial slight evidence supporting the theory of the charge.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). (b) The “deliberate ignorance” instruct

2009“When a jury requests a recharge on a particular point, the trial court has the discretion to recharge in full or only as to the points requested.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McNeil v. State, 284 Ga. 586, 589 (4) ( 669 SE2d 111 ) (2008). [0]ur review is limited to determining whether that discretion was abused, taking into account the sensitive nature of the judge’s responsibility at this stage of the trial and the duty of the trial judge to provide impartial and effective guidance on the law for the jury to follow in its deliberations.

2009“When a jury requests a recharge on a particular point, the trial court has the discretion to recharge in full or only as to the points requested.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McNeil v. State, 284 Ga. 586, 589 (4) ( 669 SE2d 111 ) (2008). [0]ur review is limited to determining whether that discretion was abused, taking into account the sensitive nature of the judge’s responsibility at this stage of the trial and the duty of the trial judge to provide impartial and effective guidance on the law for the jury to follow in its deliberations.