implied assumption of the risk doctrine in Ohio

11 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

Case	Followed	Cited
Gallagher v. Cleveland Browns Football Co.green ohio · 1996 · cited in 3 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2009–2015 2 sentences 2015Id. {¶23} Rawlins’s motion for partial summary judgment sought dismissal of the Cleveland Indians’ affirmative defense of primary assumption of the risk. 2009In that case, the doctrine of implied assumption of the risk, not primary assumption of the risk, would be applicable." Id. {¶ 17} Consequently, we must determine whether being struck by a baseball while standing at the end of an open walkway leading to the rear of the stadium during a baseball game is a risk directly associated with that sport. {¶ 18} First, it is important to note that Appellees provide several safety precautions for spectators.	1	3

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

Case	Cited	Years
Anderson v. Ceccardi green ohio · 1983 2 sentences 1991Anderson v. Ceccardi (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 110 , 6 OBR 170, 451 N.E.2d 780 . 1991Anderson v. Ceccardi (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 110 , 6 OBR 170, 451 N.E.2d 780 .	2	1984–1991
Lykins v. Fun Spot Trampolines green ohioctapp · 2007 2 sentences 2009Although she concedes that trampoline use is a recreational activity, she argues that “the risk of being bounced up on a trampoline and landing on a hard, inflexible surface is not one that is inherent and foreseeable to the activity.” Consequently, she asserts that the trial court erred in applying the “reckless or intentional” standard instead of the general negligence standard. {¶ 23} Appellant relies almost exclusively on the Twelfth District Court of Appeals’ holding in Lykins v. Fun Spot Trampolines, 172 Ohio App.3d 226 , 2007-Ohio-1800 , 874 N.E.2d 811 , to establish that her injury is 2009Although she concedes that trampoline use is a recreational activity, she argues that “the risk of being bounced up on a trampoline and landing on a hard, inflexible surface is not one that is inherent and foreseeable to the activity.” Consequently, she asserts that the trial court erred in applying the “reckless or intentional” standard instead of the general negligence standard. {¶ 23} Appellant relies almost exclusively on the Twelfth District Court of Appeals’ holding in Lykins v. Fun Spot Trampolines, 172 Ohio App.3d 226 , 2007-Ohio-1800 , 874 N.E.2d 811 , to establish that her injury is	1	2009–2009
Knopp v. Dayton Machine Tool Co., Unpublished Decision (12-8-2004) green ohioctapp · 2004 1 sentence 2007"In essence, the doctrine of implied assumption of the risk does not mean that the defendant did not proximately cause the injury; rather it means the plaintiffs own negligence was so great it supercedes any negligence on the part of the defendant[.]" Knopp v. Dayton Machine Tool Co. , Columbiana App. No. 03 CO 60 , 2004-Ohio-6817 , ]}24.	1	2007–2007
Hadar v. Avco Corp. green pasuperct · 2005 2 sentences 2005Hadar v. Avco Corp., 886 A.2d 225 , 2005 PA Super 326, at ¶ 1 . {¶ 27} Pennsylvania, like Ohio, requires that a party have full knowledge and appreciation of a risk before such risk may be assumed in a legal sense. 2005Hadar v. Avco Corp., 886 A.2d 225 , 2005 PA Super 326, at ¶ 1 . {¶ 27} Pennsylvania, like Ohio, requires that a party have full knowledge and appreciation of a risk before such risk may be assumed in a legal sense.	1	2005–2005
Mulloy v. Longaberger, Inc. green ohioctapp · 1989 1 sentence 2000Mulloy v. Longaberger, Inc. (1989), 47 Ohio App.3d 77 .	1	2000–2000
