implied assumption of the risk doctrine in Oregon

1981Ritter v. Beals, 225 Or. 504 [ 358 P.2d 1080 ] (1961) subsumed under contributory negligence the form of assumption of the risk in which plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably encounters a known risk; this type of assumption of the risk is unaffected by section 5 and should be pleaded as contributory negligence.

1981Ritter v. Beals, 225 Or 504 (1961) subsumed under contributory negligence the form of assumption of the risk in which plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably encounters a known risk; this type of assumption of the risk is unaffected by section 5 and should be pleaded as contributory negligence.

2022No. 1J, 303 Or 1, 4 , 734 P2d 1326 (1987), the question of a defendant’s “duty” to a plaintiff is properly subsumed in the question whether the defendant’s conduct unreasonably created a foreseeable risk of harm to a protected interest of the plaintiff, and that question is committed to the jury except in “extreme case[s].” Donaca v. Curry County, 303 Or 30, 38 , 734 P2d 1339 (1987); see also id. (“[B]roadly phrased arguments over ‘duty’ in common-law negligence tend to turn into a disputed rule of law what properly is a determination of the ordinary issues of negligence liability: whether def

2022No. 1J, 303 Or 1, 4 , 734 P2d 1326 (1987), the question of a defendant’s “duty” to a plaintiff is properly subsumed in the question whether the defendant’s conduct unreasonably created a foreseeable risk of harm to a protected interest of the plaintiff, and that question is committed to the jury except in “extreme case[s].” Donaca v. Curry County, 303 Or 30, 38 , 734 P2d 1339 (1987); see also id. (“[B]roadly phrased arguments over ‘duty’ in common-law negligence tend to turn into a disputed rule of law what properly is a determination of the ordinary issues of negligence liability: whether def

2016The failure of a claimant to make a direct claim against a third party defendant does not affect the requirement that the fault of the third party defendant be considered by the trier of fact under this subsection.” In 1975, the legislature enacted former ORS 18.475 (1975), renumbered as ORS 31.620(2) (2003), abolishing the doctrine of implied assumption of risk: “The doctrine of implied assumption of the risk is abolished.” In Maas v. Willer, 203 Or App 124 , 125 P3d 87 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 411 (2006), which relied on Jensen and which defendants cite here, the alleged negligence was based

2016The failure of a claimant to make a direct claim against a third party defendant does not affect the requirement that the fault of the third party defendant be considered by the trier of fact under this subsection.” In 1975, the legislature enacted former ORS 18.475 (1975), renumbered as ORS 31.620(2) (2003), abolishing the doctrine of implied assumption of risk: “The doctrine of implied assumption of the risk is abolished.” In Maas v. Willer, 203 Or App 124 , 125 P3d 87 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 411 (2006), which relied on Jensen and which defendants cite here, the alleged negligence was based

2015In the light of Vandeveere-Pratt , defendant’s proposed jury instruction was not “correct in all respects.” Hernandez, 327 Or at 106 .

1998Even when the court decides that a particular Restatement principle corresponds to Oregon law, the court does not “enact the exact phrasing of the Restatement rule, complete with comments, illustrations, and caveats.” Brewer v. Erwin, 287 Or 435 , 455 n 12, 600 P2d 398 (1979).

1998Even when the court decides that a particular Restatement principle corresponds to Oregon law, the court does not “enact the exact phrasing of the Restatement rule, complete with comments, illustrations, and caveats.” Brewer v. Erwin, 287 Or 435 , 455 n 12, 600 P2d 398 (1979).

1998This section is not intended to create or abolish any defense.” ORS 18.475(2) provides: “The doctrine of implied assumption of the risk is abolished.” 4 The court repeatedly has stated that “[t]he exact formulations of the Restatements are not necessarily authoritative statements of the law of this state[.]” Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 300 Or 452, 460 , 712 P2d 803 (1986); see also U.S. National Bank v. Fought, 291 Or 201, 227 , 630 P2d 337 (1981) (Linde, J., concurring) (“it is misleading to speak of pleading or proving a cause of action ‘under’ [a Restatement section], at least unti

1998This section is not intended to create or abolish any defense.” ORS 18.475(2) provides: “The doctrine of implied assumption of the risk is abolished.” 4 The court repeatedly has stated that “[t]he exact formulations of the Restatements are not necessarily authoritative statements of the law of this state[.]” Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 300 Or 452, 460 , 712 P2d 803 (1986); see also U.S. National Bank v. Fought, 291 Or 201, 227 , 630 P2d 337 (1981) (Linde, J., concurring) (“it is misleading to speak of pleading or proving a cause of action ‘under’ [a Restatement section], at least unti

1977Since the instruction on contributory negligence alone requires reversal if ORS 18.470 applies, this opinion does not pursue the other issues. 3 See Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477 (NY 1811). 4 See Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F Cas 756 (CC NH 1814) (No. 13,156); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 US (9 Crunch) 43, 3 L Ed 650 (1815). 5 Maryland Declaration of Rights § XV (1776).

1977Since the instruction on contributory negligence alone requires reversal if ORS 18.470 applies, this opinion does not pursue the other issues. 3 See Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477 (NY 1811). 4 See Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F Cas 756 (CC NH 1814) (No. 13,156); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 US (9 Crunch) 43, 3 L Ed 650 (1815). 5 Maryland Declaration of Rights § XV (1776).