Collier v. Northland Swim Club green ohioctapp · 1987 2 sentences 1990The court in Collier v. Northland Swim Club, 35 Ohio App. 3d 35 , 518 N.E.2d 1226 , (apparently no attempt was made to appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court) addressed a similar situation and concluded that the defense of assumption of the risk as applied to diving accidents is implied rather than primary. 1990The court in Collier v. Northland Swim Club, 35 Ohio App. 3d 35 , 518 N.E.2d 1226 , (apparently no attempt was made to appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court) addressed a similar situation and concluded that the defense of assumption of the risk as applied to diving accidents is implied rather than primary.	1	1990–1990
Capps v. McCarley & Co. neutral ark · 1976 2 sentences 1983McPherson v. Sunset Speedway, Inc. (C.A. 8, 1979), 594 F. 2d 711 (applying Nebraska law); Capps v. McCarley & Co. (1976), 260 Ark. 839 , 544 S.W. 2d 850 ; Blum v. Brichacek (1974), 191 Neb. 457 , 215 N.W. 2d 888 ; Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc. (1977), 119 R.I. 70 , 376 A. 2d 329 ; Myers v. Lennox Co-op Assn. 1983McPherson v. Sunset Speedway, Inc. (C.A. 8, 1979), 594 F. 2d 711 (applying Nebraska law); Capps v. McCarley & Co. (1976), 260 Ark. 839 , 544 S.W. 2d 850 ; Blum v. Brichacek (1974), 191 Neb. 457 , 215 N.W. 2d 888 ; Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc. (1977), 119 R.I. 70 , 376 A. 2d 329 ; Myers v. Lennox Co-op Assn.	1	1983–1983
Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc. green ri · 1977 2 sentences 1983McPherson v. Sunset Speedway, Inc. (C.A. 8, 1979), 594 F. 2d 711 (applying Nebraska law); Capps v. McCarley & Co. (1976), 260 Ark. 839 , 544 S.W. 2d 850 ; Blum v. Brichacek (1974), 191 Neb. 457 , 215 N.W. 2d 888 ; Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc. (1977), 119 R.I. 70 , 376 A. 2d 329 ; Myers v. Lennox Co-op Assn. 1983McPherson v. Sunset Speedway, Inc. (C.A. 8, 1979), 594 F. 2d 711 (applying Nebraska law); Capps v. McCarley & Co. (1976), 260 Ark. 839 , 544 S.W. 2d 850 ; Blum v. Brichacek (1974), 191 Neb. 457 , 215 N.W. 2d 888 ; Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc. (1977), 119 R.I. 70 , 376 A. 2d 329 ; Myers v. Lennox Co-op Assn.	1	1983–1983
Blum v. Brichacek green neb · 1974 2 sentences 1983McPherson v. Sunset Speedway, Inc. (C.A. 8, 1979), 594 F. 2d 711 (applying Nebraska law); Capps v. McCarley & Co. (1976), 260 Ark. 839 , 544 S.W. 2d 850 ; Blum v. Brichacek (1974), 191 Neb. 457 , 215 N.W. 2d 888 ; Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc. (1977), 119 R.I. 70 , 376 A. 2d 329 ; Myers v. Lennox Co-op Assn. 1983McPherson v. Sunset Speedway, Inc. (C.A. 8, 1979), 594 F. 2d 711 (applying Nebraska law); Capps v. McCarley & Co. (1976), 260 Ark. 839 , 544 S.W. 2d 850 ; Blum v. Brichacek (1974), 191 Neb. 457 , 215 N.W. 2d 888 ; Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc. (1977), 119 R.I. 70 , 376 A. 2d 329 ; Myers v. Lennox Co-op Assn.	1	1983–1983
Leona McPherson and Robert McPherson v. Sunset Speedway, Inc., a Corporation neutral ca8 · 1979 1 sentence 1983McPherson v. Sunset Speedway, Inc. (C.A. 8, 1979), 594 F. 2d 711 (applying Nebraska law); Capps v. McCarley & Co. (1976), 260 Ark. 839 , 544 S.W. 2d 850 ; Blum v. Brichacek (1974), 191 Neb. 457 , 215 N.W. 2d 888 ; Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc. (1977), 119 R.I. 70 , 376 A. 2d 329 ; Myers v. Lennox Co-op Assn.	1	1983–1983

Where else courts name it

OH 11 (1983–2015) OR 8 (1977–2022) CA 6 (1983–1994) TN 3 (1999–2007) NH 3 (2002–2010) WA 3 (1992–2006) AZ 2 (2006–2006)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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